Afghanistan and the British Government of India from the Afghan War of Independence to 1947 by Raja, Md. Waseem
AFGHANISTAN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 
OF INDIA FROM THE AFGHAN WAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE TO 1947 
ABSTRACT 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
f( m 
HISTORY 
By 
MD. WASEEM RAJA 
Under the Supervision of 
RAJKUMAR TRIVEDI 
Professor of History 
CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH • 202002 (INDIA) 
2000 
L-y^^. 
K A c e . N ^ ^^...,.. ] 
y-i .^  
ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the Anglo-Afghan diplomatic relations, 
encompassing the last two and half decades of the British colonialism in 
the Indian subcontinent. 
The period (1919-1945) chosen for study had been a complex one. 
With the dawn of 20"' century, the International political scenario equally 
became more and more complex. The World War I had witnessed the 
division of the world into two rival camps. Whereas the Russian Revolution 
of 1917 brought forth the Marxian socialist ideology to the fore. A new 
element injected in the world on the basis o^ ideology. Western World's 
hunger for colonies and domination of the world, and unprecedented 
economic development of Germany, had disturbed the hitherto existing 
balance. It had its impact on Central Asia particularly on Afghanistan. 
Even the great power equation underwent changes. The international 
situation became more complex, and new problems cropped up. A 
religious undercurrent emerged as an ideology, which was visible, and 
enveloped the muslim world. 
The entire Islamic world was in ferment. Partly it was fanned by the 
rival western imperialists as a tool to weaken their rivals. After the Treaty 
of Sevres the issue of Khilafat was up against British Imperialism. The 
awakening of the Muslim world was evident in Pan-Islamism and in the 
groups like Young Turks and Young Afghans. Muslim reformers like 
Mohammed Abduhu, Jamal-ud-Din Al-Afghani, and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, 
by initiating and advocating a new gospel; which gave rise to Muslim 
renaissance, stretching from North Africa to India. There was an attempt 
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to break from the tradition of the Islamic orthodoxy and Khilafat. These 
ideas, rather quitely and slowly, had begun to influence Afghan people and 
their society. There was a strong desire for change in attitude and 
modernization which would have put Afghanistan on an elevated position in 
the civilized modem world. 
The period after the world war I, therefore, marked the "beginning of 
the trouble" for the British in India. The World War I had to a great 
extent exposed British weaknesses. The awakening and the ideologies, gave 
thrust to anti Imperialism and resentment against colonial domination. They 
posed a serious challenge to the might of the British Imperial domination. 
Most powerful and significant was the ever strengthening and 
widening canvas of Indian National Movement. Evidently the partition of 
Bengal in 1905 and its annulment in 1912, for the first time resolved to 
fight the British unitedly. The formation of Ghadar Party, and the protest 
against the Rowllat Act (which was wholly against the formation of 
Provincial Government in Kabul, seditious activities) and similarly terrorist 
and other disruptive activities had put the British Indian Government on the 
dfensive. There were agitations, boycotts, and hartal. The Jallianwala Bagh 
massacre caused the deepest resentment against the British rule. The 
Khilafat issue had particularly hurt the muslim sentiment. The movement 
for restoration of Khilafat took a new colour and for the first time the 
British faced the Hindu-Muslim unity working against the British 
Government in India. Khilafat and "Non-Cooperation Movement" were 
Mass agitations. 
Such was the background in which we seek to study the diplomatic 
relations between Afghanistan and the British Government of India (1919-
in 
1945). The so called Great Game between the British and the Soviets 
were played in Afghanistan during the whole of the 19"" century. In the 
the 20* century, the great power players changed, but the 'Game' and the 
victim- Afghanistan, remained the same. The period between the two 
World Wars all the powers attempted Afghanistan's tilt in their favour. For 
its strategic location, apart from the old rivalry of the Soviets and the 
British in which Afghanistan found itself sandwitched. 
The study focuses its attention mainly on the diplomatic relations 
between the British India and Afghanistan. Nevertheless it explores and 
analyses the complex international scenario which some how had bearings 
on the diplomatic relation between the two. Any study of Anglo-Afghan 
relations can not be made in isolation. One has to see it through different 
angles and perspective for a proper assessment of the Soviet, German and 
various other regional and international power equations. 
The Emergence of Germany during the 1920's on the Central Asian 
scene should not be viewed solely from the German strategic consideration 
from where they could have pursued their goal of challenging the British 
hold in Central South Asia. The "special relationship" that had developed 
between Germany and Afghanistan was part of the Afghan rulers attempt 
to maintain political and economic independence by playing off 
Afghanistan's neighbours against one another with Germany as the "third 
force" in the constellation of powers on the Central Asian scene. 
The relations between the British Government of India and 
Afghanistan began to change under the new regime and with a new 
foreign policy. Amir Amanullah heralded, a period of break from 
traditionalism, isolationism to defensive neutralism and throwing off the 
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alliance with Britain. Such a relationship had relegated Afghanistan to a 
position of vassalage; which the growing spirit of nationalism in the East 
was no longer willing to tolerate. For countering the British influence, to 
start with Afghanistan had established normal diplomatic relations with 
Soviet union and also strove for solidarity with the Muslim world, (a 
complete break with the Pro-British attitude of the previous Afghan 
rulers). The first and fundamental conflict, which in a way set the tone for 
future relations between Amir Amanullah and the British Govrnment was 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. More than that, the timing of the 
war when the British were busy with internal unrest in India, nearly half a 
milHon British Indian troops were in Mesopotamia, and India was in the 
grip of serious epedemic of Influenza and a hot summer. In this war there 
was the declaration of a jihad, use of Indian revolutionaries against the 
British. There was a move for getting Bolshevick support. All these struck 
at the very roots of British Imperial policy. It can be gathered from the 
circumstances surrounding the Third Anglo-Afghan War that the British 
oSicials distrusted the new Amir. Amanullah achieved diplomatic and moral 
victory in the ensuing Treaty of Rawalpindi (Aug. 1919). For the following 
decade the same distrust and acrimonious relations continued. The abrasive 
character of Anglo-Afghan relations during the Amanullah's reign was 
caused by differences in both policy and style. From the British point of 
view, Amanullah's activism presented immense threat to British India. But 
Amanullah believed that Afghanistan as a sovereign country was entitled to 
have close and friendly relations with USSR. It had every obligation to 
spouse the cause of millions of Indian Muslims who were still under 
foreign bondages and had historical, ethnic, and religious rights to have ties 
with the transborder Pushtun tribes on the Indian side of the Durand Line. 
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For the first time in the history of Anglo-Afghan relations Amanullah had 
caused deep consternation for the British "forward policy." 
Justifiably, it can be concluded that Amanullah's relation with Britain 
were less than satisfactory, yet they were still heavily influenced by old 
geopolitical doctrines, generating many points of conflict and tensions. 
These frictions were made worse by serious differences in style and 
especially by cultural, psychological and personal inconsistencies. Anglo-
Afghan tensions undoubtedly hampered the full development of 
modernization programme and contributed to the onset and the outcome of 
the rebellion in a number of ways unfavourable to Amanullah. They did not 
however, lead to the secret British intervention in the overthrow of 
Amanullah (which still is controversial). Nevertheless, the principal factor in 
the fall of King Amanullah was in the conflict between tribal power and 
centralized authority. 
With the end of Amanullah ends a glorious chapter of Afghan foreign 
policy. A long civil war followed and with the end of Baccha-i-Saqqao's 
six month rule, Afghanistan strived for stability and not for grandeur. 
During this short period of Baccha's rule nothing happened significant in 
terms of foreign policy. On the contrary there was a show of cold 
shouldering by both the Soviets and the British. 
Nadir Shah's rule fi-om IQ* October 1929 brought Afghanistan back 
to peace. He wanted to follow Amanullah's foreign policy but due to his 
own limitations he went for friendly relations with the neighbours. He like 
his predecessors experienced all kinds of foreign pressures and 
inducements, but he never gave in or compromised with the basic and 
traditional policy of his country, to follow complete "neutrality" and keep 
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Afghanistan out of rivalry between the two powerful neighbours, and to 
preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. He 
attempted to strike a balance between the Britain and the Soviet Union so 
that none could dictate terms to Afghanistan. Nadir Shah was acceptable 
to the British and they offered him monetary assistance. The British 
Government seemed was more or less satisfied with the existing treaty 
with Afghanistan having provisions for "neighbourly relations", although the 
most contentious issue between them was the issue of transborder Pushtun 
tribes v/ith whose support Nadir had acquired the throne. Pushtun's were 
expecting rewards from the new Afghan Govrnment in terms of money 
and arms which the British would never have liked to happen. The frontier 
issue continued to dominate between the two for a long time. 
Nadir Shah's, reign was for short period of time. He was succeeded 
by a teenage Prince King Zahir Shah. However, his reign saw the 
beginning of stability and a better Afghan foreign policy. The following 
decade were most crucial and complex. The international equations were 
taking different shapes and the world was on the brink of another 
catastrophic World War. In the very first policy statement in 1934 Zahir 
Shah called for an attempt to work "for world peace and development of 
Afghanistan." He expressed a desire for friendly relations with all its 
neighbouring countries. The traditional policy of neutrality continued to be 
the hallmark of Afghan foreign policy. The British in India were facing an 
organized mass movement, internal disturbances, during the national 
movement. Zahir Shah's government had supported revolutioanries like Raja 
Mahendra Pratap and the Afghan tribes who were hostile to the British. 
When the World War II broke out in Europe, Afghanistan had by this 
time befriended the new emerging. Axis poweres Germany, and Italy. 
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Afghanistan began to depend on them for financial and technical assistance. 
The Afghan's dependence on Germany brought a new power in Central 
Asia. The emergence of a third force was well utilised by Afghanistan in 
"playing off', one power with the other, especially Great Britain. But 
Afghanistan thwarted all attempts to turn the country into a theatre of war 
or a battle ground for European diplomacy." Afghan Parliament was quick 
to proclaim the "neutrality of Afghanistan which could safeguard its 
independence and territorial integrity. The decree of neutrality had restricted 
the activities of nationals of the belligerent powers. Though the Germans 
had tried their best to induce the Afghan Government for some kind of 
disturbance on the North West Frontiers with a view to weaken the 
British. Zahir Shah refused to comply with their wishes. 
A serious issue of Axis Nationals had come up between the Afghan 
government on the one side and the Allies on the other side. The British, 
in particular, had pressurised the Afghan Government for the expulsion of 
the Axis nationals who were involved in subversive activities against the 
Allied interests. Allied powers exerted pressure through economic blockade 
and diplomacy. Afghanistan had to see that the German and Italians who 
were working in Afghanistan, leave the country during the war. 
After the departure of Axis nationals from Afghanistan there was no 
further pressure from Great Britain or Soviet Union on Afghanistan. 
Possibly they were convinced of Afghanistan's adherence to strict neutrality. 
Afghanistan preserved its freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity throughout by pursuing an independent and neutral policy. With 
the end of the World War II in 1945 the changed international political 
scenario left its mark on Afghanistan as well. 
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We see a change in the interests of power groups, the old rivalry 
between Britain and the Soviet Union, had been replaced by the Soviets 
and the United States of America. Afghanistan remained sandwiched in 
their diplomatic and ideological skirmishes with no to respite to its 
people. 
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PREFACE 
The geopolitical importance of Afghanistan has always been recognised 
and emphasised by academic scholars and diplomats. Situated at the cross roads 
of trade and commerce, hordes of invaders came through it into the Indian sub-
continent. The purpose of the present study is to examine the historical, political 
and the diplomatic history of Afghanistan since 1919 to 1947. Afghanistan had 
been used as a buffer state, especially by Russia and British India; and the "Great 
Game" have been highlighted in several studies. The interest of Germany in 
Afghanistan and the attempt of successive Afghan rulers and policy makers to 
utilize it by playing off the British against the other to further its interests. Gradually 
evolving its independent and neutral position through a precarious balancing of 
external pressures. Amir of Afghanistan's basic interest was to secure his throne 
and preserve the territorial integrity of his country. The study lays its focus on the 
internal forces of disenssion and regression which had always put the Afghan 
polity in a mess. Afghan roots in tribalism and religious fundamentalism impeded 
the growth of nationalism. Apart from there internal factors the persistent threat 
of external aggression and domination - both from the British and the Soviet 
Russia enveloped Afghanistan into disenssions. Unfortunately this is inherent in 
its composition and structure as a nation. Neither reforms nor modernization could 
succeed. 
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The thesis has been divided into seven chapters, including one on conclusion 
eight appendices. Sources and Bibliography. The chapter one discusses 
geopolitics and its bearings on the strategic location of Afghanistan. We have 
discussed the topography and its impact on the culture, its people and the national 
identity. 
The second chapter deals with the background of the diplomatic relations 
between the British India and Afghanistan. The chapter contains a detailed study 
of the political developments inside Afghanistan: How it dealt with "the Great 
Game" between the British and the Czarist Russia? It also analyses the politics 
and diplomacy of the great powers vis-a-vis Afghanistan. 
The third chapter is a study of Amir Amanulah's reign (1919-1929), who 
wanted to give Afghanistan new status, as a sovereign modem nation. That had 
resulted in the war of independence in 1919. The British designs worked against 
AmanuUah and his fall in 1929. The Russian designs were to obtain access to the 
warm waters of the Indian ocean through Afghanistan. 
The chapter fourth is about King Nadir Shah's diplomatic relations with the 
British and his efforts to seek the British support and assistance for upgrading its 
infrastructure. 
The chapter fifth is about King Zahir Shah's initial years. The chapter also 
examines the various problems which Afghanistan had been facing before the 
World War II. 
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The chapter sixth is on the later phase of the Zahir Shah's reign and the 
German influence on Afghanistan which has been traced from the time of Amir 
Amanullah. 
The chapter seventh is on conclusion. There are eight appendices including 
brief biographical notes about dramatis personnae. 
In the preparation of this work various kinds of evidences have been used. 
For any research scholar to undertake a study on such a theme is a difficult task, 
as the sources are scattered in different part of the world. My access has been 
limited and full of constraints. I could not get any opportunity to consult sources 
in Britain and Germany. For this reason I have relied on the materials available in 
the National Archives of India, New Delhi have been fully utilized by me. The 
diplomatic correspondence, reports and memoranda etc. included in the secret 
foreign political files in the National Archives, contemporary newspapers journals, 
books and official publications have been used. Since I had no access to the 
German and Russian records, therefore, I have relied upon the pubUshed works 
and these have been duly acknowledged. 
I am indebted to many people. It is my duty to express my grateful thanks 
to Professor Satya Prakash Gupta, Chairman/Coordinator, Centre of Advanced 
Study, Department of History for his encouragement and inspiration during the 
course of my research. My thanks are due to all my teachers for their advice and 
suggestion. 
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I am really indebted to my supervisor and Professor Raj Kumar Trivedi for 
his invaluable guidance and discussions at the, same time giving me freedom to 
develop my own views and express them. But for his active guidance and advice 
this work would not have been completed. 
I sincerely acknowledge the words of encouragement and inspiration 
received from Prof Mansura Haider, Prof Shahabuddin Iraqi, Prof Ishtiyaq Zilli, 
Prof R. A. Alavi, Prof. B.L. Bhadani, Dr. S.L.H. Moini, Mr. Ishrat Alam, Dr. 
Iqbal Sabir, Dr. Parvez Nazir, Dr. M.K. Pundhir and others whose names are not 
given here I am thankful to each one of them. 
I thank the University Grants Commission for the award of the J.R.F. which 
enabled me to visit the various places where my research material are available. 
I express deep sense of gratitude to the staff members of NAI, New Delhi, 
specially Dr. Sanjay Garg (Publication). Dr. P.C. Pradhan, the Asstt. Director 
Archives, Dr. Fareed, Dr. Mumtaz Beg and other staffs for their valuable help 
and assistance. 
My thanks are due to the staff members of ICWA, Sapru House, New 
Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti House, New Delhi and 
JNU Library, for their help in the retrieval of source material and research facility. 
The Librarian (Acquisition) US Library of Congress Office American Centre, 
Ms. Pulkita Sood, Mr. Sanjay Garg, the Asstt. Archivist in the Delhi State 
Archives, Mrs. Sudipta Basu are all acknowledged for their help and emotional 
backup. 
I express my thanks to Prof. Shahabat Husain, Dr. Naushad Ali P.M., Mr. 
Masoom Raza all from the Department of Library and Information Science, AMU, 
Aligarh, for their encouragement and help whenever needed. I thank my friends 
Dr. Manzoor Ahsan, Jahangir Nagar University, Dhaka, Dr. Ahsanullah, Asstt. 
Professor Islamic University Kushtia Bangladesh, for their interesting deliberations 
on various aspects of my research. Dr. Z.M. Noman, Lecturer in Law, A.M.U., 
Aligarh, Dr. Rabat Ali Khan and Dr. Mahmood S. Khan both Reader in 
Psychology, Dr. A. A. Usmani, Reader in Physics, Mr. Anwar Alam, Fellow 
Research Scholar in History and Mr. Yusuf Research Schoar in Urdu, are also 
acknowledged for their help and encouragement. 
My parents and other members of the family stood by me in moments of 
despair and dejection that research entails. They had to suffer due to my devotion 
to research. My Abbu & Ammijan always inspired me during the period of my 
struggle to complete the work. My father expired before I could show him the 
fruit of my labour, I dedicate my work to my late father a debt that can never be 
repaid and his memory that is my precious possession. 
Thanks are also due to Mr. Kafeel A. Khan & Jameel A. Khan for typing 
my thesis with wholehearted devotion and sincerity. 
M. Waseem Raja 
Aligarh 
November, 2000 
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GLOSSARY 
Afghan Millat 
Durre - Durran 
Hukmati - Kalan 
Jehad 
Jirga 
Khalq 
Lashkar 
Mir, Amir 
Parcham 
Pir 
Ghazi 
Majlis 
Badai 
Badraga 
Brampta 
Darrah 
Darbar 
Ghairat 
Faqir 
Gusht 
Kafilah 
Khassadar 
Khel 
Khudai Khidmat Gar 
Kotal 
Malik 
Melmastia 
Mizh 
Mujahiddin 
Nanawati 
Nang 
Powrindeh 
Akhund 
Arbab 
Khana-ba-dosh 
Khwa 
Mujadid 
Salis 
Ulus 
Wesh 
Afghan Nation 
Pearl of Pearls 
Commissinary, Division 
Holy War 
Tribal Assembly 
People 
Tribal Army 
Ruler, Leader, Commander 
Flag 
Saint 
Fighter for Islam against the infidel 
Assembly 
Revenge 
Tribal Escort 
A round up; usually of people or members of a tribe 
whose members have been causing trouble as an 
indeminity. 
Mountain passes 
Large assembly. Court 
Self-respect 
Holyman 
A patrol 
Camel Caravan 
Tribal levy; they wore thier own clothes and 
provided their own weapons. 
Clan 
Servants of God called Red-shirts (surkh poshan) 
by the British. 
Crest of a pass, as in Landi Kotal in the 
Khybar pass 
Tribal Chieftain 
Hospitality 
Dilect of the 'Pushtu Mong' meaning We 
soldiers of the Holy War 
A deputation (literally entrance) from the Pushtu 
Verb to enter 
Honour 
Merchant, trader 
Religious teacher or saint 
A Chief 
house-on-back 
A direction, side, region 
A renewer, reformer 
An arbitrator 
A tribe 
Distribution of land 

CHAPTER - I 
AFGHANISTAN'S STRATEGIC LOCATION: 
GEOPOLITICS & DIPLOMACY 
Afghanistan is located in the South Western corner of 
Central Asia. Lying in the northern subtropical zone, it 
extends from 29°21'N to 38°30'N latitude and from 60°31'N 
to 75° East longitude. It is bounded on the north by Russia, 
on the West by Iran; on the South and East by Pakistan; 
and in the extreme North-East (in the Wakhan region) by the 
People's Republic of China.^ Afghanistan's land area (650,000 
sq.kms.) is second only to Mongolia.lt has the largest 
population among the land locked states in Asia. 
Afghan topography can be divided into the 
following regions : I.Mountain System. II. River Basins 
The River Basin : (a) The Oxus River Basin (b) The Kabul 
River Basin (c) The Seistan Basin (d) The Hari- Rud Basin. 
The central mountain system and its offshoots dominate 
the landscape of the country. It forms the main watershed 
for the important rivers of Afghanistan. 
The north-eastern section of the system, the Hindu-Kush 
range, begins as the Muztagh range in the Pamirs. It 
For minute details on the geographical description. See also, 
Wilber, N. Donald, ed. Afghanistan. 'Human Relations Area 
Files, New Haven, 1956, p. 20. 
becomes prominent only when it reaches a point northwest 
of Kabul in the Shibar pass where it gives way to the 
Koh-i-Baba.^ The Hindu-Kush upto Shibar, are the 
highest mountain ranges in Afghanistan, whose average 
elevation exceeds 4000 mt. above sea-level. The central 
mountain massifs have an average width of about 400 
kms, i.e. from Peshawar to Kunduz. In the southwestern 
section this width increases. It is basically "a wild 
desolate, a country of great peaks and deep valleys of 
sharp gorges and rushing grey-green rivers.^ Lofty 
transverse mountain ranges under permanent snow cover 
and deep narrow valleys, render communication difficult 
and give few choices for population concentration. 
Although, the Hindu-Kush have numerous passes (about 
8 to 10) in their earlier course, Killick Pass (to 
Hunza), the Baroghil Pass (to Gilgit) and the Dorah 
Pass (to Chitral), are by far the most important and 
accessible ones. In its main axis, the Khawak, Bazarak, 
Shibar, Bamian Hajigak and Malakand passes provide 
gaps through which the Kabul river valley is connected 
with Balkh and Kunduz. 
With Hindukush in centre Salang range transversing west 
and southwest to the north of Bamian and the Mir Samir 
range after Charikar gap, bifurcates into the Paghman range 
2. See, Fraser-Tytler, no. 11, pp. 5-6, Op.cit. 
3. For details on the nature of watersheds. See. Hayden, no. 9. 
and joins Koh-i-Baba. The Safed -Koh or Spingar mountain 
projecting east- ward forms the Afghan boundary with 
Pakistan. It is separated from the main Hindu-Kush range by 
the valley of the Kabul river. The Salt range commences 
from the south-eastern side of the Safed- Koh and trends a 
south-easterly direction to Kala Bagh in Pakistan. The 
Sulaiman mountain commences from the Safed Koh. The 
Sulaiman range forms an important watershed between the 
Helmand and the Indus rivers. Khwaja Amran range 
commences at the northern extremity of the Kabul plateau 
and extends north east towards the Ghilzai country. It 
separates Shorawak from Pishin and then froms the northen 
boundary of Pishin and afterwards takes the name Toba, 
from a country through which it runs.'* Another range trend 
eastwards to separate Pishin from Shawl. After traversing 
approximately 150 km. of the Koh-i-Baba bifurcates into 
two-a northern and a southern spur - known as Safed -Koh 
and Siah -Koh. The entire country between these mountains 
is characterised by dry barren elevated plateau and extremely 
rugged terrain. The Koh-i-Baba later gives way to the 
Parapomissus mountains, which trend a southeast northwest 
course with an average elevation of 3500 mt. above sea 
level. 
The pattern of mountain distribution, then, suggests its 
Mounstuart, Elphinstone; An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul. 
Vol. 1, London, Karachi, 1972, p. 140. 
latent influence upon the activity of the inhabitants of the land -
locked state. They formed difficult barriers of communication 
as well as assigned individual characteristics to the dififrent social 
groups with distinct economic basis for livelihood. This later, 
induced loose political cohesion as groups among the inhabitants 
of the state. 
Though the river basins^ of Afghanistan occupy extensive 
areas, it is only along the foothills and river valleys where most 
of the human activity is carried out. The Oxus river basin 
extends from Wakhan to Murghab in the west. The places of 
strategic importance like Balkh and Mazar-i-Sharif falls under this 
basin. Implant tributaries off this river are Kokcha and the 
Kunduz rivers. All other rivers, such as Balkhab, Andkhoi and 
Maimana disappear in the sands of Oxus plain.* 
The Kabul river basin includes the basin of Alishang, 
Panjshir and Konar rivers of the left bank, and of the Logar, 
Kurram, Ghazni and Kaitu of the right bank. This bank is full 
of numerous mountains and valleys. The Kabul rivers basin is 
"from the pohtical geography point of view, the most significant 
region of Afghanistan."^ 
5. For details on rivers of Afghanistan See, Rishtiya, Sayed 
Qasim. The Rivers of Afghanistan. Afghanistan, Vol. II, No. 2, 
pp. 8-14, 1947. 
6. See for details regarding Oxus-plains, Rickmens W; The Doab of 
Turkistan. A Physiographic Sketch of Some Travels, Cambridge, 
1913, p. 60. 
7. Norton Ginsberg, ed.: The Pattern of Asia. Englewood, N.J., 
1958, p. 684. 
The Kabul river valley, by far is the most important line 
of direct trade route from Peshawar. The main line of 
communication between Kabul and Peshawar is about 272 
Kms. in length. Unlike the passes located in the extreme 
north and in the southern parts, the Khyber group of passes 
afford easy communication. The importance of this group of 
passes is that, they not only formed the primary line of 
approach to the North-West Frontier of the Indian Sub-
continent in the colonial era, but also was essential transit 
route for the land-locked state. The Kurram pass is separted 
from the Khyber pass by the Safed-Koh range and its 
offshoots. Between Peshawar and Kohat there is an extension 
of the full formation eastward towards the Indus. Tochi 
valley is also one of the important and possible transit 
routes, thought it has got limited accessibility towards East -
Central Afghanistan. The Seistan basin is in the extreme 
southwest. Seistan's northern river is made up by the Hindu-
Kush ranges and the Helmand basin as a whole covers 
350,000 sq.kms. little more than one tenth of Iran.* It 
consists of series of Hamuns, (where the two major rivers 
Helmand system and Farah-Rud discahrges their waters), 
lakes, terraces and benches. The main feeder line of the 
Seistan region, is Helmand river with Shala -Rud and Lake 
Gaud-i-Zirreh.^ 
8. W.B. Fisher, ed.; The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. I, and The 
Land of Iran. Cambridge, 1968, p. 76. 
Gopalakrishnan, R., Op.cit., p. 18. 
Seistan is dominated by clay and salt flats. The valleys 
of Helmand basins are deep and flat.. Below Girishk, the 
river Helmand receives its largest tributary, the Arghandab 
which has three tubutaries of Arghastan, Tarnak and Dari 
rivers. 
The Hari-Rud basin is delimited in the north by the 
Parapomissus mountain and Karakum desert, by the Siah-
Koh in the south, by the Band-i-Turkestan and Koh-i-Baba 
in the northeast and east.In its middle course, Hari-Rud 
forms the boundary between Afghanistan and Iran. It is an 
extremely fertile area made up of alluvial and outwash plain. 
The Khwagar and Korukh rivers are important tributaries of 
the Hari-Rud. 
The unproductive wastelands of southern and Western 
Afghanistan occupy nearly one-third of the total area of the 
country. In the South, Dasht-i-Margo on the right bank and 
Registan on the left bank of the Helmand river, are 
prominent features. Whereas the plateaus in western 
Afghanistan, consists of open wave-like plains of sandy and 
gravel covered flats. The entire area is located in a 
deperession between the Iranian and Afghanistan boundary. 
Physical relief has played an important role in shaping 
the nature of state activities of Afghanistan with persistent 
regularity, it had influenced the course of Afghan history. 
With its varied influences it had affected the historical. 
political and economic development of the state. It has 
created acute regional imbalances and emergence of core 
areas which determined the political affiliation and 
relationships of the different regions between each other. ^ ° 
Almost all aspects of life in Afghanistan are affected or 
even dominated by the climatic conditions. Although it varies 
with location and elevation, it is mostly dry throught the 
country. Its climate with extreme cold and oppressive heat 
has left a deep impact upon the agriculture, industrial and 
commercial activities and the character of the inhabitants.'' 
The impact of geographical environment has been 
persistently felt in the Afghan history. It had remained as a 
physical basis of its evolution as a state. The spirit of 
political freedom and independence among the various 
10. Lack of data and source materials have, however impeded a 
detailed analysis of the impact of geographical environment on 
political and economic actions of the state. An attempt has been 
made to select from the mass of information and observation and 
are presented in a manner to indicate the physical influence upon 
the state. 
11. For details on climatic condition of Afghanistan See. Varsilov, N.l, 
and Bukinich, D.D., Agricultural Afghanistan. Leningrad, 1929, 
suggests a four fold classification of the Afghan climate. Survey of 
Land and Water Resources: Afghanistan, no. 11, vol. 17, Hydrology 
divide Afghan climate into three divisions which are based upon 
local climatic factors and elevation and also, G.S. Arez, The 
Climate of Afghanistan. Kabul, 1969. Arez suggest six fold division 
of climate - These are - (1) Desert climate of South West. (2) 
Monsoon climate of Pakhtiya. (3) Mediterranean Climate of 
Nangarhar. (4) Steppe climate of North and South side of 
Hindukush. (5) Alpine Tundra Climate of Central High Lands. (6) 
Highland of northeast Hindukush. 
8 
Afghan tribes or their periodic defections, are all probable 
effects of the geographical remoteness. The locational 
proximity had also helped in shaping its history. The 
weakening of central authority and the necessity of agressive 
forward policies to maintain internal political stability as 
consequences, remained a recurrent theme of the Afghan 
history. The physical environmental conditons have more or 
less determined all the major aspects of the Afghan society 
and the nation state. The Hindu-Kush and its westward 
extension seemed to divide the westward migrating Central 
Asian tribes into two streams divesting one Westeward to 
Herat and Iran and the other southward to the Indian Sub-
continent through the seasonally open passes of the Hindu-
Kush. It served so much to divide Central Asia from the 
Indian sub-continet.^^ The mountain system have tended to 
prevent any sort of cultural exchanges between the various 
diverse social group inhabiting Afghanistan. As territories of 
each social group was physiographically limited from others 
the social group develpoed their own traditional political 
conception and organisation on the basis of modifying 
influences of the physical environment they inhabited. 
However the unequal physical division between northern and 
southern Afghanistan enabled the geopolitical inter-relationship 
to have far reaching impact upon Afghanistan. 
12. J.P. Singh Uberoi; Between Oxus And Indus. A local History of 
the Frontier. 500 B.C. to AD. 1925. Indian Horizon. New Delhi, 
vol. XXII, No. 1 January 1974, p. 81. 
The prevalence of semi-arid conditons enabled the 
northern half of the country to weave its own distinct 
geopolitical relationships. The social and economic landscape 
was markedly influenced by the availibility of water for 
irrigation which led to the emergence of towns like Balkh 
and Mazar-i-Sharif. ^ ^ 
Southern Afghanistan was divided into eastern and 
western halves which was both physical as well as economic 
and political division. Although the region is predominantly 
inhabited by Pushtun tribes (unlike the Uzbeck, Hazaras of 
the north) the geographical elements contrived to equate the 
power balance between the major nuclear areas of Herat, 
Kandhar and Kabul. 
It is evident that in its efforts to develop, Afghanistan 
had expressed itself to foreign political pressures. The 
foreign economic assistance was formulated by foreign aid-
givers and was contrary to the need and geographical 
environment of the state. 
The geographical factor have played a significant role 
in shaping the national charactger and political outlook of 
Afghanistan. It inherited a harsh terrain and austere climate 
as well as the consequences arising from the cross-road 
location of Afghanistan in Central Asia. Conditioned by 
location and relief "an axial line of crest with its flank 
13. Jan Myrdal and Gun Kassle; Gates of Asia : A Diary of Long 
Journey. London, 1972, pp. 76-77 and 169. 
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facing two large units between which the minor one is 
buffer"*'' was presented by the Hindu-Kush between Russia 
and England in Central Asia under these circumstances the 
political geography of Afghanistan becomes even more 
important, when, once the land people relationship is evident 
and established. 
Afghanistan is a land-locked country, therefore, much of 
its problems emanate from its geo-political location. This 
inherent weakness of its enclosed location, had far reaching 
consequences on its development and existence. For 
centuries, it has faced, the unceasing expansionist designs of 
various powers, and its neighbours. Afghanistan lay in the 
between the great trade routes. Ever since the rise of Soviet-
Union as a great power and the long existing interests of 
Great Britain; it became a zone of recurrent political and 
armed conflicts during the 19* century and rivalry during the 
20th century. The country was not coveted for its 
resources, rather as a strategic zone, the inclusion would 
have tilted the balance between the two major powers. For 
this reason the location of Afghanistan had been the prime 
factor in the shaping of its history and diplomacy.'^ 
14. Lionel, W. Hyde, Continent Of Asia. London, 1933, p. 312. 
15. Semple, Ellen Churchill; Influence of Geographic Environment. 
London, 1911, p. 129. Also Hans, W. Weigart, et al. The Principle 
of Political Geography. New York, 1951, p.74. Also Geo-Strategic 
settings of Afghanistan and the effect of geography on the foreign 
poHcy See. Arthur, S Banks, ed; Political Handbook of the World. 
1979 (New York, 1979), p.41. 
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Afghanistan perceived the threats posed by Britain and 
Russia to its independent existance, yet it was caught 
conflicting in the struggle of the two essentially European 
politico-territorial systems. As a result of the active forward 
policies of Britain and Russia, both the internal and external 
forces had undermined the stability, as well as, the survival 
of Afghanistan as an independent state. A situation, and in 
the new power equation, Afghanistan had no active role to 
play.'^ 
There are regional variations due to the inhospitable 
terrain and links between one region to the other were 
always weak, resulting in regional imbalances, in terms of 
modernization and development within the country. Such a 
geopolitical situation and with the conciousness of regional 
identity among the inhabitants of the state, the efforts of the 
Afghan rulers to consolidate their powers were frustrated. 
Afghanistan was under constant threat and influence of its 
neighbours. The boundary adjustments between Afghanistan 
and the colonial powers, reflected as how Britain and Russia 
had secured their strategic, administrative and economic 
interests. The boundary adjustments had deprived Afghanistan 
of valuable pasture lands and irrigation method in the North-
west Frontier with Russia in 1886. In 1895, the trans-Oxus 
16. On strategic location See. Ibid p. 22 also Bilgrami S.H; 
Afghanistan & British India. Sterling Pub. New Delhi, 1972, 
pp. 45. 
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region of Shignan and Darwaz was transferred to Russia. 
That loss was compensated by Wakhan strip which was 
actually meant to separate the British and Russian territories 
from each other. In the Southern and Eastern Frontier, with 
Britain (1895), the division of contiguous tribal areas not 
only resulted in the political division of the inhabitants of 
Afghanistan but also created administrative and economic 
problems. The political division of the traditional Afghan 
habitat therefore, became the primary consideration in the 
Afghan foreign relations with Britain and later with Pakistan.'^ 
Arthur Conolly regarded that it was the failure of the 
Afghan Amirs to incorporate Baluchistan and the North-West 
frontier into its own territory in the 19* century could be 
regarded as the singlemost obstacle to its subsequent external 
relations.'* The ownership of these areas, perhaps, could well 
have led to a more tenable territorial claim towards the 
Indian Ocean coast, which would have enabled it to have 
17. See. Gopalakrishnan, R.: The Geography and Politics of 
Afghanistan. Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi; 1982, 
p. 3. For more details on the boundary adjustment and its 
effect aftermath on the relation with the bordering countries. 
See, Donald, N. Wilber, ed; Afghanistan. Human Relations 
Area Files, New Naven, 1956, pp. 23-25. 
18. The stability of Afghanistan required the unity of the Pushtun 
populace but due to Durand Line it was divide into two parts. See 
for the detailed topography of the region in Conolly, Arthur. 
Journey To The North Of India. Overland From England Through 
Russia. Persia. And Afghanistan. London, 1838, pp. 834. 
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access to sea by recognised treaty agreements.^^ The 
resultant stagnation of the continental interior reflected the 
impact of peripheral forces.^" 
It also indicated the highly volatile character of the 
internal political dynamics; and the rival regional interests and 
the persistence of widely dispersed and diversified population 
groups. An amalgam of different cultural and ethnic groups, 
Afghanistan's internal sub-divisions, could not merge into 
form an effective political unit. For more than a century, 
Afghanistan's physical and cultural isolation stressed the 
internal political weaknesses, accentuated grievances and 
hindered economic development. 
There were political intrigues conspiracies, turmoil and 
even the threats of secession - between Kabul and Kandhar 
19. Gopala Krishnan, R; Op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
20. The role of Afghanistan as a corridor of power was formulated in 
geographical terms by the great British Geographer, Sir Halford 
Mackinder, and by Captain Alfred Mahan of the US navy as they 
wrote about the influences of geography on the political destiny of 
nation. According to them, "the central factor was the existence of 
the "world island" the cormected land mass of Africa and Eurasia. 
The "heartland" of this world island lies in the great landmass of 
interior of grasslands, steppes, and deserts of Central Asia. 
Protected by geographical isolation from attack, this heartland 
operating along internal lines of conmiunication, can exert enormous 
pressures. Population and other pressures originating in the heartland 
are translated into expansionist forces towards any direction 
particularly towards warm sea. For more details on the theory 
propounded by Mahan and Mackinder, See, Halford 
Mackinder; Democratic Ideas and Reality (New York : 
f i ^ ^ r i i , ^a^mVgon""go^,"MsMg,M'^0^^" ^^"^^""^ ^^ ^''^ 
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or Afghan -Turkistan and Herat-formed a recurrent theme in 
Afghan pohtical history. Keeping in view the ethnic factor, 
dissensions had been a feature of Afghan polity.^^ The 
Southern Afghan tribes, mainly Pushtu speaking are in 
majority and had the tendency to dominate over the northern 
tribes who are mainly Uzbeck, Turkomen, Hazaras, Kizill-
Bash. 
Afghanistan's internal communication networks had been 
its weakest link and had caused impeded economic and 
political development of the state. The access to the sea 
had been the most sought after issue for the land- locked 
country of Afghanistan during the 19* & 20* centuries, and 
failure to it resulting in Afghanistan's negotiating from a 
position of weakness, and discovering to its coast that 
compromise was there by denied. Afghanistan was thus 
forced to accept the subordinate role in the decision-making 
processes affecting the transit trade and economy.^^ The 
resultant subordination to the Soviet- Union or the British 
India for an transit outlet led the Afghan state to feel 
somewhat weaker. ^ ^ 
21. For more details on ethnicity See, the chapter on "The effect 
of national attitude on domestic & foreign policies", in Donald 
N. Wilber, ed. Afghanistan: Human Relations Area Files. New 
Haven, 1986, pp. 136-143. 
22. See,Richard S. Newell; Afghanistan: The Dangers of Cold War 
Generosity, Middle East Journal. Washington, D.C. Vol. 33, 
Spring 1969, p. 170. 
23. See, Moodie, A.E. Geography Behind Politics. London 1947, p. 41. 
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Afghanistan, therefore, lacked homogeneity and free 
intermingling of its populace.^ '* 
Afghanistan being a mountainous country with more than 
40 percent of the total land area above 2000 metres. It has 
only 22 percent of the total land area with predominantly 
agrarian economy,on which more than 85 percent of 
population depended on agriculture, for their living and 
provides about 87 percent of the total commodity exports of 
the land- locked state. The Afghan relief is a "desolate belt 
of mountain ranges, salt stepp and irregular Playas, all of 
which are for the most part uninhabited or sparsley 
24. See, Hayden, H.H: The Geology of Northern Afghanistan, Memoirs 
of Geological Survey of India. Calcutta, Vol. XXXIV, pt.l, 1911; 
p.5, See also C.L. Griesback, Field Notes from Afghanistan: No.3, 
Turkistan Records of Geological Survey of India. Calcutta, pt. 4, 
1886, p. 235. See also introduction about problems of drawing 
geographical maps of Afghanistan also See Gopalakrishnan, R. 
Op.cit., p. 11 and also Rouhollah, K. Ramazani: The Northern Tier 
(Afghanistan. Iran and Turkey). Princeton, N.J. 1966, p. 10. 
25. The Afghan relief has also been divided by Dudely Stamp; Asia, 
A Regional and Economic Geography. London 1967, pp. 179-81, 
into six distinct regions and by W.K. Fraser-Tytler: Afghanistan: A 
Study of Political Developments in Central and South Asia. London, 
1967, pp. 6-7, into four principal river-stystems. Survey of Land 
and Water Resources: Afghanistan, 6 vols. The Food and 
Agriculture Organisations of the United Nations (Rome, 1965), 
Classified the physical relief according to elevation. The basis of the 
present classification is based on the fact that though each 
subdivision shows certain degree of similarity, they are distinctly 
separated from each other. Further, the mountain systems have been 
taken as a separate unit, solely due to the reason that they act as 
the important water parting of the state. The unproductive 
westerlands are included in the river basins to facilitate the analysis. 
16 
populated region.^^ The Afghan relief is dominated by the 
mountainous backbone and its offshoots; thereby forming a 
barrier between Central and South Asia.^ ^ 
26. For more details on mountains of Afghanistan, See; Ali, Muhammad. 
Afghanistan's Mountains. Afghanistan Vol. ID, No., pp. 46-52, 1953. 
Also Kohzad, Ahmad Ali: Along The Koh-i-Baba And The Hari 
Rud. Afghanistan. Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 1-16, No. 2, pp. 1-21, vol. 
VII, No. 1, pp. 50-55, vol. No. 4, pp. 54-56, vol. IX, pp. 20-
43, No. 2, pp. 1-21, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954. Also for northern 
portion of Afghan topography. See Fraser-Tytler, Sir, W. Kerr. A 
Great North Road. Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. 
XXIX, Part II, pp. 129-135. 
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CHAPTER-II 
ANTECEDENTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND AFGHA-
NISTAN TILL 1920's 
"India is like a fortress with a vast moat of the sea 
on two of her faces and with mountains for her wall on 
the remainder. But beyond those walls, which are 
sometimes of by no means inseparable height and admit 
of being easily penetrable, extends a glacis of varying 
breadth and dimensions. We do not want to occupy it but 
we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes." 
[Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India .1899-1905J. 
Afghanistan emerged as a nation in 1747. The Anglo-
Russian rivalry and had its strongest impact on Afghan 
foreign policy. A study of this development would enable us 
to understand Afghanistan's past and present history. 
The word "Afghan" denotes the national name of all 
the people of Afghanistan and symbolises an indivisible unit 
in the heart of Asia.* Hasan Kawun Kakar writes that 
Afghanistan had three principal names Ariyana in 
antiquity, Khorasan in the medieval era and Afghanistan in 
modern times.^ Modern Afghanistan confirms almost to the 
land mentioned in the old Greek as Ariana, in the old 
1. Habibi, AH. "Afghans and Afghanistan," Afghanistan (KabulV Vol. 
XXII, No.2, Summer 1969, p.l. 
2. Hasan Kawun Kakar, : Government and Society in Afghanistan. The 
Reign of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (Austin : University of Texas 
Press), p. XV. 
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Persian as Airy a or Airy ana, in Sanskrit as Arya Vartta or 
Arya Varsha and in Zend as Eriene-Veejo, situated between 
India and Persia, Aryana was a geographical and cultural 
rather than a political name. The name Aryana lasted for 
about 1500 years from 1000 B.C. to the 5* Century of the 
Christian Era. 
The word Khorasan denoting the "land of the rising 
sun" gained currency during the second century of the 
Christian Era.^ Even upto the 19* century the name 
Khorasan, refering to Afghanistan, was in vogue along with 
the words Pushtun-Khwa and Sarhad."* Thus it was only 
towards the end of the 19* century that "the appellation 
Afghanistan replaced the word Khorasan completely."^ Hasan 
K. Kakar therefore holds the view that Afghanistan is not a 
new name and believed to have appeared with the accession 
of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747.^ Afghanistan was then 
called Aryana.^ 
3. According to Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, an eminent Afghan 
Historian, "for fourteen centuries the name Khorasan was applied 
initially to the parts of Afghanistan and later to the whole country 
and is still in use for a small region to the north-west of Afghanistan. 
For a detailed study see. Ghulam Mohd. Ghobar, Khorasan (Kabul 
History Association 1946). 
4. MountStutart, Elphinston, : An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul 
(London : Richard Bentley, 1839), p.200. 
5. Opcit, Kakar, No. 2, p. XV. 
6. Ibid, Kakar, No.2, p.XVI. 
7. Pazhwak, A.R., Aryana : Ancient Afghanistan (London : Royal 
Embassy of Afghanistan, 1957), p.7. 
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According to available evidence the word "Afghanistan" 
was applied in a political sense to a land for the first time 
in the third decade of the 14* century by Saifi Herawi.^ The 
advent of Islam during the 7* century proved instrumental in 
regard to overhauling the entire culture and civilization of 
Afghanistan.^ The Muslim conquest brought Afghanistan 
within a greater political entity, stimulated trade in the region 
and preserved the country's geographic importance as a 
crossroads between India, Central Asia the Mediterranean 
world.'° 
For about two centuries the local dynasties ruled over 
Afghanistan — Tahirids (820 A.D. - 870 A.D.), and the 
Samanids (874 A.D. - 999 A.D.). The closing years of the 
10* century witnessed the advent of regime of Subuk-tagin 
in Afghanistan, who was succeeded by his son Mahmood 
Ghaznawi, who ruled over Afghanistan till 1157 A.D. The 
Ghaznavi's empire extended over Kabul, Bulkh, Badakhshan, 
Persian Khorasan and some parts of India.^' The Mongol 
invasion brought economic disaster for Afghanistan during 
the 13* century. During the 14* century Afghanistan was 
8. Saifi Herawi; Risala-i-Tariqi-Qismat-i-Ab-i-Qalb (The Irrigation of 
Herat), edited by Magil T.Herawi (Tehran, 1989), p. 77. 
9. For details See; Pazhwak, No.8, pp.77-91, opcit. 
10. T.W. Arnold and A. Gviillaume : The legacy of Islam. (Oxford, 1936), 
p.79 and also, Vartan, Gregorian : The Emergence of Modem Afghanistan 
(Stanford/California Univrarsity Press, 1969), p.4. 
11. Molesworth, G.N. ; Afghanistan 1919 (Bombay : Asia 
Publishing House, 1962), p.3. 
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invaded by Taimur Lane and the early decades of the 16*'' 
century witnessed the establishment of Mughal rule in Kabul 
by Zaheeruddin Mohammad Babur, a descendent of Taimur in 
1504.'2 Following the death of Babur which led to the 
collapse of Mughal rule in Afghanistan, the local tribes again 
vied for establishing their paramountcy in Afghanistan. During 
this period Afghanistan was divided "Between the Empire of 
Persia and Mughal India, the Northern Tribes being under the 
Mughal rule.'^ 
The Afghan identity found its early assertion during 16* 
and l?**" centuries under the inspiration of Roshannia 
Movement and with the leadership of Khushhal Khan Khattak 
(1613-1689) who inspired the Afghan tribes to "defend their 
independence and strive for political unity.'"* 
The geographical situation in the region underwent a 
substantial changes and the early period of IS'*" century 
witnessed the southern Afghan tribes led by Ghilzais, rise in 
revolt against Persia, which in later years spread to Herat 
and south-east of Persia. The first successful attempt to 
establish an autonomous Afghan state was made in 1709, 
when Mir Wais a prominent Ghilzais chieftain rallied his 
tribes in a successful revolt against the Persian empire.'^ and 
12. Opcit, Gregorian, No. 14, p. 15. 
13. Opcit, Molesworth, No. 15, p.4. 
14. Opcit. Gregorian; No. 14, p.43. 
15. Ibid. Gregorian, No. 14, p.44. 
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succeeded in establishing the rule of Ghilzais. With the 
assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali 
emerged the leader and was made the king.^ ^ 
Ahmad Shah Abdali after assuming the reins of power, 
consolidated his position and took stringent measures to 
strengthen his empire. He led eight expeditions into India and 
succeded to incorporating portions of Punjab, Kashmir and 
Multan in his empire. By the time of his death in 1773, the 
Afghan empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali extended from Atrek 
river to the Indus and from Tibet to Arabian Sea. While his 
successor managed to continue his legacy but without any 
major changes in the domestic and external policies.'^ 
The closing years of 19* century had been witnessing 
the rise of powerful France, evincing interests in the country 
of south-west and Central Asia, and also the ascendency of 
British power on the Indian sub-continent. During Zaman 
Shah's reign (1793-1799) the external threat to Afghanistan 
had increased with the expansion of British interest in India 
and Persian plans to reassert its sovereignty over Herat 
portended the threat to Afghanistan. According to Vartan 
Gregorian, "Afghanistan thus, entered the 19**" century a 
politically disunited state.'* 
16. Adamec, W. Ludwig : Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid 20^ 
Century (Tuscon, Arizona, The University of Arizona Press, 1974), p.2. 
17. Khan Sultan Mohammad; Tarikh-i-Afehanistan (Persian), New Delhi, 
1953, p.27. 
18. Gregorian, opcit. No. 14 p.51 and also, Bilgrami, A.H., Afghanistan and 
British India. 1793-1907 (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers 1972,) p. 13, 
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Afghanistan was frequently invloved in foreign conflicts 
during the IP**" Century. The signing of the Anglo-Sikh 
Treaty of 1809 enabled the British to acquire the passage 
towards the west and came in clash with Afghanistan.^^ The 
British found in Shah Shuja a freind. Thet despatched the 
Mountstuart Elphistone Mission on October 13, 1808 who 
indicated towards increasing the French and the Russian 
threat to Afghanistan.2° However the Afghans had discovered 
the real intention of the British, and regarded "an alliance for 
the purpose of repelling one enemy was imperfect and that 
true friendship between the two states could only be 
maintained by identifying their interests in all cases.^' 
Despite the opposite interests, the British Government of 
India and Afghanistan had signed a treaty in June 1809, 
under its terms Afghanistan was expected to prevent the 
passage of French and Persian troops on their way to 
India. While the British Government pledged to pay the 
Afghan's for their services against the confedracy. Besides 
Afghanistan would exclude all Frenchmen from its territory.^^ 
After the defeat of Shah Shuja by Shah Mahmud, the treaty 
became almost a dead letter. 
19. For the full text of treaty see, Aitchison, C.U; A Collection of Treaties-
Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and the Neighbouring Countries 
(Calcutta : Govt. Printing Press, 1909), Vol. VIII, p.44. 
20. BUgrami, Opcit, No. 23, P35. 
21. Aitchinson, Opcit, No. 25, Vol XI, p.309. 
22. For the fiill tesxt of treaty. See Aitchinson; Opcit. Vol. Xm pp. 53-55. 
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With the emergence of strategic importance of 
Afghanistan for the Russians, the British and the Persians^^ 
were alarmed and thus signed two treaties in 1809 and 1814 
against Russian design against attack by Afghanistan. On 
the other hand, considerable Russain gain from the two 
treaties of Adrianople and Turkmanchai brought considerable 
alertness for the British who concluded that only "Persian 
or Russian gain at the expenses of Afghanistan" as 
tantamount to an extension of Russias' political and 
economic gains on the doorstep of India.^ '* Lord Ellenbrough 
(Viceroy of India) writes that "the Russian Commerce could 
be utilized to prepare the way for Russian armies in 
Afghanistan.^^ For putting a check to the Russians, Lord 
Palmerston, the then British Foreign Secretary, is of the view 
that "a Pro-British power in Afghanistan could influence 
officers in Persia in which Russia was deeply interested.^^ 
The advice of London to Lord Auckland, the then 
23. The name Persia is used for Iran here because the official use of 
name Iran was started only in 1937. Hence prior to that reference 
is made to Persia in the Present study. For the text of treaty of 
1809 See Aitchison, Opcit, No.25 Vol.13, pp. 53-55. For the text 
of Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814, See, ibid, p.54. Also See Hurewitz, 
J.C: Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East : A Documentary 
Survey, 1535-1914 (New York, 1956), Vol.1, pp.86-88. 
24. Mosley, Phililp, E.; Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the 
Eastern Question. 1838-39 (Cambrdge, Mass, 1934), pp.3-4. 
25. Davis, H.W.C. "The Great Game in Asia : 1800-1844" Proceedings 
of the British Academy (Oxford, 1926), p.230. 
26. Vincent, A. Smith, ed., Oxford Historv of India (Third Edition) 
Oxford, 1958, p. 591. 
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Governor-General was advised by London to pursue 
Afghanistan issue more vigrously in order to check Russians 
and the Persians.^^ 
In this background famous Alexander Burne's Mission 
was despatched to Afghanistan in Novermber 1836 with the 
objective of securing political and commercial advantages. 
However, the Mission sent by the British Government of 
India could not bring the desired results. Therefore, the 
British tried to put Shah Shuja an exile (then a British guest 
in India) on Afghan throne in order to bring Afghanistan 
under British sphere of influence. In October 1838 the then 
Governor General of India, Lord Auckland, issued a 
"Manifesto" accusing the Afghan ruler. Dost Mohammad of 
taking meausres, prejudicial to the security and peace of the 
Indian frontiers.^^ In November 1838, the British Army 
launched expedition against Afghan Amir Dost Mohammad. 
Though they had succeeded in installing the British protege 
Shah Shuja on Afghan throne, but in the ensuing Civil-War 
around 1500 British Armymen along with Shah Shuja had 
perished. Despite this blowing defeat, the British forces again 
had entered Afghanistan in the Autumn of 1842, again 
suffered defeat.^^ 
27. Ibid. p.603. 
28. For details. See Kaye, J.W. : History of War in Afghanistan 
(London, 1851, Vol. II, pp.3-6) Also Sykes, Sir, Percy . A History 
of Afghanistan (London, MacMillan, 1940),Vol.11, pp.36-37. 
29. For details See Kaye, Opcit, No. 38, Vol.11, pp.218-46. 
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The British appeared to have not learnt any lesson from 
the first Afghan War and continiued to commit mistake in 
understanding the Afghan issues by launching Second Anglo-
Afghan War. The period between the First Afghan War in 
1842 to the start of the Second Anglo-Afghan War proved 
to be quite harmonious as far as the relations are concerned. 
The treaties concluded between the British Government of 
India and the Kingdom of Afghanistan on 30* March, 1855 
and on 26* January 1857, had terms of friendship and a 
subsidy of Rupees One Lakh to the Afghan Amir, followed 
by Mission under Major H.B. Lumsden who was to stay at 
Kabul for mutual trust and faith in each other.^ ^ 
In spite of instability in Afghanistan, following the death 
of Amir Dost Mohammad in 1869 the British and the 
Afghans nevertheless forged closer relations. In the same 
year, the Amir Sher Ali Khan had paid a visit to India and 
signed the Anglo-Afghan agreement under which the British 
had declared that they would not interfere in the Afghan 
internal affairs.^' 
Having seen the Russian advances towards Central-Asia 
30. For the text of the treaty. See, Bilgrami, A.H.; Opcit, 
No.23,pp.313-15, for Lumsden Mission, See N.A.I. Files Foreign 
and Political Diary for April 1857. 
31. Boulgar, D.C.: "Central Asian Question", Essay on Afghanistan, China 
and Central Asia (London, 1885), p. 62. See also, Kapur 
Anupchand: "Disraeli's Forward Policy" in the North-West Frontier of 
India, 1874-1877", The Research Bulletin of the Punjab University 
(Lahore), No. 1, 1951, pp.4-6. 
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and the capture of Khiva and Bukhara etc. had alarmed the 
British Government of India and the British Policy makers 
were in favour of establishing a permanent British Mission in 
Kabul and wanted a pro-British Afghan Government.^^ 
In this way the earlier British Policy of non-intervention 
was replaced by a "forward policy."" Afghanistan was torn 
with the internal disturbances thus the then Afghan ruler Sher 
Ali Khan rejected the British desire to establish a permanent 
mission at Kabul.^ '^  
About at the same time Russian Mission under General 
StolietofP^ was accorded a grand reception at Kabul. This 
was sufficient for the British to get provoked, and that 
cuhninated into the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In the ensuing 
battle inspite of British military superiority the English Army 
suffered a humiliating defeats at the hands of Amir Ayub 
Khan^^ (who later on became Amir of Afghanistan). In the 
same year Amir Sher Ali Khan's demise on 2P* February 
1879 led to the signing of Treaty of Gandamak^^ in May 
32. Rawlinson, H.C.: England and Russia in the East (London, 
1875), p. 14. 
33. For details regarding "Forward Policy", See Fraser-Tytler, W.K.: 
Afghanistan, (London. Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 137-147. 
34. Ali Shah, Sardar Ikbal: Modern Afghanistan (London: Sampson 
Low, 1938), p. 21. 
35. Balfour, Betty: Lord Lytton's Indian Administration (London: Longmans 
Press, 1899), pp. 247-248. 
36. Ali Shah, Op.cit. No. 51, p. 22. 
37. For the text of the treaty of Gandamak, See, Aitchinson, Op.cit. No. 
24, Vol. XI (Calcutta, 1909), pp. 344-347. 
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1879. Under this treaty the new Amir of Afghanistan, Amir 
Yaqub Khan agreed to the appointment of a British Agent 
in Kabul and followed the advice of the British in the 
conduct of Afghan foreign relations. But soon after the 
British agent Sir Louis Cavagnari was murdered in Sept. 
1879 which led to the British reprisal. Amir Yaqub Khan 
was forced to abdicate in 1880 and Amir Abdur Rehman 
Khan took over as the new ruler of Afghanistan.-38 
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan made his intentions clear to 
the then Chief British Agent in Kabul, Lepel Griffin in 1880 
that "I desire nothing in lieu of services rendered nor do I 
demand favours in exchange for duties performed but I have 
claims on the desire of the Afghan Nation".^^ In a royal 
proclamation issued in 1887, he appealed to the Afghan's 
sense of honour, national dignity and patriotism drawing 
there attention to Anglo-Russian Threat.'^ ^ 
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan pursued the policy of 
isolationism. Afghanistan was isolated from Persia and Russia 
while even dealing with the British the Afghan Amir exercised 
and asserted his independence to decide the important 
38. Adamec, Op.cit. No. 20, p. 9. 
39. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 34-40, August 1889, No.34. 
See also NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 256-280, July 1880, 
No. 261, p. 8. 
40. For the full text of this proclamation. See Wheeler, Stephen: The 
Amir Abdur Rahman (London; 1895), pp. 248-250. 
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issues/* Amir's insistance on British envoy to Kabul as 
Muslim was also a contentious issue and was agreed upon 
Afzal Khan in place of Mir Hashim Khan/^ He even refused 
to give permission to the British troops and offices to visit 
the strategic areas in Afghanistan. He had also turned down 
the British project of rail-links to Chaman."*^  He endeavoured 
hard to keep the foreign influence at bay by not inviting 
British troops during the Ghilzais reprisal of 1887-88.'*'' To 
this effect Lord DufFerin, the then Viceroy of India had aptly 
remarked to Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1886 "as your 
mind is constantly occupied by the idea of asserting your 
independence of all control in internal affairs, that you see 
interference in every British action.'"*^ 
Abdur Rahman was now getting influence by Pan-
Islamism also.'*^ This was also due to the thinking of the 
Russians anti-muslim attitude.'*'' The Amir was afraid of 
41. Maaroof, Mohammad Khalid: Afghanistan and Superpowers. 
(Commonwealth Publishers, New Delhi 1919), p. 13. 
42. NAI Foreign and Political Files, No. 56, Nos. 213-239, August 
1882 KWI, p. 4. 
43. Ibid, Nos. 256-280, July 1880, No. 261, p. 8. 
44. Adamec, Op.cit., No. 55, p. 23. Also NAI Foreign and Political 
Files, No. 56, Nos. 76-83, August 1899, No. 81 A, pp. 6-7. 
45. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 573-577, August 1892, No. 
575, p. 5. 
46. Adamec, Op.cit. No. 55, p. 23. 
47. Mohammad, Mir Munshi Sultan, ed. The life of Abdur Rahman 
(London 1900), Vol. II, p. 260. 
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possible Russian and British coalition against these Muslim 
countries of Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan/* In that case 
Amir was interested in coalition of Muslim countries of 
Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan against the then 
superpowers/^ Thus, the Amir had kept Afghanistan 
politically intact by pursuing a policy of strict neutrality by 
warding off the internal or external interference by either 
great power. He has also maintained the balance of power to 
the advantage of Afghanistan/'^ 
Following the death of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 
October 1901, his son Amir Habibullah Khan had succeeded 
as new Amir of Afghanistan. As Russian wanted to have 
direct relations with the new Amir the British were opposed 
to such a move and thus Amir Habibullah was faced with 
critical foreign political challenges.^' For further cementing the 
relations the British Government of India had sent a 
condolence message on the demise of the Amir Abdur 
Rahman Khan and wanted the confirmation of previous 
Anglo-Afghan Agreements. Amir had replied on 31 Oct. 
1901 promising the honour of the agreements made by his 
late father with the British Indian Government saying "so 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid, p. 266. 
50. Maaroof, Op.cit., p. 16. 
51. Adamec, Op.cit., No. 20, p. 9. 
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long as the illustrious British Government firmly adhered to 
them." 
On the other hand the Russians had been looking 
forward for a possible peaceful coexistence with the British 
Govt, of India on the question of Afghanistan and a "move 
which could help in removing the British distrust of a 
Russian invasion of India"." In that regard, M. Lesar's, 
(Secretary at the Russian Embassy in London) declaration 
that "Russian Afghan relations had been defined by the 
arrangement of 1872 and 1873 which Russia regarded as still 
being in effect and as placing Afghanistan entirely outside 
her sphere of action" suggest that Russia was predetermined 
to have direct relations with Kabul even prior to the taking 
over by HabibuUah as the new Amir of Afghanistan.^ "* 
For that matter a series of diplomatic negotiations 
between Russia and England had started in order to ascertain 
the intention of each of the two in having direct relation 
with Kabul. On 29 January, 1902 the British envoy in St. 
Petersberg conveyed a verbal declaration of his government's 
point of view to the Russian that Britain did not wish to 
contend that "there was no force in the Russian 
52. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Section, F. No. 94-128, 
Oct. 1908, No. 99. 
53. For the press review of Russian Publications. See Novoe Verema, as 
taken from NAI Foreign and Political files No. 106-108, May 1899, 
No. 108. 
54. Quoted from Adamec, Op.cit. No. 55, p. 33. 
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arrangements for direct communications on matters of local 
details, but that a having charge of Afghan foreign relations 
they held that arrangemnts for the purpose could only be 
made with their consent.^^ Ludwig W. Adamec feels that 
now it was left to Russia to formulate proposals as to the 
change of the status quo and to give guarantee that any 
relations would remain of a non-political character.^^ 
Following that both Britain and Russia stuck to their 
respective positions which created an impasse. Russian then 
had started taking interest in Meshhed and Herat region 
through border infringement and other shady deals with local 
Afghans. Reacting to the developments London wanted 
permanent British Representative at Meshhed but Lord 
Curzon had declined. The British were now more interested 
in renewal of agreements and sending a mission to Kabul. 
However the Louis W. Dane Mission reached Kabul on Dec. 
1904 and thereafter the renewal process of the agreement of 
1880 had started. Though Amir Habibullah never wanted to 
serve as "mere pawn on the chess-board of Indian Military 
defence."" The prolonged series of negotiations had resulted 
in the conclusion of what came to be known as Habibullah-
Dane Treaty on 21st March 1905.In that agreement the 
55. Quoted from Adamec, Op.cit. No. 55, p. 33. 
56. Gregorian, Op.cit., No. 14, p. 211. 
57. Sykes, Percy: History of Afghanistan (London: 1940), Vol. II, p. 47. 
Also NAI Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Section F. No. HI, 14 
August 1901. 
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position of Amir Habibullah was more affirmed and a British 
subsidy £400,000 was started. But the British failed to get 
the maximum advantage of a trading concession and setting 
of a diplomatic mission in Kabul.^* As obvious, the treaty 
brought discomfiture to the Russian who foresaw a great 
danger in the agreement. In that regard the British foreign 
secretary. Lord Landsowne, with a view to allay the Russian 
misgivings assured the Russian Ambassador in London, 
Count Benckdorff, that Britain could not interfere in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan and would maintain the status 
quo." 
In the ensuing misgivings the Russians felt satisfied at 
last, despite various objections to that agreement. 
Following these developments Russia and Britain feeling 
the impulse of developments on the International scenario, 
tried to forge a closer tie through the famous Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907, which comprised the three agreements 
one each on Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. The pact 
pertaining to Afghanistan was more favourable to Britain.^^ 
The Russians had agreed to conduct the political relations 
with Afghanistan through the intermediary of the British 
58. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Sections File No. 94-128, 
Oct. 1908 Nos. 99. 
59. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 83-162, August 1903, No. 
155, Notes. 
60. Maaroof, Khalid, Op.cit., p. 23. 
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Government. The Russians had gained only in terms of local 
question of a non-political nature which could be settled 
directly by the Afghan and the British officials. 
However the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, was 
extremely disgusting even for Amir Habibullah and for the 
people of Afghanistan. 
According to Vartan Gregorian perhaps "no single event 
gave as much impetus to the growth of Afghan nationalism 
as the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 did."^^ Fearing the 
attack on Afghan independence the Amir had expressed his 
reluctance to adhere to the Anglo-Russian Convention in 
which Afghanistan was cited as the third party and without 
whose approval the terms would not come into force.*^ 
However the Afghan misgivings continued leading to the 
acrimony between the Amir and the British Indian Viceroy. 
In reply to the question regarding the Convention, the Afghan 
Amir had replied to the viceroy in a massive fifty four 
pages letter that "the same had destroyed the independence 
of Afghanistan and the same was never signed by the 
Afghan government."" 
61. Habibullah to Hardinge, 18 August, 1914, British Documents, No. 91, 
Vol. IV, pp. 528-529. 
62. For details on the Turkish Angle vis-a-vis Afghanistan the World 
War I. See Trivedi, R.K.: The Critical Triangle (India. Britain and 
Turkey). 1908-1924. Publication Scheme, 1993. 
63. India Office (London) P.S. Papers, 4741 (1914) Memorandum No. 
373. As cited by Maaroof, Khalid, Op.cit., p. 24. 
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However, sensing the impediment in its approval by the 
Afghan government the Anglo-Russian party declaring 
Afghanistan 'a neutral', they agreed to sign in her absence. 
Despite these difficulties, Afghanistan's relation remained 
normal v^ i^th the British preceding the outbreak of the First 
World War. The caution and independent nature of foreign 
policy pursued by Amir HabibuUah had deterred both Britain 
and Russia from exerting any sort of pressure on 
Afghani Stan. ^"^  
The outbreak of the First World War in the summer of 
1914 had forced both Britain and Russia not to force the 
Convention of 1907 on Afghanistan and in return Amir 
HabibuUah pledging his adherence to the Anglo-Afghan treaty, 
declared his determination to maintain neutrality in the war." 
Even when it was the question of Turkish entry to the war. 
Amir HabibuUah reiterated his country's continued commitment 
to the policy of neutrality. 
Despite Amir Habibullah's strict neutrality in the ensuing 
international crisis, the general mood in Kabul was of strong 
anti-British^^ and wave of sympathy for the Turkish cause. 
64. An Englishman wrote to his relatives in Bombay from Kabul "Almost 
every one in Kabul was strongly anti-British and Pro-Turkish, except 
the Amir who speaks seldom in public.NAI Foreign and Political 
Files, FPS War, Nos. 1-202, Dec. 1915, No. 12. 
65. NAI Foreign and Political Files, FPS War, Nos. 1-202, March, 
1916, No. 16, p. 7. 
66. NAI Foreign and Political Files, FPS War, Nos. 1-202, March, 
1916, No. 16, p. 7. 
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Even Mahmud Khan Tarzi had blamed the war on English 
for their commercial rivalry with the Germans^' as is 
reflected in his writings in Sirai-ul-Akhbar. Germany also 
tried to woo the Amir in their favour but the Amir did not 
respond positively. The Germans tried to woo the Amir to 
sign a treaty but the Amir did not respond.' 68 
Though the maintenance of strict neutrality by 
Afghanistan during the war did not do much good to 
Afghanistan, as in terms of reward from the British 
government nothing came concrete as the Indian Viceroy's 
overture of "being generous" was hardly heard by London.^^ 
Following the assassination of Amir Habibullah on 19 
February, 1919, Amanullah had succeeded the throne of 
Afghanistan on 2P* February, 1921. Just after the assuming 
of power the Amir tried to convey a clear message to the 
British government of India of Afghanistan's aquiring a new 
status of "a free, autonomous and independent country both 
internally and externally, and would not tolerate any outside 
67. For details See Adamec, Op.cit., No. 55, pp. 28-40. 
68. For details See Maaroof, Khalid, Op.cit., pp. 27-28 and NAI 
Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Secret, File Nos. 705-806, Oct. 
1920, No. 705 Notes 706. 
69. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Secret, B. Nos. 92-101, 
Sept. 1919, No. 98 and Foreign Secret File Nos. 705-806, Oct. 
1920, No. 720. 
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interference."^" But as expected the British reply was an 
impression that AmanuUah's rise to power was 'not 
favourably viewed by London'. The acrimony continued 
between the British government of India and Amir AmanuUah 
Khan which led to the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The war 
had proved to be a costly affair for the British, whereas 
Amir Amanullah Khan had succeeded in securing full 
independence for Afghanistan and many such issues were 
settled. 
70. Kapur, Harish; Soviet Russia and Asia. 1917-1927 (Geneva, Victor 
Chevalier, 1965), p. 216. 
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CHAPTER-III 
PART-I 
AMIR AMANULLAH'S ASSUMING OF POWER 
AND THE THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 
Amir Habibullah was assassinated on Feb. 19, 1919 and 
with that the race for the throne begun. Nasrullah the brother 
of Habibullah, and InayatuUah were two powerful contender 
who had been withthe king in Jalalabad and and declared 
themselves the kings, whereas Amanullah' who had often 
served as the regent in his father's absentia, and had been 
taking independant decision was fortunately at KabuP during 
the event. He captured the Arg (a combination of royal 
residence, fort and treasur) and spent the money lavishly for 
getting support of the army.^ The army though was in his 
command was rejoiced with the improved condition and 
increased salary, gave him overwhelming support. Nasrullah 
was captured alongwith his family members and brought to 
1. For detailed sketch of Amanullah's contest for the throne. See Rhea 
Talley Stewart; Fire in Afghanistan (New York. Double day, 1973). 
2. He had been helped by the circumstances of his being is Kabul 
while every possible claimaint was in the south, as quoted from Wild 
Roland; AmanuUah. Ex-King of Afghanistan. Hurst and Blackett Ltd. 
London, 1932. 
3. Army seeing the prospect of freedom from British tutelege supported 
Amanullah, see for detail in this regard Abdul Ghani; A Review of 
Political situation in Central Asia, Ch. 4; See also. Ikbal Ali Shah, 
The Tragedy of Amanullah (London : Alexander, 1933). 
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kabul. Those who were found quitly were put to death, 
some were confined to prison and those found innocent 
were freed including Inayatullah.'* 
Amaullah in this way seized the throne of Afghanistan 
on April 13, 1919 and held a public Darbar^ and was 
recognised as the full fledge king of Afghanistan. Before that 
Amanullah, a few week ago vowing to bring the murderer of 
his father to justice, had steered the people by his public 
oratory.^ He claimed that his legitimacy and his mandate to 
rule emanated from the Afghan nation. Personal popularity of 
Amanullah in the army and among the Barakzais provided 
him an added strength from the start of his reign. 
After the arrest of his uncle Nasrullah and most of the 
members of Habibullah's entourage, kept in pending 
investigation of the assassination. This was an astute move 
that immobilized the leadership of the traditional of force.^ 
4. Nasrullah was put to confinement and died in jail. Whereas 
InayatuUah who was found innocent freed. 
5. "Darbar" is common among Afghan tribal chiefs and particulalry 
during such occassion as coronation of new king powerful tribal 
chiefs from all over are invited to attend. 
6. Siraj-ul-Akbar (Kabul) Feb. 19, 1919. 
7. During the Habibullah's regime (called Serajiya) the court was divided 
into two faction, one was Pro-reform other opposing it. The Pro-
reform was led by Amir Habibullah, while Nasrullah being very 
religious led the orthodox conservative faction. Getting rid of 
Nasrullah, meant a big relief for the new dynamic Amir who wanted 
no such hindrances. See May, Schinasi, Afghanistan at the begiiming 
of the twentieth century: A study of Siraj-ul-akbar (1911-1918) 
Naples, 1979, pp. 34-35. 
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Nasrullah died in jail and the other members of Musahiban^ 
family who were found innocent were released. 
Amir Amanullah then with consolidating his position at 
home began to unfold his maneouvres in foreign affairs. He 
lost no time in indicating a complete change in the Afghan 
politics as he had spoken in his coronation speech of 
complete Afghan independence on March 1, 1919. One of 
the Amanullah's first acts after seizing the throne was to 
write a letter on March 3, 1919 to the Viceroy of India, 
Lord Chelmsford, declaring Afgthanistan to be entirely 
independent^ and before that he had declared himself and his 
country as entirely free, autonomous and independant country 
internally and externally in his coronation speech.'" 
It appeared that the British did not view these 
development with any seriousness and attached no significant 
8. Among the four leading families of Afghanistan, the Amanullah family, 
Charkhi, Tarzi and Musahiban played important role in Afghanhistory. 
Amir Abdur Rahman had Tarzis and Musahiban exiled in turkey and 
British India respectively. Though Habibullah permitted both of them 
to return. It was Nadir Khan from Musahiban family who succeeded 
Amanullah. Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, Cornell 
University Press, pp. 35-36. This family is also known as "Peshawar 
Sirdar family" Cf Caroe, p. 307. 
9. Appendix to document no. 98, NAI foreign Political files, Fronties 6, 
1919. 
10. Ludwig, Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs to the Mid 20th century. 
University Arizona, Press, 1974 p. 46. See also East India 
(Afghanistan). Papers regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, 
Presented to Parliament, London, 1919, pp. 4-5 for detail. 
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apparently.^' They were aware of the new ruler's Barakzai 
lineage'^ and tradition and hence possibly were convinced 
that this was a pretext for seeking an increase in his 
stipend. The viceroy of India in a letter offered no 
comments on his declaration of Independence. On the 
contrary, praised Amir Amanullah and expressed the hope 
that the good relation established by ancestors with the 
British would be continuing by the new Amir as well.'^ 
Amir Amanullah's declaration of independence and 
autonomy had come at a time when the British were facing 
problems in India.''* On 13 April 1919 hundreds of peaceful 
political demonstrator had been massacred by the army at 
Jallian Walla Bagh in Amritsar.'^ The protest which followed 
had swept across India's major cities of Bombay, Delhi and 
11. Cited from Raja, Anwar; Tragedy of Afghanistan. Verso Londo, 
1988, p.l8. 
12. Amanullah's mother Queen Ulaya Hazrat belonged to this tribe of 
Barakzai who had considerable influences. See May Schinasi, 
Afghanistan at the Beginning of the 20"* century. Naples, 1979, pp. 
109-110. 
13. Cf Anwar Raja, Tragedy of Afghanistan, Verso London, p. 18. 
14. Before that during the World War I Britain had managed to keep 
India farily quite by a combination of military controls and vague 
promises of post war liberal reforms. See, Holden Furber; British 
Conquest and Empire, in W. Norman Brown, ed., India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1951), p. 167. 
15. The Hunter commission found that General Dyer had ordered his 
troops to fire into a packed crowd of 15,000 confined in a stadium 
resulting 379 dead and 200 wounded (Annual Register. 1919, p. 
272). 
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Lahore. An Afghan declaration of independence at this point 
could only be viewed by the Indian as an example to be 
followed. 1^  
As soon as the reports reached Kabul of serious roiting, 
in the Punjab, the Afghan government took steps to put 
pressure on the British in India.''' On April 13, 1919 
Amanullah invited a number of influential frontier chiefs to 
Kabul and told them that the holy war was imminent.'* He 
also ordered concentration of Afghan Army on the eastern 
border, where one section under General Swaleh Khan,'^ 
proceeded to Dakka^ *^ near Khyber, second under Nadir 
Khan^' to Matun (Khost) and third commanded by Abdul 
Quddus, was posted at Kandhar. 
The British government of India deployed 7,50,000 
troops all along the Durand line^^ in an operation involving 
16. Cited from. Raja Anwar; The Tragedy of AfghanistaiL. Verso, London, 
p. 18. 
17. Cited from, Fletcher Arnold; Afghanistan. Highway of Conquestu. 
Cornell University Press, New York, 1966, p. 189. 
18. Quoted from, Arnold Fletcher; Afghanistan. Highway of Conquest. 
Cornell, 1966, p. 189. 
19. Swaleh Khan was the commander-in-chief of the Afghan army. 
20. Dakka was an important military outpost four miles away from 
Khyber Pass. 
21. Nadir Khan, the Afghan war Minister during the Afghan war of 
Independence had succeeded Amanullah as king. 
22. The drawing of this "boundary" the so-called Durand line had often 
belen challenged by the Afghan at various times. See D.S. Franck; 
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some 400,000 transport animals. Facing this army were 
38,000 Afghan infantry men (one hlaf of them with small 
bore rifles and the rest with 19**' century Martinis and 
Sniders) 8,000 cavalry men and 4,000 artillery men with low 
quality guns.^^ The Afghan army had neither aircraft nor 
mechanised units. 
The stage was set for the Third British Afghan war^ '*, 
which began on May 6, 1919. From the beginning it was 
the most uneven contest ever fought. The British forces 
were fifteen times stronger in size to that of the Afghan 
Army. They were armed with mortars, tanks and aircraft. In 
addition to it had behind it the experience of four year's of 
first World War. Compared to the British they had oudated 
weapons. The British bombed Kabul. The fighting began on 
three major fronts. At Khyber the tribal militia raised by 
British rebelled and occupied the area.^* However, British 
counter attacks had not only regained control, but pushed 
(continued fiom previous page) Pusfatunistan : Disputed Dispoation of a Tribal 
Land; Middle East Journal vi (1952) p. 49-62, Louis Deupree; Pushtunistan 
V.no. 2,3, and 4. PouUada B.L., Some International Legal aspects of the 
Pushtunistan Disputes: Afghanistan (Kabul) XXI No. 4, 1969, pp. 10-36. 
23. A good account of the type of the guns, and other war machinery 
can be found in Molesworth, G.N. (Lt. Gen.) Afghanistan. 1919 
(NY. Asia Publishing House, 1962) Chap. VII. 
24. A detailed description of the war is recorded in Government of 
India, "Official Account of the Third Afghan War, 1919" (Calcutta : 
General Staff Army Headquarter, 1926). See also G.N. Molesworth, 
Afghanistan. 1919 (N.Y., Asia Publishing House, 1962). 
25. Spin Baldak was an important Afghan fort north west of New 
Chaman, a strongly buih fort. 
43 
back the Afghan nearly 20 km. into their own territory. In 
the Qandhar sector also British attack was successful. There 
was heavy fighting around the Afghan post of Spin Bolaak^^ 
which the British eventually captured. 
At Khost the Afghan army fought valiantly and advanced 
as far as the contonment of town of Tal. In this engagement 
the military governor of Paktia General Nadim Khan, 
emerged as hero. As hostilities began he pressed the local 
tribes into service.Thirty thousand armed Waziris tribesmen^^, 
who were settled in British occupied territories marched to 
him and^* they were joined by other tribesmen. Emboldened 
by the success, tribal parties began to carryout daring raidas 
into the British territories. In 1919 according to one estimate 
a total of 611 raids took place, resulting in 198 killed, 392 
wounded and 463 abductions, property worth 300,000 rupees 
was damaged and of the invading tribal fighters 119 were 
killed, 60 injured and 40 taken prisoner.^^ Most of these 
raids were carriedout behind British line and the main targets 
26. Many of the tribal militia armed by the British including powerful 
Waziris and Mahseed tribes revoltd in ensuring war. See the series 
of Secret Telegrams from the Chief Commissioner, NWPF, to the 
Government of India, lOL, LPS/10/808/1061, 1919. 
27. Waziris a highland tribe speakers of soft Pushtun wear long hair, not 
true Afghan. See Olaf Caroe; The Pathans. for detail Macmillan. 
28. For detail see, Sadat, Asmat; Afghanistan. Land of Jirgas. Kabul, 
1986, p. 38. 
29. See for detail Saunan Island, India. Pakistan and Pakhtunistan. 
Stockholm 1981, p. 28. 
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were British and Indian officers. 30 
On May 24, Amanullah responded to British feelers and 
the government of India accepted an end to the hostilities, 
as the situation all along the NWF had rapidly deteriorated.^' 
The hostilities in the third Afghan war lasted only a few 
weeks yet the relations between them had deteriorated 
considereably. Now that the tribes were roused at last, 
British would have met far more serious opposition if the 
war had continued. In fact the ferocious Darwesh Khel 
Waziris alone could have done considerable damage to the 
British army. Moreover an epidemic of cholera broke out in 
the British army, with heavy mortality.^^ Thus war was to 
end, though as a military stalema . The viceroy. Lord 
Chelmsford and his delegate Sir H.R. Grant were keen for 
a peaceful settlement of the issues. 
Thus on May 28, while the army of Nadir Khan was 
investing Thai, the viceroy received a message from 
Amanullah Khan, who wrote that the action of Swaleh 
30. The detail comes from, Spain, J.W., The Pathan Borderland. Hague, 
1963, p. 186. 
31. See the series of Secret Telegram from the chief commissioner 
NWFP, to the Government of India, lOL, LPS, 10/808/1061, 1919. 
32. All this led to afghan attack more furiously as their main tactic was 
guerilla warfare. See Arnold Fletcher; Afghanistan. Highway of 
Conquest. New York, 1966. 
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Khan" had been misinmterpreted and that the Afghan had 
not contemplated attacking India. He also requested for 
armistice. In the British reply, the condition under which an 
armistice would be granted, were "that the Afghan's were to 
withdraw all tropps from the border that the British 
troops should remain where they now are in Afghan 
territory British troops, will not bomb or machine gun 
Afghan localities or troop [;] further that you will undertake 
that your people won't fire upon or molest British aircraft. 
AmanuUah's response was the show of defiance and 
challenge. He pointed out that the civil and military forces 
of Afghanistan as identical and that it was impossible to 
move the tribes from the border. He also wrote "the spirit 
of freedom has nearly brought to its death, agony, 
oppression and domination among the various nations. '^* 
Whether the British government was impressed by the 
new Amir's philosophical defiance or forced by 
circumstances, they now agreed to a peace conference. But 
the die hards in the imperial structure both in India and 
England wanted to see the upstart young king of 
Afghanistan, who had dared to challenge British power, eat 
33. Swaleh Khan, the commander-in-chief then at Peshwar commanding 
the army, couod not wait for the expected uprising of the tribals 
against the British and jumped the gun before. Through he was 
dismised later on. 
34. As cited from Iqbal Ali Shah; Afghanistan (London, 1938), p. 118. 
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dirt. They objected even to cease fire and were outraged at 
the suggestion that Britain should relinquish control of 
Afghanistan's foreign affarirs.^^ 
The British agreed to the peace conference, which was 
to be held at Rawalpindi. The Afghan delegation was led by 
Ali Ahmad Khan, one of Amanullah's cousin and the British 
by Sir Hamilton Grant.^^ The discussion lasted for about a 
forthnight (from July 26 to August 8, 1919) and were 
acrimonious in the extreme. To the astonishment and the 
anger of the British the Afghans did not behave in the least 
like a vanquished nation.^' They put forth the claims to all 
of Waziristan, to a much larger subsidy, and to their own 
independence and sovereignty and in their spare time they 
made inflammatory speeches for the benefit of an admiring 
audience of Indians. On August 8, treaty was concluded. Its 
five articles called for the withdrawl of British, the cessation 
of British subsidies and a stop to the flow of Afghan war 
materials through India. No mention was made of Afghan 
sovereignty, but at the request of the Afghan delegation a 
35. See Naftula, Khalfin, British Plots against Afghanistan, Novosty, 
1981, pp. 92-93. 
36. Sir Hamilton Grant, the foreign secretary to the Govt, of India 
assisted by the Viceroy's personal secretary and nine civilian officials 
and military men. The nine member Afghan delegation was led by 
Ali Ahmad Khan, commissiary for Home Affairs. Cited from Naftula 
Khalfin. British Plots against Afghanistan, Novosty, 1981, pp. 92-93. 
37. More on the Afghan approaches see the Report by Sir Hamilton 
Grant to the Government of India no. 108 Sept. 6, 1919. NAI, 
Foreign Political Filed Fronties B, nos. 15-138, Oct. 1919, as 
quoted from Leon PouUada; Reform and Rebellion, pp. 250-51. 
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rider to the effect, that it had been implied was attached to 
the treaty.^^ 
Compared with the previous wars the Third Afghan War 
was less bloody yet the British Government of India had to 
spend a huge sum of about £ 16,500,000. It was a drain on 
them immediately after the end of the World War I. 
The question needs to be examine as to why did 
Amanullah had gone for a war against the British? Fraser 
Tytler holds' that the flood of popular sentiment which had 
swept Habibullah his throne swept Amanullah on to it.... But 
the Afghan like other young people are liable to be 
volatile. "39 
Within a few weeks of his accession Amanullah had 
antagonised the powerful religious factions by imprisioning his 
uncle Nasrullah''" for his complicity in the murder'*' of his 
father and incurred the resentment of the army by releasing 
the distinguishing Musahiban family."*^ Therefore, when 
38. As cited fro, Aitchinson C.U., A collection of treaties. Sanads and 
engagement relating to India and neighbouring countries (Cal. 1933), 
vol. XIII, pp. 45-60. 
39. Fraser, Tytler, Afghanistan, op.cit., p. 35. 
40. Nasrullah as has been stated earlier was extremely orthodox person 
opposed to HabibuUah's modernizing programme. He had a powerful 
factions of religious men. See May Schinasi, Afghanistan at the 
Beginning of 20th century. Naples, 1973, pp. 34-35. 
41. Nasrullah at that time of HabibuUah's murder was with him in Kalla 
Ghosh. (Laghman Province) and this is suspected of complicity. 
42. Musahiban family along with Nadir Khan (the Minister of War) was disliked 
the Proturidsh group in the army. There was a kind of schian in Amanullah's 
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Amanulah felt his position was endangered he sought to 
reunite his people and bring them under his fold. The 
opinion prevails that war resulted primarily due to domestic 
Afghan causes. Amanullah needed independence. Though the 
British viewed relation with Afghanistan in the same way as 
was concluded with Habibullah but Amanullah took it 
differently. But with the emerging of situation, Amanullah 
wanted to concluded a new agreement with Britain, in which 
complete independence a major term, and which Britain was 
reluctant to grant. British Government was inclined towards 
Nasrullah. These all made Amanullah hostile towards the 
British. 
To sum up it can be said that the most important 
reason for the Third Afghan War were Amanullah's fear that 
Afghanistan would again be subjected to the British tutelege 
if he was to practice the policy of his predecessors. 
Amanullah emerged from the conflict as the champion of 
Afghan freedom and Afghan looked upon this war as "war 
of independence." Amanullah emerged upon the war with 
enormous prestige, not only as nationalist fighter who had 
successfully twisted British lion tail, but as one who had 
done in the name of jihad. 
(continued from previous page) cabinet later on as Pro- and anti-Turkish 
factions opposed each other. See, the Secret Report on the kabul mission 
by Sir H.R Dobbs, lOL, LPS/10/809, 1909, for military reform controversy 
CHAPTER-III 
PART II 
ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING 
AMIR AMANULLAH'S PERIOD 
Afghanistan became the biggest concern of the British 
for securing their colonial interests in India.' Both from the 
starategic and diplomatic point of view, it occupied a 
prominent place in British policy concerns in the 
region.Situation had become more complex after the 
Bolshevick Revolution taking into consideration the Indo-
Afghan relation dealt by the British. Soviet intentions were 
aggressively threatening.^ Whereas the new Amir Amanullah 
was mainly concerned with the issue of "complete 
Independence for Afghanistan." 
This way from the strategic considerations Afghanistan 
became buffer for their vested interests. Therefore, British 
1. See, Ludwig, Adamec: Afghanistan (1900-1923). A Diplomatic 
History. Berkley, 1967, who has extensively dealt with the diplomatic 
and strategic importance of Afghanistan in relation to the defence of 
British India. 
2. The Russian were more aggressive after the Bolshevick Resolution 
and by the time of Amir Amanullah's assuming of power, they had 
already encroached upon the independent Khanates of Khiva and 
Bukhara, etc. the Soviet Policy makers had been eyeing towards the 
British India through Afghanistan. See also, Gregorian Vartan; The 
Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. In particular Stalin's statement that 
"Central Asia and the States bordering India are to Russian outposts 
from which the Soviet authority should be able to threaten England; 
The Times. Jan. 1, 1923, p. 9 as cited by Samra, C.S.: India & 
Anglo-Soviet Relations (1917-1947), Asia Publication, 1959. 
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obviously wanted to put pressure on Russians by seeing that 
Afghanistan remained titled towards the British India. This 
had been the British ploy to be used for their "forward 
policy."^ And the British had pursued it towards the Amir's 
of Afghanistan in the past. Amir Abdur Rahman however, 
had strong disliking for such a stereotyped pattern of foreign 
policy yet he was aware of the limited option available to 
Afghanistan and thus remained clueless. Amir Habibullah 
turned out to be a "Pro-British and he bowed down before 
the British designs. Amir HabibuUah's policy antagonised a 
large section of Afghan intellectuals. Young Afghans including 
young Amanullah'*. 
The previous two full scale wars (Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1838, 
1878) and continuous diplomatic edge in terms of sending envoys to 
Kabul and getting Afghan cooperation was infact a way how the 
British would pressurise Russia (as the Russians were acting in the 
historical pattern of previous heartland empires and was intent on the 
conquest of the Asian rimlands and on gaining access to the warm 
seas). Similarly the Russian leaders were convinced that Britain had 
sought to restrict and frustrate Russia's legitimate expansion in Asia 
and at some point would resort to military aggression to esnsure 
containment within limits which the latters could not accept. 
A good summary of British and Russian views on the Central 
Asia problems is contained in, George N. Curzon : Russia in Central 
Asia in 1889. London, Frank Cass, 1969. For a fuller exposition of 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. See Olaf Caroe : Soviet Empire. 
London, McMillan, 1954. Also Edward Allworth, ed. : Central Asia : 
A Century of Russian Rules. New York, Columbia University Press, 
1966. Also William P. and Zelda K. Coates . A History of Anglo-
Soviet Relations. London, Lawrance and Wishart, 1943. Also William 
Habberton : Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan. Urbana, 
University, Illnois Press, 1937. 
See for details, Singhal, D.P.: India & Afghanistan (1876-1907). 
Queensland, 1963, p. 72. 
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As an Amir of Afghanistan Amanullah found it totally 
obnoxious to follow the imperialist design of either the 
powers and was unwilling to follow even the stereotype 
patterns of foreign policy set by his predecessors.^ 
Amanullah was a witness to and was aware of the 
developments taking place in some of the muslim countries. 
The Pan-Islamic upsurg against imperialism, strong anti-British 
feelings had surfaced in Afghanistan. Amanullah had to take 
notice of these forces to make Afghanistan an extremely 
independent nation.^ 
5. Sareen, Anuradha : India and Afghanistan (1907-1921) Seema 
Publication, Delhi 1981, pp. 107-108. The period preceeding Amanullah's 
accession was the period of revolutions, Worid War-I, Pan-Islamism and 
fight for the survival of the Khilafat. Seriously misjudging the internal 
intellectual undercurrent and the inclination of the Afghan elite towards 
anti-British factor. Amir Habibullah did not pay much heed to the Turco-
German Mission, Young Afghan leanings and the Pan-Islamic ideological 
prevalents, Habibullah sided with the British and that cost his life even. 
That gave a chance to the young Amanullah to see his ideology prevail 
in Afghanistan's Foreign policy. See for details, Percy, Sykes : A History 
of Afghanistan. II Vols. London, McMillan, 1940, 264 flf. Sykes point out 
that even Newspapers like Sirajul-Akhbar too was consistently anti-Britis, 
reflecting pro-Turkish and German leanings. Report by Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) on Aman-i-Afghan. National Archives of 
India, New Delhi, Home and Political Department, Secrete Deposit No. 
21, July 1916, No. 31, October 1916 and No. 53, November 1916) 
showes the serious tirade against the British. Also, May Schinasi : Sirajul-
Akhbar. L'Opinion Afghan et la Russie : Cahier du Monde Russie et 
Sivietique, XII (1971), pp. 467-479. See for Turco-German influence in 
Afghanistan, Ludwig Adamec : Afghanistan. 1900-1923. and Trivedi, 
R.K.: The Critical Triangle. India. Britain and Turkey. Publication Scheme, 
Jaipur, 1993. 
6. See, Appendix to the Document No. 98, NAI Foreign and Political Files, 
Frontier B, 1919, as quoted by Leon B. Poullada; Reform and Rebellion 
in Afghanistan (1919-19291 Cornell University Press, 1973, p. 234. 
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AmanuUah's resolve to cast off all signs of British 
domination and control the affairs of Afghanistan particularly 
at this moment which had coincided with the problems faced 
by the British in the area. Especially British government of 
India had been struggling hard against the Non-Cooperation 
Movement and the threats posed by Bolshevick Russia.^ 
AmanuUah's announcement of a new and independent 
foreign policy had its effect on the morales of the British 
government of India.^ Amanullah initially looked towards 
Soviets for military help, for raising a soviet trained Afghan 
Air Force. The British had always viewed the Russio-Afghan 
ties a dangerous sign for them. Amir AmanuUah's departure 
from the earlier established pro-British policy was a 
revolutionary step. Amanullah took advantages of the serious 
internal turmoils posed by the British in India, and declared 
war against the British in May 1919.^ He proclaimed it to be 
7. The period is marked with the web of confusion and the disorder for 
the British government of India as the series of problems related to 
the post-war settlement of the promises, the Khilafat questions, the 
Non-Cooperation Movement etc. combined with the aggressive threat 
from the Bolshevick Russia had, raised their dragon heads. See for 
details on the problems facing the British Government of India. 
Trivedi, R.K.: The Critical Triangle. (India Britain and Turkey). Jaipur 
1993. Particularly the chapter on "Turko-German Intrigue in India 
during the world war II." Also Bamford, RC; Histories of the Non-
Cooperation and Khilafat Movement. Deep Publication, 1974. and 
Zelda, Coates: A History of Anglo Soviet Relations. London, 1945. 
8. The defeat of Turkey and the neutrality of Afghanistan in the world 
war I led to the Afghan's developing strong anti-British Sentiment. 
See, Sareen, Anuradha, op.cit., p. 107. 
9. A detailed account of the war is recorded in, Molesworth, G.N,: 
Afghanistan. 1919. New York, Asia Publishing House, 1962. 
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a jihad.'" Nadir Khan's Pushtun uprising"*' in the NWF 
against the British and Amanullah's seeking help from the 
soviet had caused consternation in the British ranks and files. 
Though the Afghans themselves had created this situation 
as is evident from the reports and secret letters. The clashes 
between the British India and Afghanistan proved not only 
costly but a bloody one.'^ The attack was to start as a 
tribal incursion from Afghan sides into a tiny piece of 
disputed territory in the Khyber pass and would coincide 
with the uprising of the Indian nationalists in Peshawar 
planned by the Afghan Secret Service. The brain behind the 
Peshawar uprising, was the famous Afghan Secret agent, 
Ghulam Hyder'^ However, the British thwarted the Afghan 
plan through a swift counter move relying on its efficient 
10. Amanullah's proclamation of jihad, was a means of waking up public 
enthusiasm and at the same time divesting the attention of hostile 
elements in the country from his own person by the call of Islam as 
his accession to power was not very legitimate. See Maconachie, 
R.R.: A Precis on Afghan Affairs. February 1919 to Sep. 1927 
(Simla, 1928) no. 1, p. 14. 
11. Nadir Khan was sent for inciting the Pushtuns on the British side of 
the Durand line against the British. See, Annual Register. 1919. 
12. According to the Annual Register. 1919 the one month Anglo-
Afghan war of 1919 had resulted in an increase of 4,750,000 
pound in the military Budget of the govt, of India. 
13. Ghulam Haider, the famous Afghan Post Master at Peshawar was 
infact operated as a Soviet secret agent and had liaison with Indian 
nationalists, as is revealed through numerous ducuments. The 
Government (Provisional) formed by Mahendra Pratap as President, 
Barkatullah as Prime Minister and Obaidullah Sindhi as Home 
Minister. See for further details. Trivedi, R.K.; Op.cit. pp. 173-177. 
54 
spy system. Kabul had offered shelter to a number of 
Indian revolutionaries who had formed "the Provisional 
Government of India in exile'"'' 
The British government of India considered those 
developments as a blatant interference in the internal affairs 
of the country. Amanullah went on to the extent of even 
condemning the Rawlatt Act and declaring the Third Anglo-
Afghan war to be a jihad. 
Nadir Khan though was successful in leading a rising of 
the Pushtun tribes against the British. At one point of time 
the entire frontier threatened to explode against the British, 
but due to the superb handling of the affairs by experienced 
George Roos KeppeP^ and Sir Abdul Qayyum, they 
managed to save the situation for the British. ^ ^ 
The war was keenly contested and evenly matched. 
Though in terms of losses, in this war too the British had 
considerable losses in terms of men and material. Even with 
14. The Government (Provisional) formed by Mahindra Pratap as 
President, BarkatuUah as Prime Minister and Obaidullah Sindhi as 
Home Minister. See for further details Trivedi, R.K.; Opcit. pp. 173-
177. See also, Cf Secret Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary 
of State for India no. 793-5, June 2, 1919, India Office Library/ 
LPS/10/808/1919; Also Sykes, P. Opcit. Vol. II, No. 267 ft. and 
Ghani Abdul: A Review of Political Situation in Central Asia, Lahore, 
n.p. 1921, chapter 5. 
15. George Roos Keppel was the Chief Commissioner of the N.W. 
Frontier Province and Sir Abdul Qayyum as a British Agent. 
16. Cf the series of Secret Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, 
Government of India, India Office Library/LPS/10/808/1061/1919 as 
cited by Leon B. PouUada, Opcit., p. 141. 
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the upper hand the Afghan forces had got, Amanullah 
thought it wise to call for a truce*'' and a deal favourable to 
his policy, resulting in the rise of his status -— a very 
disgusting situation for the British.'* 
Among the British ranks and files this war had led to 
the emergence of divergent views and clash of opinions in 
regard to the future Anglo-Afghan policy to be pursued. 
Lord Chelmsford, the then British viceroy to India was in 
favour of "an entirely new game to be played in Asia". He 
wanted a 'drastic policy shift' towards Afghanistan.'^ But the 
17. For details on. The Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919). See Sareen 
Anuradha: India and Afghanistan (1907-1921). Chapter 6, Seema 
PubHshing, Delhi, 1981. 
18. For the war and the subsequent negotiations for peace. See Adamec, 
Op.cit., A publication of the British Govt., Papers Regarding 
Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, gives an account of the Third 
Anglo Afghan war on the basis of sixty seven documents. For some 
time this publication was of necessity the most important source for 
this war; however, its usefulness is limited because the documents 
published are largely communicated between India and England and 
only such documents were listed, as could safely be published at the 
time. For the most comprehensive coverage of the war, consult the 
files on the Afghan war containing about one thousand documents 
bound in seven volumes, as follows: NAI, Foreign and Political Files. 
Secret Afghan War, August 1919, no. 90; Sept. 1919, nos. 92-101, 
file 1, July 1919, nos. 1-235; file 2, August 1919, nos. 1-200B; file 
3. August 1919, nos. 201-422; file 4, Sept. 1919, nos. 6-195; file 
5, Oct. 1919, nos. 18-191. For an account by a participant in the 
war. See India Office Memorandum A183, Afghanistan, Diary of 
Events, Feb. 20, 1919, Sep. 15, 1915. 
19. Even Hamilton Grant, the then Foreign Secretary of the British Govt, in 
India Jiad-suggested for a "relation based on real fiiendliness and mutual 
^Jar^^vM^lM^tii^ and for that advocated for treaty based on Afghan 
^^Tfis.^^ee, NX^'^oi^gn and Political Files Secret Frontier, Oct. 1920, 
/h.f^o. 705-806, as citedt^ by Sareen Anuradha, Op.cit. p. 122. 
r \ Ace. No )'^"jj 
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suggested new approach, found in the bureaucratic and 
geopolitical thought of the imperial policy makers "too 
deeply ingrained for a general attitude to change even in the 
changed scenario". There were conflicting and distorted 
perceptions of each others policies.^" 
Though the real intentions of the British policy makers 
could not become clear. The same acrimony and conflicting 
policy debate among them led to misunderstanding and 
tension among the Afghan elite too.^' 
The leading newspapers and journals of Afghanistan 
particularly the Sirai-ul-Akhbar and Aman-i-Afghan journals of 
Afghanistan were vehemently anti-British in the tone and 
content. These journals more reflected the Amir's point of 
view and had been praising the German efforts during the 
World War I ,which was part of the tirade against the 
British India. 
Though the real intentions of the British policy makers 
20. The so called "New Approach" in relation was not destined to 
succeed as Lord Chelmsford himself embarked upon a "policy of 
releasing Afghanistan from the leading strings of the British" of which, 
though Afghanistan was free, and independent but policy wise had to 
be treated then as dependency. Cf Lord Chelmsford's Secret Report 
to the Rt. Hon. Edwin Montague in Despatch no. 73, Oct. 2, 1919, 
India Office Library, LPS/10/808/1919, as cited by Leon B. PouUada, 
Op.cit., p. 243. 
21. AmanuUah, Tarzi and Young Afghans proud of a new freedom, they 
felt they had wrested from the British by skilfiil diplomacy and force 
of arms, deeply resented the British patronising attitude. Leon B. 
Poullada, Op.cit., p. 243. 
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could not become clear. The same acrimony and conflicting 
policy debate among them led to the misunderstandings and 
tension among the Afghan elite too. 
Seeing the consistent tirade against the British 
government and its policies by these journals, the government 
had come out with a ban on circulation of journals into 
India. Even Amir Amanullah had lost no occasion to thrash 
the British through media, for their colonial policies in India. 
Time and again he had interacted himself on the British 
attitude towards the Indians,^^ as he had espoused the cause 
of Indian nationalist leaders for their fight against the 
atrocities and high handedness of British Indian authorities. 
There is enough evidence to suggest a closer link between 
the exiled Indian nationalist's and Amanullah's secret agents 
in India, i.e. Hakim Aslam and Maulvi Manzoor.^^ Afghan 
intrigues in the tribal areas of the North West Frontiers had 
become a constant source of friction. Amanullah's Tribal 
Affairs Department was reported to give extensive subsidies 
to the tribes on the British side and goaded them to agitate 
22. Likewise Amanullah spoke on Indian Muslim's question, the Rawllatt 
Act etc. See Adamec, Ludwig, Op.cit., p. 114. 
23. Cf. Captured or Intercepted Documents Relating to Afghan 
conspiracy against the Government of India, India Office Library/LPS/ 
10/808/1061, Part B, 1919 as cited by Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., 
246, for a detailed discussion on subversive activities. See, Trivedi, 
R.K.: The Critical Triangle: (India. Britain and Turkey), 1900-1924: 
Publication Scheme; Jaipur 1993. See also for "details on Provisional 
Government of India in Kabul. 
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and propagate against the British.^^ On the other hand the 
British activities in the tribal belt also raised the level of 
conflict with Afghanistan. British had a modified forward or 
"close Border Policy," which involved gradual peaceful 
penetration, with extension of roads and railways upto the 
Afghan borders.^^ later on Afghan attempt to negotiate the 
tribal problems with government of India, was simply ignored 
and given a cold reception.^^ Afghan pride was seriously 
hurt in finding that the British had not accorded them the 
respect due to a sovereign state. 
In 1920, a Afghan mission was not permitted to plead 
the cause of the Khilafat in London. British also had 
protested to Italy about a projected commercial agreement 
with Afghanistan on the ground that Afghanistan lay within 
the British sphere of the influence.^^ 
24. It was suspected by the British Government in India that the money 
was coming from the Soviet Union. Cf. Telegrams India, Afghan, 
Bolshevick Connection, India Office Library, LPS/10/809/1919, Soviet 
Activities in India, NAI Home Political Files, 7-379, 1930, as cited 
by Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 247. 
25. The Policy involved more a diplomatic manoeuvre rather than an 
"aggressive forward pohcy". See for details on the theory of "Close 
Border Policy", Spain, James W: The Pathan Borderland, The Hague 
Mouton, 1963, p. 153; Also Annual Register 1926. Fraser-Tytler: 
Op.cit., pp. 203-204. 
26. On tribal question, Curzon heading the Foreign Office in London did 
not give any indication of enthusiasm in discussing the matter with 
Afghan envoy, which had created problem for both parties. See also 
Amanullah-Chamberlain discussion in this regard as cited by Leon B. 
Poullada, Op.cit., p. 247. 
27. Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 248. 
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During the same period, as the acrimony continued, the 
British government of India continued to impose the 
sanction on the transit of goods through India to 
Afghanistan. During the Mangal revolt the British had 
stopped arms shipment from France and Germany to 
Afghanistan, which Tarzi had termed to be a flagrant 
violation of Afghan sovereignty.^* British had regarded with 
great suspicion and displeasure the system of interlocking 
treaties among USSR, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan that 
had as a common denomination hostile to Britain.^^ 
Afghan exiles in India were additional source of friction 
and suspicion between Amir Amanullah and the British. The 
British projected them as the heir apparent to the Afghan 
throne. Consequent to the various tribal revolts, they had 
28. Adamec, Ludwig: Afghanistan. 1900-1923: A Diplomatic 
History. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p. 163, 
Castagne, Joseph, Les Basmatchis, Paris, E. Lerouse, 1925, p. 
13. Tarzi's Statement in Paris, December 17, 1923 as quoted in 
full in Melia,Op.Cit p. 32, see also NAT Foreign Secretary, 
Notes, F.356, 1919. The appearance of exiled Abdul Karim 
(son of Amir Yakub) in the 1924 Khost Revolt & Mohammad 
Umar (descendant of Sardar Ayub during 1928-29 were 
indication of British involvement in subversive activities, against 
Afghanistan. See, Secret Telegram to IB, Quetta, to the Chief 
of the General Staff, New Delhi, No. l-Q-9 January 4, 1929 
India Office Library/10/1203 p. 135, 1927, as cited by Leon 
B. PouUada, Op.cit., p. 240. 
29. In this treaty they had resolved to "oppose" any attack on on any 
one of the parties by any imperialist. See for full document on the 
Turco- Afghan Treaty as reproduced in Adamec Ludwig, Op.cit., 
Appendix pp. 192-193. Also Mustapha, Chokaieve, "The Bolshevicks 
and Afghanistan", Asiatic Review (London) July 1929. 
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raised various objections to Amanullah's efforts to initiate 
modernization programmes in Afghanistan. Sir Francis 
Humphry's had never considered Amir Amanullah more than 
a mere kinglet. The slight and scorn was intolerable for the 
Amir and his people. Naturally those developments had 
bearings on the Anglo-Afghan relations.^° 
The Projected rail-road for Afghanistan sponsored by 
Clemenceau^^ was Humphry's target and did everything to 
discourage and scuttle that. During Baccha-e-Saqqao's attack 
on Kabul, Humphry's had tried to be more blatant in 
approach dealing with Afghanistan and accordingly on 
numerous occasions the Afghan air space was violated and 
the rebels were helped by that way. The pamphlets were 
dropped from the planes which had to incite the rebels 
against Amir Amanullah's regime. These pamphlets contained 
malicious propaganda stuffs hostile to the regime and 
objectionable photographs of Queen Soraya.^^ 
30. Sir Francis Humphry's stay in Kabul covers whole of Amanullah 's 
reign (1919-1929) and from all the known sources. Sir Humphry's 
had developed utter dislike for the Amir and was responsible in more 
detereorating diplomatic relations. See, Leon B. PouUada, Op.cit., pp. 
252-253 and also Telegrams from Sir Francis Humphry's in the 
British Legation, Kabul, to the foreign office London no. 39, 1927-
1929. Also, Minutes of the India Office London, prepared by A. 
Wakeley, no. 1178, February 16, 1929. 
31. Micheal Clemenceau was leading the Kabul Qandhar Railroad 
Project and had conducted survey of the area during Summer 
of 1920. 
32. Leon, B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 253. See also Fraser Tytler, 
Op.cit., pp. 210-211. 
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Although Amanullah was accorded a cordial and dignified 
reception in London during his visit, sending down a positive 
signal and hope for better relations in future. But in general the 
relation between Amir Amanullah and the British were highly 
unsatisfactory. The blame for the rebellion of 1928 was put on 
the shoulders of the British." The Press of the Soviet Union, 
France and Germany had laid the blame on the British.^ '* The 
suspicion of the British intrigue was evident and focussed on 
the presence of Col. T.E. Lawrence (of Lawrence of Arabia 
fame) in the tribal area during the revolt. That carmot be termed 
merely a coincidence, rather a definite link could be seen. 
Humphry's unsympathetic report about the rebellion led the 
British to adopt a neutral attitude between the Amir and the 
rebels. Undoubtedly, the declaration of neutrality operated 
dangerously against Amir Amanullah in a number of ways. That 
deprived him of the support which could have saved him.^ ^ 
33. Whether there was a British comphcity behind the revoh which had 
ousted Amir Amanullah, from the power, is altogether a different 
question, but for a long time Anglo-Afghan relations could never 
improved. 
34. See, the press review done by Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 256 of 
the Morning Post. Jan. 31, 1929, The Bombav Chronicle. Jan. 19, 
1929. The Indian National Herald. Jan. 14, 1929 and The Chicago 
Daily Tribune. Jan. 16, 1929. A good summary of the French and 
German Press View is given in The Times (London) of January 16, 
1929, for an example of the Russian attitude. See The Sundav 
Worker of April 21, 1929. 
35. While facing the final outbreak of the civil war Amir Amanullah was 
ironically expecting support fi-om the British who waited the ouster of 
the Amir. Leon, B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 257 and Fraser -Tytler, 
Op.cit., pp. 210-212. Also Raja, Anwar; The Tragedv of 
Afghanistan. Verso London, 1979, p. 21. 
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Deep in trouble, in the final phase of the rebellion. Amir 
Amanullah had sought the British help, but was regretfully 
told of the "British neutrality" in that regard.^^ 
Later on. Amir Amanullah had deep regret in not 
forging a close relation with the British and that failure he 
had attributed to his "hands off policy". 
Still the British did never want a chaotic scenario in 
Afghanistan or a power vaccum, which could have given the 
Bolshevick a chance to expand in the region." 
To sum up, the failure on forging a better relation lay 
on both the sides i.e. the British and Amir Amanullah, 
because in the given geopolitical circumstances old 
perception continued to influence their policies.^^ 
Both the parties concerned had to differ almost on all 
issues and sometimes personal ego was also involved. The 
Anglo Afghan acrimony and tension through his reign had 
36. The British neutrality had worked well and saw Amir Amanullah 
loose his throne to the bandit, named Bacchae-i-Saqqao. See, Secret 
Telegram from the Foreign Office, London to the Brutish Minister, 
Kabul, no. 36, Feb. 6, 1929. India Office Library/LPS/10/1288, p. 
53, 1929 as cited by Leon, B. Poullada, Op.cit., 259. See also, 
Gregorian Vartan, The Emergence of Modem Afghanistan. Paolo Alto, 
Stanford Press, 1969. For the "British neutrality" issue. 
37. Cited from Ludwig Adamec W. Op.cit. p. 4. Ludwing has given an 
incicisive concluding remark on Anglo-Afghan relations and its 
intricacies. 
38. Cf Leon, B. Poullada had worked extensively on Afghan Affairs 
with all minute details. See for Anglo-Afghan Relations, his work 
"The Reform and RebeUion in Afghanistan r 1919-1929). 
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undoubtedly hampered the full development of the 
modernization programme of Amir Amanullah. 
Social resistance to a process of modernization and 
change is understandable. It gathers political overtones when 
such a resistance receives foreign assistance. But for the 
British sympathy, the conflict between Amir Amanullah and 
the tribal interests against the central authority would never 
have succeeded. 
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CHAPTER-III 
PART-III 
RUSSIO-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING 
AMANULLAH'S REIGN 
"My spirit will remain in 
Afghanistan though my soul go to 
God. My last -words to you my 
son and successor, we never trust 
the Russians". 
... Abdur Rahman Khan (d..l901)' 
"That Central Asia and the 
State bordering on India are to 
Russia outposts from which the 
Soviet authority should be able to 
threaten England". 
... LENIN, Times, Jan. I, 1923, p. 9. 
Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of three different 
cultural zones. The Islamic world, the Indian culture and 
Chinese influence.^ For this reason Afghanistan had a long 
history of conflict in Central Asia. Inspite of this Afghanistan 
owed much of its importance to its strategic location.^ 
1. Abdur Rahman, Amir (d. 1901), Amir Abdur Rahman (Autobiography) 
ed. Mir Munshi (trans, from Persian into English), p. 201. 
2. See Rahul, Ram; Struggle for Central Asia. Vikas, 1982, p. 45. 
3. Afghanistan was a place where the territorial interest of Imperial and 
colonial powers i.e. Russia and British was to clash apart from 
interests of Germany and France. For dertail on the same, see C.C. 
Davis, Frontiers : A study in Imperial Policy, p. 1. 
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Afghanistan had been the main route of invasions from the 
great Eurasian heartland to the Middle East and the south 
Asia. The geopolitical importance of Afghanistan can be 
understood by looking at the theories propounded by the 
British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder and by Captain 
Alfred Mahan of the U.S.A.'*, in which they have discussed 
the influence of geography on the political destiny of 
nations. The doctrine admirably apply to the situations of 
Afghanistan, which could act like a "wheelchair" for any 
expansionist power. 
It was due to occurrence of any weakness in the 
peninsular power the pressure from heartland broke through 
and that happened a number of times in the apparent case 
of Afghanistan. Due to this position, Afghanistan has 
traditionally been one of the great political unstable and 
contentious zones. The history of Afghanistan offers an 
appropriate examples of the theory put forwarded by the 
geo-politicians. Nevertheless there are many critics of such 
theories.^ 
Such propositions and theories may not exactly fit in 
4. The discussion of geographical factor is primarily based on Halford 
Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York : Norton, 
1962), Alfred Mahan, The Problem of Asia (London, Sampsonlow, 
Marston, 1900). 
5. For example, N.J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace (New York 
Harcourt, Brace, 1944) H.W. Weiweighert From Mackinder's 
Heartland. American Scholar writer 1945-46; and Leopold Amery in 
Geographic Journal (London^ April, 1904 p. 441. 
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the case of Afghanistan, yet the area around Afghanistan had 
been incessant warfare in the past and the "Great 
Game" between the Russian and the British interests in 
Central Asia, had been unparalleled in history^ 
The conflict in the region intensified with the 
British acquiring foothold in the Indian subcontinent and 
advancing towards Central Asia by the 18* century. On 
the other had Russian too, had started their assertive 
policy for their interest in Central Asia. The two 
empires then began territorial aggression and occupied a 
large chunk of terr i tor ies by 19''' century. Their 
advances were rapid and so convincing that they had 
presumed their own clash at any point of time and the 
place which obviously occurred at Afghanistan in the 
later phase of their rivalries. Then "the great game"^ 
with players like Arthur Corolly*, Charles Masson^, 
6. Russian interest in Asia (Afghanistan) dates back to 1807 when 
Russians started enroachment and British could not help the 
Asian region particularly on the persian Central Asian 
possession, which compelled the British to seek Afghan 
diplomatic support. See for detail, D.C. Boulger, England and 
Russia in Central Asia. London 1879, Vol. II, p. 340. 
7. The "Great game" was the term coined by Sir John w. Kaye, A 
History of War in Afghanistan. 3'^ ed. 3 vols. London, 1874. 
8. Arthur Conolly along with Colonel Stoddart the British agents 
before the first Afghan war, were bejheaded in Bokhara in June 
1842, Cf dupree, Afghanista. p. 374. 
9. Charles Masson was a deserter from the East India Company 
army, who was later on found to be American agent. See the 
Masson Papers, 631-657. Also Louis Durpee, p. 385. 
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Alexander Burnes'", B. Vickovitch'', and other with their 
extremely intriguing conspiracies in the region. 
It was from the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali's 
succession, that the Russian had planned to expand towards 
the region, by establishing a military base at Orenburg near 
Ural mountain by the border of the Afghan territory. The 
British too had started territorial occupations in India, 
swallowing one native kingdom after another until they 
occupied the Indus plain by August 1843. Now it was the 
time when the two empires was to clash in Afghanistan in 
order to thwart each other's expansionist policy. The British 
fear against the Russian worked well and thus then moves 
resulted in two full scale wars, namely the Anglo-Afghan war 
of 1838^^ and in 1878'^ The two empires had been fighting 
in Balkans and in Turkey too apart from the high plateau of 
Afghanistan. Their intentions mainly emanated from their fears 
and aspirations'"*. They had resorted to military means as 
10. Alexander Burnes headed the Mission sent by Lord Auckland to 
Kabul in Sep. 1837. See Dupree, Op.cit., p. 371. 
11. Capt. Vicovich (also called Vickovich, Vitkievich) a Russian agent was 
sent to counter the Burnes mission came to Kabul in Dec. 1837/ See 
Louis Dupree, op.cit. p. 371. 
12. For the first Afghan war the best modem explantion comes from J.A. 
Noris, The First Afghan War 1838-1842. Cambridge 1967. 
13. For a best detail work on second Anglo-Aghan war. See The Road to 
Kabuyl, Brian Robson 1986, Arms and Armour Press Limited, London. 
14. See for detail on the sitiuation. Gopal Krishna, K., The Geography and 
Politics of Afghanistan Concept Publication, New Delhi, 1982, p. 73. 
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solution to these issues^^ But to the outside world they 
manifested them as that of purely defensive in nature'^ Amir 
Abdur Rahman was inclined to the British sphere of 
Influence" yet he had aspired to free Afghanistan. Though 
he had to contend with balancing tact between the two 
empires and thwarted attempts from both sides for rail Road 
projects^^. But the Russians had to say no to the "close 
border policy" and kept on interfering in Afghan affairs 
which culminated in the "Punjdeh Crises" and occupied a 
portion of Afghan territory'*. The incident, had far reaching 
consequences and aggravated the atmosphere, compelling the 
British to ask Russia for delimitation of Russio-Afghan 
border in 1887. By that time the British wanted Afghanistan 
15. Both wanted to extend the boundaries which of course were ill-
marked at that time. See A. Lobonov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia. 
New York, 1951, p. 113. 
16. A good summary of Russian and British views on the Central Asian 
problem is contained in G.N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 
(London, frank Cass, 1967). For further detail see, Olaf Caroe, 
Sovieit Empire. London, macmillan 1954. 
17. For the game which the Imperialists played with Amir Abdur 
Rahman, See in detail, Gopalakrishnan, R., The Geography and 
Politics of Afghanistan. Concept Publishing, New Delhi, 1982. The 
Evolution of Afghan International Boundaries. Also Mir Munshi 
Mahmoud Sultan Khan, ed. The Life of Abdur Rahman - amir of 
Afghanistan. London 1900, 2 vols.. Vol. I, pp. 196-9. 
18. The Panjdeh affair (1885) was of utter significance as for the first 
time Russians did venture into Afghan territory and occupied it after 
a short battle. At the same time when Amir Abdur Rahman met 
Viceroy Lord Dufferin in Rawalpindi, he chided the viceroy for the 
lack of British armed assistance in their hour of need. See for detail 
Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 423. 
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to behave as "unilateral buffer state" against Russia. 
Amir Abdur Rahman was also subjected to a pressure 
tactics for agreeing to a border settlement with British India. 
They split the Pushtun tribe into two parts, one part to 
British Indian side and other to Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman 
succumbed to the British pressure against Russian and 
accepted the British view of unilateral buffer state. He was 
more scared of Russian aggressiveness and expected help 
from the British which was in order to contain Russia^^ 
Amir Habibullah followed the legacy of his father and 
wanted to play a balancing tactics between the Imperialists^" 
from 1901. But Russia's defeat in 1905 in the Russio-
Japanese war, compelled Russia to come to term with the 
British on Afghanistan and signed the Convention of St. 
Petersburg in 1907 and agreed on their sphere of influence.^' 
The Entente led them to become allies during world war I. 
19. The Orenburgs and Tashkent Railways built by Russia near Afghan 
border touching Kushk, was the disturbing sign for Abdur Rahman. 
Apart from various other points of aggressiveness by Russians. See 
Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, p. 264 et sq. 
20. Habibullah's home task was already finished by Amir Abdur Rahman 
who had placed Afghanistan on a strong footing both in external 
policy (by implying unilateral buffer state theory favouring British India) 
as well as the domestic, peace. See, Bilgrami, A.H., Afghanistan and 
British India, p. 241. 
21. It was the convention which was favourable to the British as it 
guaranteed the British India's security. See for the text of the 
convention. Philips, C.H. The evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-
1947. Oxford 1962, pp. 485-6. Also G.R Gooch, British document 
on the origin of war. 1927. 
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But after 1917 revolution the Anglo-Russian rivalry once 
again was revived. 
With the assassination of Amir Habibullah in 1919 
young Amanullah assumed the leadership in Afghanistan. 
AmanuUah was about 28 years old when he succeeded his 
assassinated father. He inherited also the political intrigues, 
conspiracies and divided loyalties of the tribal leadership. 
These he sought to surmount and establish order in the 
state. Much more daunting were the geopolitical intrigues of 
the powers like the Soviet Russia and Great Britain. 
With his accession whole diplomatic scenario was bound 
to change as the young Amir was a die hard anti-Imperialist 
in general and anti-British in particular. He worked for total 
independence for Afghanistan which culminated in Third 
Anglo-Afghan War.^ ^ The Soviet saw the anti-British stand of 
the Amir, decided to give immediate recognition to him and 
even an assurance for future help. Amanullah's diplomatic 
initiative in writing to Lenin and the despatch of Mohammad 
Wali Mission to Moscow was soon reciprocated by the 
Soviets with great cordiality. This was the period when the 
22. Just after the third Afghan war Amanullah wrote two letters to soviet 
union stressing the fact that Afghanistan was free and independent and 
pointed out that Afghan Psychology had always contained in it ideas 
of equality, humanity and Uberty. Cf lizvestia (Tashkent), May 21, 
1919, Dokumentry 11, 175, Teiipliniski, pp. 7-10, Masson and 
Romodin IT 402-5. 
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Soviets were in desperate need of having Muslim Allies.^^ 
Lenin had despatched a Mission under K. Bravin with the 
offer of material assistance against the British.^^ With that 
Amanullah got relieved from the Russian pressure on 
Afghanistan. 
Amanullah exploited the opportunity and turned the 
military stalemate of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, into a 
brilliant piece of diplomatic triumph at the peace negotiations 
at Rawalpindi. The Afghans achieved the sought after 
"complete Independence." With this began a new era in 
Afghanistan. In the hectic diplomatic rounds Afghanistan had 
an upperhand. Negotiations with the British India were held 
first in Mussorie in 1920 and again in 1921 with Henry 
Dobbs in Kabul. Afghan now had a secrete military dealings 
with the soviet union.^^ A high water mark of success of 
the Afghan diplomacy under Amanullah like which had never 
been achieved before by any other Afghan ruler. Yet there 
23. Lenin had replied on 27, 1919, congratulating the Amir and the 
Afghan peopleiii for the defence of liberty and accepted proposal for 
diplomatic ties. Cf Izivestia (Taskent^  May 21, 1919, The Times. June 
13, 1919. 
24. Cited from, Adamec Ludwig, op.cit.i pp. 144-148. 
25. The treaty was quite advantageous for the Afghan as they were given 
(i) free transit of goods through Russia, (ii)i 1 million gold Rouble aid 
annually and a promise of freedom for Bukhara and Khiva. Cf 
Secret Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of India no. X-3061, 
March 6, 1921 (irepeating messges from Dobbs in Kabul) lOL/LPS 
912 P 5261, 1920. Also Reysner, Afghanistan, p. 207; Raskolinikov, 
Afghanistan, p. 20. See the text in Documentary III, 550-55. 
72 
were many snags as the Russian had continued the 
suppression of the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, the 
Russio-Afgan Relations received a set back and could not 
further improve thereafter. The relation also worsened due to 
soviet double standard in terms of maintaining good 
neighbourly relations. As per the terms of the soviet Afghan 
Treaty of 1921, they had to give back to Afghanistan's 
Punjdeh territory conquered by them and an economic 
subsidy of one million gold rouble per year.^ ^ 
Russian also began to show cordiality towards the 
British which caused an alarm to Afghans. The success of 
soviet-Afghan relations depended upon the lesser contact 
between the soviet Union and the British India. The Russian 
realising more benefits from the British therefore they tilted 
towards them and even concluded the Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement,^ ^ and to Afghans it appeared to have marginalised 
the terms of the Russio-Afghan Treaty. In turn the British 
gave recognition to the soviet union in 1924. Although the 
honeymoon between the two old rival was soon over and 
relations were once again strained. Consequently the British 
withdrew the recognition of the USSR in 1927^*. As 
Amanullah had realised soviet intentions of using Afghanistan 
26. Cited from Ludwig Adamec, op.cit., 157ff. 
27. Xenia Eudin and Robert Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy (1924-19341 
Documents and Materials (University Park, Penn. State University 
Press, 1968, Document No. 32 statement of Litivenoff on Oct. 4, 
1929. 
28. See for the basic diplomacy involved behind the agreement, Ullamn, 
H. Richard, Britain and Russian Civil War. Princeton, 1968, p. 173. 
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as a launch pad for their adventure against the British India, 
he never became a Russian protege. During the tribal revolt 
of 1928, Soviets were reluctant to help AmanuUah. In fact 
the Soviets had encouraged Amanullah for his reform 
programme and in his anti-British policies^'. At the same 
time the Soviets never wanted Amanullah to quit for he was 
thoroughly anti-British. The support from the Soviets never 
came and Amanullah was forced to quit. Amanullah had 
reportedly remarked that "the Soviets had instigated him into 
enemity with the British and then did not help him in the 
crises"^". It was too naiive for Amanullah to have expected 
such help from the Soviets. They had their own designs 
against Afghanistan and Amanullah failed to see them. 
29. Actually Soviets did not want to prejudice the Dovgalevsky-
Henderson, Protocol of Oct. 1929 in which they had agreed upon 
for negotiated settlements to for any dispute, A History of Anglo-
Soviet Relations. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1945, pp. 355-356. 
30. Cf Secret Telegram from Major E.T.R. Wikham to the Government 
of India, May 28, 1929. NAI Foreign Political file 137-F 1929. As 
quoted from Leon B. PouUada, op.cit. p. 231. He is reported to 
have said that "Soviet's instigated him into enemity with the British 
and then not lifted a finger to help him." 

CHAPTER-IV 
KING NADIR SHAH & THE BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA : PERIOD OF 
NEUTRALITY (1929-33) 
Nadir Shah' was fifty years old when he assumed 
power. He was mature, rationale^ and pursued traditional 
Afghan policy towards his neighbours i.e. the Soviet Union 
and the British India. The change in his attitude was due to 
the long period of internal confusion and political instability 
in the country. This was reflected in his address to the 
opening of the Afghan National Consultative Assembly and 
he explicitly referred to his foreign policy towards his 
neighbours." 
He termed the "Policy of Neutrality" as the most useful 
and hoped for "entertaining good friendly relations with the 
neighbours." He invited friendly neighbours who were not 
against the Afghan national interests to come forward for a 
Mohammad Nadir Khan (1883-1933), son of Sardar Yousuf Khan 
and cousin of Amir Amanullah, was Afghanistan's envoy to France 
had returned during civil war and won the battle devisivly against 
Baccha. His takeover is marked by transfer from "Kabul Sardars "to 
the Peshawar Sardars" as he had massive support of Peshawar 
Sardars. 
His major flaws were a tendency towards severe and arbitrary 
action and a convintion that anyone who opposed him was "ipso 
facto" an enemy of the nation.See, Fletcher Arnold.; Afghanistan. 
Highway of Conquest. Cornell 'N.Y. 1985. 
75 
cordial relation with his country/ 
Nadir Shah asserted that Afghan neutrality was a reality: 
In that case he sought to convince the Soviets, muslim 
nationalists and modernists, inside and outside the country, 
that he was not a protege of the British Imperialists/ 
Though Nadir Shah nearly followed the pattern of Amir 
Amanullah Khan with regard to neutrality." This seems to 
have been deliberate for he had no time to formulate a new 
policy. 
Despite his best efforts to come out clearly on the 
issue of neutrality yet Afghans were convinced of his role in 
the ouster of Amir Amanullah with the help of the British. 
During the final phase of uprising, against Amir Amanullah 
Nadir Shah reportedly had met Richard Maconachie, a 
former Counsellor of the British Legation in Kabul and at 
that time was, the British political agent in the Kurram Valley 
near the frontier, confirmed their suspicion.^ Later on the 
Afghan apprehensions of British complicity with Nadir in the 
ouster of Amir Ammanullah appeared more convincing 
because the British had instantly granted aid to Nadir Shah 
in 1931, in the form of 10,000 rifels, five million catridges 
3. For the text of the speech see. Islah. July 8, 1931 and as it is 
reproduced in the ,Gregorian, Vartan.;Op.Cit. 
4. Mohammad, ALi; Progressive Afghnistan. Lahore, 1933, P. 173-74. 
5. Infact it was with the Maconachie's support that the final over throw 
of Baccha-i-Saqqao was possible. 
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and some £ 1,80,000 in cash.' This generosity on the part 
of the British was a further indication of the British 
endorsment of Nadir Shahs takeover. In order to allay the 
doubts. Nadir Shah emphasised that the aforementioned help 
from the British was not accompanied by any conditions." 
He even compared these British overtures as being similar to 
that had been given to the Amanullah when Afghanistan was 
in the grip of internal political difficulties.^ In order to 
further strengthen his position amidst controversies regarding 
British help; Nadir Shah vehemently denied that he and his 
brother had ever received British assistance, in their struggle 
to over throw the infamous Bandit Amir Bacchae-i-Saqqao*. 
Apparently, he did not want to show his inclination for pro-
British policies. He emphasised that "It was only through 
the exclusive help of the Almighty God, and thanks to the 
sacrifices of the people of Afghanistan unassisted by any 
foreign power that I took Kabul. It was only the divine help 
and the zeal of the entire Afghanistan that saved our 
6. See, Fraser-Tytler; Afghanistan pp.23l-236,See also Arnold Fletcher, 
Op,cit. p.232. 
7. Islah, July 8, 1931, as quoted from Gregorian Vartan, Op; Cit. 
8 Tadjik Bandit Leader Habibullah Kalakani by name popularly known 
as the Baccha-i-Saqqao (son of Water Carrier) had over thrown 
Amir Amanullah. After a short span of just about six months reign 
he himself was overthrown by Nadir Khan. For details regarding 
Baccha's overthrow see; Pioneer, April 24, 1929. Habibullah, Amir 
of Afghanistan : My Life From Brigand to King. London, N.d, 
1930, p.221. See also Gregorian Vartan, opcit, pp.285-292. 
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fatherland."^ Even his brother Shah Wali Khan '^' had denied 
any help given to him by the British and claimed that 
"during the initial and crucial stages of the anti-Baccha 
struggle the British authorities, far from helping Nadir, had 
infact obstructed him.'^ The fact remains that the British did 
help Nadir's campaign against Baccha; as such reported by 
the Soviet Newspapers,'^ confirming the military and 
monetary help given to Nadir by the British. 
Nadir chose to follow a different course and set of 
policies than Amir Amanullah. Yet on foreign policy he had 
said that "Afghanistan would like to pursue the same foreign 
policy as it was during Amanullah's time.'^ He adhered to 
a policy of non-involvement both in India and in Central 
Asia, seeing in "positive neutralism" the best means of 
9. I si ah. July 8, 1931. See also; Fletcher, Arnold; Afghanistan. Highway 
of Conquest. NY 1965, p.232. According to him the British had 
given nothing to the hard pressed Amanullah" but this is not the case 
as examined by Gregorian.who is of the opinion that the British 
had supported him. 
10. Shah Wali Khan, a brother of Nadir had fought alongside his 
brother for the overtake of Kabul. His decisive victory was at 
Charasiah against the Baccha's forces and he was first to take 
Kabul. 
11. Ghazi, pp. 34,39, 43, The British govt, in India-had refused to 
permit the Orakzais and the Waziri's participa i^oif ^ : ^ d %fm^e for 
Kabul. See, also Islah, July 8, 1931, ^aSu ted by Gregbiiaiiv, V, 
op.cit., p.232. i:r:(T'^3G5 ^ \ 
\ ( Ace. No... )^J 
12. Joseph Castagne, "Soviet Imperialism in wghanistan. Foreigii'".<^fairs" 
(New York), Part 13, No.4 p.702. 
13. Mohammad, Ali; Progressive Afghanistan. (La!tote^l>|3)^'.pp^l73-74. 
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securing internal political stability, consolidating the new royal 
dynasty's power, and guaranteeing both the flow of Afghan 
trade and the success of a modest modernization 
programme. Such a policy made it essential for him to stay 
on friendly terms with both the British and the Soviet.''* 
Apart from the friendly relation with the British which was 
never made too open. Nadir Shah also found it very handy 
in developing a better ties with the Soviets. The Soviets had 
granted immediate approval to the Nadir government as the 
Soviets too had realised the importance of better relation 
with Afghanistan.'^ Even Izvestia in its editorial had hinted 
Afghanistan to better its ties with true friends like Soviet 
Union, Persia and Turkey to overcome its grave internal 
problems and instability.'^ 
Afghan policy makers preferred to strike a balance 
between the Soviets and the British. They had sensed the 
danger from both the side as the Soviets could have 
championed the irredentist or revolutionary movements in 
northern Afghanistan, the British could have stirred up the 
tribal opposition to the Afghan monarchy, and either or both 
could champion the cause of Amanullah against the 
14. Gregorian Vartan: The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Stanford 
Press, 1969, p.322. 
15. Jane Degras, (Edit) "Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London, 
1951), Part II pp. 430-31. 
16. Castagne, Op.cit., No. 109, pp.702-3. 
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Musahiban family.'^  
With the consolidation of the power in Kabul Nadir 
Shah made his brother Shah Wali an envoy to London; 
while the other brother Muhamad Aziz was sent to 
Moscow.'* Shah Wali was born and brought up at Dehradun 
when the family was in exile, and a guest of the British 
Government of India; was move to better the ties of 
bilateral relations. However, the appointment of Allah Nawaz 
Khan,'^ an Indian migrant to the position of Minister of 
Court was not appreciated by the British Government of 
India because they considered him to be an active "anti-
British" and anti-Russian revolutionary.^^ 
17. Gregorian Op.cit., p. 233. Nadir Shah was Durrrani Afghan of the 
Muhammadzai branch, and a direct descendent of Painda Khan, the 
founder of the dynasty. Nadir's father Muhammad Yousuf Khan was 
exile by the Amir Abdur Rahman, he and his four brothers were 
bom and brought up at Dehra Dun in the United Provinces of India. 
After Abdur Rahman's death the Musahiban family as they were 
called, returned to Afghanistan and entered the services of the Amir 
Habibullah and continued till Amanullahs was pleased. See for 
details. Fraser-Tytler; W.K., Afghanistan. A Study of Political 
Development in Central Asia. Geoffery Cumberlegs Oxford, 1950. 
p.223. 
18. Ibid, p.237- and Gregorian V. Op.cit. p.234. 
19. Allah Nawaz was born in Multan, fled Afghanistan in 1920 studied 
at Lahore, actively involved in Indian revolutionary party, had been a 
short time Assistant Editor of the Ittihad-i-Mashriqui of Jalalabad 
and later on became the interpretor of DACOM, the German 
Afghan Company. NAI, Foreign and Political File, 325-F, 1929 nos. 
1-15, No.2. 
20. DDA Inner Politik Afghanistan, Politik 5, and as quoted by Ludwig 
Adamec opcit. p. 183. 
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The new foreign policy formulation of the new 
Government started soon after Nadir Shah's assumption of 
office. The attitude of new government's foreign policy was 
made clear with the issuance of ten point policy 
declaration.21 Significantly the text envisaged the continuation 
of previous government of Amir Amanullah's foreign policy. 
Amanullah's policy had confronted many contradictions in 
relation to Russia the British India. The policy was based on 
the ideas of Amir AmanuUah who tried to broaden the 
diplomatic infrastructure of Afghanistan."^^ The first foreign 
power to respond to the diplomatic overtures of 
Afghanistan's new government was the Soviet Union. Soviet 
Foreign Commissary L.M. Karakhan, explained that the 
Soviets wanted a "constant neighbourly relation", and 
"consolidation of Afghan independence and economic and 
cultural progress."2^ The Soviet ambassador Leonide Stark 
was accorded a cordial reception.^^ On 18 November 1930, 
21. Rahul, Ram; Afghanistan. Mongolia & USSR. Vikas Publishing, New 
Delhi, 1987, p.28. 
22. DDA, Politik 5, Afghanistan, Inner Politik, Vol. 6, India Office 
Memorandum A231 for the Persian text see, Munasebat. no. 43, 
pp.43-44. 
23. NAI, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL FILES, 278-F, 1929, nos. 1-
66, Notes no. 66, p.9. For speeches by Stark and Nadir Shah 
see Munasebat. nos. 44 and 45, pp. 44-45. 
24. Rahul, Ram, Op.cit p.28. See also Islah. Dec. 31st, 1930, Ettelat. 
Jan. 1st 1931. It was in order to minimize the influence of the two 
powerful neighbours apart from Afghanistan's need for Japanese 
products which included clothes, chemical products and machinery. 
See also Morrison, Ronald; "H.M. King Mohammad Nadir Shah 
Ghazi of Afghanistan" (obituary) JRCAS Jan. 1934. 
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Afghanistan concluded a treaty with Japan in London. The 
Japan connection was aimed to boost the military and 
commercial prospects of Afghanistan. It was necessary, in 
order to minimise the influence of its two powerful 
neighbours. ^ ^ 
The Civil War which overthrew Amir Amanullah, had 
destroyed, plundered the foreign legations : and were left 
under the care of Afghans themselves. The British Minister 
in Kabul, Sir Fransis Humphrys^^ left Afghanistan and 
leaving the British legation under one Rahmat Khan, an 
Afghan landowner from Peshawar as its caretaker. Rahmat 
Khan did not enjoy any diplomatic status but he carried on 
certain tasks like collecting information and maintaining 
contact with the British official in Peshawar.^ ^ But the British 
thought it would be better to settle some of the unresolved 
question and security for its diplomatic staff in the country 
before resuming full diplomatic ties.^* Therefore, the British 
Secretary of State's response to the Afghan overtures was 
somewhat evasive. He stated that his government had 
"followed the events of the last few days with close interest 
25. Gregorian, Op.cit, p.236 
26. Sir Francis Humphrys, the British Minister to Kabul had served there 
from 1922 till Amir AmanuUah's abdication in 1929. 
27. The Soviet Commisar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litinov had 
expressed the feeling that Nadir Khan was the best choice even 
though he was pro-British, Munasebat No. 43, pp. 43-44. Also see 
Gregorian Op.cit pp. 321-322. 
28. Ludwing, A. Op.cit p. 185. 
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and ardent trust that the hopes which are now entertained 
of peace in a united, friendly, strong and independent 
Afghanistan may speedily be realised and the old friendly 
relations between the two countries be continued.^^ London 
did not wish to delay the recognition of new Afghan 
government, yet it was cations in its approach considering 
the situation prevailing their. They just wanted to be sure of 
the security of the British consulate in Kabul and 
elsewhere.^° Kabul Legation had suffered some damages but 
Jalalabad Consulate was totally destroyed due to the ensuing 
civil war between the forces of the Baccha and Amir 
Amanullah. 
The Afghan foreign minister, Faiz Muhammad Khan^ ^ had 
informed the British government of its government's decision 
of appointing Shah Wali Khan as Afghan Minister in London 
and requested them to give their approval. Through this 
Afghan government was trying to convey the gesture of 
goodwill and an eagerness to establish the diplomatic ties. 
29. NAI, Foreign and Political Files, F. No. 278, 1929 Nos. 1-66, 
Notes No. 22. 
30. NAI, Foreign and Political Files, F. No. 278, 1929 Nos. 20, 24. 
31. It seems that apart from the security fear and the normalization of 
the business activity, the British had been waiting for Soviet move. 
They did not recognise the new regime until it was confirmed by 
Soviet recognition. It took the British one more months than the 
Soviets to recognise and give legitimacy status to Nadir's regime on 
Nov. 14, 1929. See NAI Foreign and Political Files, 278-F, 1929, 
Nos. 1-66, No. 9-A. Also Ludwig Adamec opcit p. 180. 
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On November 14, 1929, the British Secretary of State Arthur 
Henderson informed Faiz Muhammad Khan that Britain had 
recognised" the government established by His Majesty the 
King Muhammad Nadir Shah, as the legal Government of 
Afghanistan" and expressed the hope "that the friendly 
relation of the past may continue with the new 
government."^2 Shah Wali after a short break in India, 
arrived in London on January 12, 1930. The new British 
Minister to Afghanistan, Sir Richard Maconachie and his 
staff also reached Kabul a few months later on May 11, 
1930." 
Still it was a wait and watch situation for the Afghan 
government. Not knowing what kind of relationship British 
government intended; and what interests, they hold for the 
British? The British diplomacy, stuck to its old modus 
operandi of "offering money and material support apart from 
a fixed subsidy. The British government had been paying 
yearly subsidy until the Third Afghan War (1919). But when 
32. In order to pacify the Afghan elite of the time. Nadir Shah had 
chosen some of Amanullah's men. Faiz Mohd. Khan (who was 
Minister of Education with Amanullah) made Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, whereas Ali Mohd. Khan (the former Minister of Commerce) 
was made Minister of Education. 
33. Though Nadir Shah was known as pro-British as there was a 
general feeling regarding Amanullahs overthrow done under the 
aegis of the British inspite of that British took time to 
recognise Nadir's government. See NAI Foreing Political Files 
378-F, 1929, Nos. 5, 20, 24. See also, ADF, Dundas: Precis 
On Afghan Affaris. Vol 1927-36, India Office Library, pp 236-51 
as cited from Ludwig, Opcit. 
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Amir AmanuUah had proclaimed Afghanistan's independence, 
no subsidy was given and none was accepted.^ "^ Acceptance 
of monetary support from the British might give impression 
to Afghan people taht they were returning to the previous 
position of dependance on the British assistance. On the 
other hand the British government at that particular juncture 
seemed to be reluctant to extend the fullest assistance in 
terms of financial or material assistance, as they were not 
too sure of tangible benefits and considered it unlikely that 
any Afghan government would ever ask for support, if it 
involved granting of certain concession.^^ Even Amir 
Amanullah was assisted by the British government on an ad 
hoc basis by providing loans for the purchase of weapons 
and airplanes and by financing Survey Projects for the 
construction of roads and railroads inside Afghanistan. 
Sometimes gifts were also offered and loans extended 
34. See for details on the British reluctancy in according the Nadir 
regime the legitimacy. According to Sir Richard Maconachie the 
British Minister to Kabul, on the ascension of Nadir Shah that 
"there had been few rulers of Afghanistan who have succeeded to 
the throne without a struggle or maintained there hold upon it 
without difficulty, but perhaps non of them have found himself in a 
more precarious situation that kind Nadir Shah was on his capture 
of Kabul in October 1929" makes thing amply clear that in British 
point of view. Nadir to start with was on a very delicate foundation. 
See Richard Maconachie's "Annual Report of 1930" India Office 
Library, 1930. As cited by Ludwig Adamec, opcit , pp.178, 
35. With the better chance of improving diplomatic ties after the Anglo 
Afghan War of 1919, then Soviet Government had agreed to return 
to Afghanistan territory in the Panjdeh district and to pay 
Afghanistan a yearly subsidy of 1,000,00 gold or silver roubles which 
the British formerly paid. See. Rahul, Ram; Op.cit p.25. 
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36 
without the condition of repayment. 
The British government actually intended to give loan to 
the Afghan government of Nadir Shah, although undecided 
about how much to be offered and whether the amount 
should be extended without any explicit request from the 
Afghan government? Though way back in 1925, the British 
government had actually decided to offer the subsidy to 
Afghan Government a hefty sum of around Rs. 700,000, but 
except a paltry sum of few thousands of rupees (spent on 
Kabul-Peshawar Road Project) nothing was given 
substantially, due to the suspicious atmosphere created by 
Amir Amanullah's government towards the British designs in 
frontier area.^ ^ 
Foregoing all such reservations the British government of 
India decided to give the loan money to the new 
government of Afghanistan. As to how much loan was to be 
36. At that particular juncture infact new Afghan government needed 
massive support, as it had inherited nearly empty treasury, trade 
being at stand still, no custom collection to compensate the current 
expenses of the Government. See Ali, Mohammad; Afghanistan (The 
Mohammadzai Period) Kabul 1959, p. 172. See also ADF Dundas : 
Precis on Afghanistan series. Vol. 1927-36. lOL, pp.236-51 as cited 
from Ludwig Adamec opcit, p. 186. 
37. Subsidy issue for cash starved Afghanistan is as old as Afghan 
Amir's relation with the British. British for their uUerior motives and 
geopolitical consideration had always sought to get favour of the 
reigning Amir in form of cash and other gifts. The practices 
continued down to modern rulers like Abdur Rahman and Amir 
HabibuUah for their Pro-British policies. Amir Amanullah who had 
different thinking all together, too was not deprived of that. See for 
details, Ludwig Adamec, opcit, p.30. 
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given remained a question among the British policy makers?^* 
Humphrys suggested that the money previously agreed upon 
was around Rs. 10 million, while some were of the view 
that the amount was too big. Later on they agreed upon to 
a lesser amount of around Rs. 700,000. The British 
Government of India had an important voice and role on the 
issue of aid to Afghanistan, because the funds needed for 
such an aid were actually borne by India rather than the 
Home Government.^^ 
The British were not going to encourage Afghan 
Government to bargain for an increase in the amount of 
subsidy provided by the British government of India. They 
felt that the Afghan should take the first step in asking for 
such the assistance.'*'' However, Shah Wali Khan while 
38. The British disinterest in advancing subsidiary at that point of time 
suggest a "suspicious British move as Afghanistan had already been 
seeking such subsidies from Soviet Union. But Afghanistan was 
desirous of getting British subsidy as the cash was needed for the 
new government. See Ludwig Adamec opcit. p.95 as cited from 
India Office Memorandum, A.204. 
39. It was always diflBcuh as to judge how much was too much to satisfy 
the Afghan regime for a pro-British tilt. Previously the advance was 
made in cash, but later on with modernization set in Afghanistan needed 
various technical instruments and alongwith arms and amunition for 
keeping Afghanistan stronger. See for details on the subsidy issue. 
Dundas ADF : The Precis on Afghan Affairs, pp.236-51. 
40. The new form of colonial exploitation is best reflected in this 
context, as the colonise country had to bear the expenses of the 
army movement and wars, advancing loans and subsidy in order to 
keep the Imperial flag high. India had to pay for such expenses on 
numerous occasions, on the costly Afghan wars and in advancing 
loans to Afghan rulers. 
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returning from London to Afghanistan passed through India; 
and was hinted to ask for the assistance from the British 
government of India, but to their great dismay he did not 
do s o / ' The British Govt, of India through an informal 
channel, was informed that Shah Wali actually held no 
authority to deal in "money matters" with them. Possibly the 
Afghans did not want to deal with British India, instead 
wanted to hold discussion on the issue in London. By 
passing the Government of India, that would have implied 
giving special leverage to the British and that was sure to 
hurt the hard earned Afghan pride.'^ ^ 
The then existing treaties with Afghanistan seemed 
satisfactory to the British government but they wanted 
"minor" amendments to the wordings of the previous treaty. 
That was of special importance for the British to obtain 
from the Government of Afghanistan a precise definition of 
the term "neighbourly" relations, used as basis for the Treaty 
of Kabul in 1921. In a way a promise from the Government 
of Afghanistan for her amiable conduct on the NW frontier 
bordering Afghanistan. 
The most contentious of the issues between the Govt, 
of Afghanistan and the British India was the issue of the 
41. See for details NAI, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL FILES, F-278, 
1929 nos. 1-66 notes on 212. 
42. See NAI Foreign and Political Files No. F-278, 1929 Nos. 1-66, 
notes on 212, Nos. 20, 34, 40, 44, 46. 
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North West Fronter. That was so from the time of Amir 
Abdur Rahman Khan, who had accepted the Durand Line'^ ^ 
as the boundary between India and Afghanistan. The Durand 
line though accepted in principle by Amir Abdur Rahman 
still the division of the Pushtuns through the line had never 
gone from his mind. He had always considered the tribes 
from the Indian side of the border as part of the greater 
Pashtunistan, and thus the division was seen as "a deceitful 
tact of the British Government.'"*^ In fact all the tribals 
united alongside the Durand could have posed greater danger 
to the British. Thus, the British ploy was to keep them 
divided. As for years the cross border shady deals and 
activities had been the real source of friction between these 
two governments, the attempt from one side to belittle the 
other had never ceased and there had been numerous border 
infringments both in the time of Amir Amanullah Khan and 
43. Durand line was never acceptable to the Afghan intelligentia as it 
was in order to weaken them by dividing them into two parts. Most 
of the frontier tribes who had been living together for centuries, had 
then found themselves in dilemma as the line had placed half of their 
people on the other side of the border. In fact that was a greater 
victory for the British diplomacy as it was led by George Roos 
Keppel (first as Adjudant of the Kurram Militia and later as 
Political Agent) Mortimer Durand, Olaf Caroe and others. See for 
details; Caroe Olaf Op.cit pp. 381-383. 
44. After the third Anglo-Afghan War which Amanullah had celebrated as 
a great victory for Afghanistan upon the Imperial British, the 
problems of accepting subsidy had arisen. Since it was feared in 
Afghanistan that accepting monetary support form British might imply 
a return to the previous position of dependence on British India both 
Afghanistan and the Great Britain were suspicious of each other. See 
Dundas ADF, A Precis on Afghan Affairs. Opcit pp. 236-51. 
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during Nadir Shah's reign.^ ^ In most of the cases the British 
war planes had violated the border. Even during the civil 
war which overthrew Amir Amanullah there was widespread 
news of the tribes, belonging to British India from across 
the border, actually taking part in the civil war/^ About 
Nadir Shah's ascension to power following the civil war, 
was also due to the help coming from across the border i.e. 
from the Indian side of the Durand line. That line was never 
actually demarcated, though the British government officials 
applied the term "presumptive line", indicating a certain 
measure of doubt. The Pathan tribes particularly the 
dominating tribe of Pushtuns, though divided had always 
maintained that they were independent of both Britain and 
Afghanistan, but that on the basis of culture and ethnicity 
as well as fellow religionists, they considered themselves one 
nation with Afghanistan.'*^ Afghan rulers did never wish to 
end contacts with the transborder tribes even after Amir 
45. The Pushtun tribes east of the Durand line, whose territory was 
increasingly regarded as an irredenta as nationalism began to replace 
the traditional ethnic or tribal loyalties. Bothe Afridis and Mohmands 
had posed grave threat to the British see. Fletcher A.; Afghanistan. 
Highway of Conquest. Cornell University Press, 1966, p.23,83. 
46. In one reported case, there was huge export of arms and ammu-
nition to Afghanistan from India, for subversive activities against Amir 
Amanullah's government. NAI file Foreign & Political Department 
1929 File No. 85-F (Secret) & also NAI file No. 163-F, F.No. 
337 (F) to confirm the export of arms to Afghanistan. 
47. A number of times British surveillance planes had violated the 
Afghan air space by crossing through Durand line see. NAI Foreign 
& Political Department File No. 294 1933. 
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Abdur Rahman had signed the Durand Agreement. Those 
contacts remained a perpetual source of border frictions 
between the British government of India and Afghanistan."** 
In spite of the British sympathies for the cause of Nadir 
Shah, Indian officials had noted with apprehension that the 
new ruler of Afghanistan had actively sought the support of 
Afghan tribes from the British side of the border.^^ The 
tribes men always expected to be rewarded for their help in 
such venture and the most coveted reward in their eyes was 
the acquisition of weapons and ammunition which thus 
strengthened them in their fight against the British penetration 
and persecution. Already at the beginning of the revolt 
against Amir Amanullah, Richard Maconachie, who was then 
the political agent in the Kurram, had feared that after 
receiving money and arms, the tribes would have turned 
against the British in the "Unadministered Frontier Areas". He 
had noted that the Jajis, the Mangal, and the Chakmani (also 
48. The Pushtu speaking Afghans on both the sides of the Durand line 
were ethnically one people, they constituted the most formidable 
soldiers and they had acknowledged the Afghan rulers as their 
"Islamic King." 
49. In order to continue their claim on these Frontier tribes the Afghan 
rulers had to show their support by paying subsidies to these tribes, 
conveying the Jirgas of tribes men to Kabul (a show of honour), 
given military assistance to them at times and by employing them as 
Khassadars (paid soldiers), the border remained rough throughout a 
fundamental contradictions were not resolved of the Anglo-Afghan 
relations. See, Islah September 12, 1935, The Anis. September 18, 
1935, No. 25 and NAI Forcing and Political files, 518-F, 1935 
No. 1-40, note 7. 
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called Chamkanni tribe) had gained considerable booty in 
weapon and money following the surrender of Afghan 
government posts, and he had felt that "their attitude at 
present is freindly enough, but when there is no more loot 
available in thier own country, there is likely to occur the 
combination of idle hand and full bandolies for which Satan 
can usually find work, and raids into Kurram Territory may 
possible be made "^ ° 
Moconachie's assumption of those tribes and their 
miadventures had become ture. After the conquest of Kabul 
they were used in quelling a Kuhistani uprising August and 
September of 1930.^^ Then they turned their attention 
towards the frontier and attacked the Kurram Valley. The 
British Intelligence blamed that tribal adventure through 
propaganda by the Indian Khilafatits agents. As they believed 
that propaganda against the British would assure them 
immense money to the tribal chiefs."" 
For reducing the chances of such misadventures and 
50. Its no denying a fact that Nadir Shah's coming to power is also 
attributed to the active support of the tribals form across the Drund 
Line and thus for further consolidation of his power and just for 
acknowledging their support and help Nadir Shah wated to have 
contact with them. 
51 The revolt had begun in 1930 among the Tadjik of Kohistan led by 
an uncle of Baccha-e-Saqqao, as Kohistan had tried to regain what 
Baccha had lost. Nadir sensing the great danger had pitched 
Pushtun tribesmen against them and emerged victorious. See for 
details, Fletcher Arnold, Op.cit, p.228. 
52. See Dundas, ADF, A Precis on Afghanistan Affairs, p. 19. 
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tribal uprising in future, the British government therefore, 
sought assurance from the new Afghan regime of Nadir 
Shah. Further that for friendly relation they would disarm the 
tribesmen at frontiers." Like the other previous Afghan 
rulers. Nadir Shah too made a vague promise that he would 
control the tribes and would desist in supporting any, anti-
British activities among Afghan tribes in India or in 
Afghanistan. Nadir Shah had his own constraints because as 
long as he was dependent on tribal support and goodwill. 
On January 12, 1930 Shah Wali in an interview with 
Maconachie in London, expressed Afghanistan's desire to be 
on good terms with Britain. He drew attention towards the 
fact that the King Nadir Shah, had chosen his own brother 
as an Afghan representative in London to emphasise the 
importance the Afghan government attached to its relation 
with Britain. Shah Wali said that Afghanistan wanted to be 
at peace with all powers and "had no intention of 
quarrelling with Russia; as that would be "luxury they 
could not afford.^^ He also desired that the British 
53. In the very begining of Nadir Shah's reign the British Secretary of 
States had already hinted in favour for a "united, freindly, stong and 
independent Afghanistan" but the tribal affairs was always there to 
create perpetual tension between the two parties concerned. See 
NAI Forcing and Political File 278-F, 1929, No. 1-66, notes No. 
66. p.9. For speeches by Stark and Nadir Shah see text of 
Munasebat, Nos. 44 and 45. 
54. NAI, Foreign & Political Department F.278-F. Nos. 1-66, Notes 
No. 66. Also see Ludwig Adamec Op.cit, p. 188. It was Nadir's 
policy of non-intervention in any Soviety Central Asian issues as it 
was not affordable for Afghanistan which had neither the financial 
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Government would accord him a proper place; just as the 
Afghan mission in Moscow was accorded and "treated with 
greatest respect and ceremony". In a way he implied that the 
treatment of the British minister in Kabul would also depend 
entirely upon the treatment accorded to the Afghan minister 
in London. Shah Wali also urged the British government to 
send its minister together with the legation personnel, 
including the wives to Kabul without any undue delay. ^ ^ In 
spite of his urgings, the British sent on May 11, 1930 
Maconachie to Kabul. 
Going through the whole aspect of British India's 
relation with Afghanistan, we find that duing Nadir Shah's 
reign their relations were complex and contradictory. 
Compared to this Afghanistan's relations were better and 
smooth with Germany and the Soviet Union.^ ^ Apprently the 
(Continue from previous page) means nor the military power to deal 
with any such issue. A weak Afghanistan had to put its house in order 
and bring about the socio-economic integration of the Kingdom, not 
embark upon any irredentist movement that might result in its own 
disintegration. See Viollis, Andree : Tourmente Surl' Afghanistan. Paris, 
1930, pp. 225-26, also Zaria Vostoka (Tiflis), January 28, 1931. 
55. NAI, F.278-F, Nos. 1-66 Notes No. 66 also Ludwig Adamec, 
Op.cit. p. 185. 
56. Due to Afghan neutrality the Soviet had felt troubled as according to 
Soviet point of view, Amanullah's anti-Britsh stance had endeared him to 
the Soviets. The passivity of the Nadir adminstration towards the Pathan 
tribal revolts and the Indian National Liberation Movement was construde 
by the Soviets as a betrayal of Amanullah's former plolicies and tacit 
collaboration with British Imperialism, and moreover "Nadir had justified 
the hopes placed in him by the British." See Fisher Louis : The Soviets 
in the Worid Affairs. London, 1930, 2 Vols., pp. 793-94, also Zaria 
Vostoka (Tiflis), July 21, Sept. 14, Sept. 21, 1930. 
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British officials in London and Delhi seemed optimistic and 
somewhat satisfied with the way the developments had taken 
place and efforts made to forge closer ties. The Pro-
Amanullah groups were suspicious of the British who were 
instrumental in bringing him down. Therefore, the British 
appeared more strong and efficient in deciding their future 
course of action and diplomacy." The British also found a 
friendly voice among the Afghan policy maker in the person 
of Muhammad Hashim Khan, for reason that he had "an 
intense dislike for all things Russian."-t58 
Although, no assistance was extended till then, Austin 
Chamberlain, the then British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
had indicated a willingness to help Afghanistan, saying, "His 
Majesty's Government earnestly desires the 
establishment of a strong central government (in Afghanistan) 
and they will be prepared when this government is 
57. The underlying causes of Amanullah's downfall have been the subject 
of variety of interpretaions. But apart from the internal socio-
economic factors the pro-Amanullah contemporary Afghan 
intelligentsia and ofcourse the Soviet with other other European 
powers lay whole blame of his fall on the British mecahnination 
with masterminding of Col. I.E. Lawrance (the famous Lawrance of 
Arabia). Thus the coming of new regime automatically British had 
pro-voice in Afghan Government Circle. See for Amanullah's 
downfall, Parvada & Izvestia, December 20, 1928. Chokieve, 
Mustafa, "The Bolshevicks and Afghanistan", The Asiatic Review. July 
1929. pp.506-7. On Soviet reaction see, Joseph Castagne : "Soviet 
Imperialism in Afghanistan" Foreign Affairs. July 1935. pp.701-2. 
Akhramovich, R.T. "Afghanistan" in vol. 4, pp.766-67. 
58 See, Dundas, Op.cit No. 549, p. 48. 
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established to show their friendship for the Afghan people 
by giving it such assistance as they can in the 
reconstruction and the development of the country. "^ ^ 
The Government of Afghanistan had asked for British 
material assistance through their Foreign Minister in June, 
1930. Afghanistan had first requested the Soviet Union, who 
by the treaty of 1921 was obliged to pay one million 
Roubles in gold. However, the Soviet cited unsatisfactory 
policies pursued by the new regime in regard to the ties 
with the Soviets therefore, had held back the loan 
nevertheless made some vague promises.^° 
Faiz Muhammad Khan the Afghan Foreign Minister, 
formerly requested Britain to supply twenty thousand rifles 
with one thousand round of ammunitions and four hundred 
thousand strelling pound in cash. The British Government 
however, responded to their request and offered exactly half 
of the demand made. The loan of money was advanced in 
one time payment of one hundred thousand pounds, 
immediately. After a period of four months during which 
Afghanistan was watched for her good neighbourly behaviour. 
59. Dundas opcit. No. 890, p.82; NAI, Foreign & Political 
Department 843-F, 1932 part 2. 
60. NAI, Foreign & Political Department 843-F, 1932, Part 2, 187-F, 
1930 nos. 1-167, nos. 36, 7, Demands were made for payment of 
the subsidy or for arms in the amount of subsidy; further more, 
Afghanistan wanted the weapons returned that Ghulam Nabi had 
taken with him during retreating into the Soviet Union. 
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the second installment of seventy five £ 75,000 was reserved 
at the suggestion of the British Minister at Kabul to be used 
for payments which Britain wanted to make at an appropriate 
time.^' 
Britain's policy appears to have been to buy the Afghan 
friendship with gifts in the shape of money, goods and 
services. The British Government of India, had to provide 
the British funds and felt that it should not be paid while 
gave impression that the British subsidy could easily match 
that of the Soviet's. At the same time they were not 
appreciating the Afghan policy of balancing between the 
Soviet's Union and the British. Yet the policy by which the 
British wanted to "wean Afghanistan away from the USSR" 
and at the same time "to lubricate the wheels of the Afghan 
Government" was a dilemma for the British. For the time 
being Britain decided to advance subsidy to Afghanistan in 
kind." 
In a note E.V. Howell the Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India in 1930 also the Political Agent, 
Waziristan, significantly laid stress upon the stresses upon 
the importance of having a friendly neighbour to the north, 
he wrote that "twice in the comparatively short period of 
61. Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit. p. 136-137 and also Ludwig A. Op.cti. 
pp. 188-189 for the text of the treaty. 
62. NAI Foreign & Political Department. 834-F, 1932 part 2, 187-F 
1930 Nos. 1-167, nos. 3, 6, 7 Frontiers 843-F, 1932. 
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our relations with them [Afghanistan] in the two great crises 
of the history of the British India, it is little exaggeration to 
say that our fate in India, hung upon the loyalty of the 
rulers of Afghanistan "" 
Then, that was decided as a matter of British national 
interest, to give a tangible sign of friendship to a small 
nation, just similar to the post World War II help extended 
to the smaller agrarian states. 
We have seen how the policy of assistance to 
Afghanistan was formulated in 1920's Amir Amanullah was 
unaware of it and hardly anything happened in this regard. 
During Amir Amanullah's regime the relation between the 
British Government of India and Afghanistan remained 
strained and no sincere effort to better the ties was made. 
A part of subsidy was spent in the purchases of spares for 
the military hardware and ammunitions and some on the 
foreign tour of Amir Amanullah Khan while he was a guest 
of the British Government.^'* The same vague kinds of 
considerations were applied to the advancement of assistance 
to Nadir Shah's regime. The British assistance or for that 
reason any such offer could have led the Afghan people to 
63. NAI, Foreign & Political Department, 1930 F. 187 Nos. 1-167. 
Appendix to notes pp. 19-26. 
64. Howell refers to the period of Dost Muhammad and the Great 
Mutiny in India in 1857 and to the period of Amir Habibullah 
during World War I. NAI Foreign Political Department 1930 F.187, 
Nos. 1-167, Appendix to notes p. 26. 
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think of "involvement of some ulterior malignant foreign 
motives" behind that. For this reason the issue of foreign 
aid was not given any publicity and advertisement." Above 
all the new government was apprehensive of the advancement 
of tribal chiefs (who had helped Nadir Shah in getting the 
throne). Possibly they had beared that money was in Kabul 
they would have created problems for the new things. They 
had expected a handsome reward in lieu of the help 
extended to Nadir Shah. But due to the shortage of money, 
the Afghan Government had only given them honorary 
military titles for their services. 
The British Government of India and Afghanistan shared 
numerous common interests therefore circumtances demanded 
amicable relationship between them. Afghanistan served the 
purpose of a "buffer" for the British India against the 
Soviet designs. Afghanistan could have no objections to 
such an status, provided there would have been no 
infringement - to the Afghan independence. In spite of the 
desirable strong cordial relations between these two parties, 
the stumbling block was the question of age old frontier 
tribal problems. These tribals had always opposed the British 
Policy of gradual penetration. Early in 1920's the Indian 
National Movement gained momentum and by 1930's the 
65. For Financial aspect in 1934, See. India OfTice Library Files (lOL), 
Foreign & Political Collection; 3/9 Part I PZ. 4644/34. as cited by 
Gregorian Vartan, opcit., p. 241. 
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movement had become widespread. The north-west frontier 
was also affected by these developments in India. The Red 
Shirt Movement under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan and other leaders of the frontiers had widened its base 
further.^^ Naturally many muslims of India looked towards 
Afghanistan for inspiration and active support.^'' The 
frontier Afghans allied themselves with the Congress Party 
and many of them took part in agitations and fought for the 
independence for India. For example the Congress Committe 
of Free Tirah, in a message to Mahatma Gandhi, had chided 
the Indian leaders for conspiring with the British in the 
Gandhi -Irwin Agreement. They had sent a letter to Mahatma 
Gandhi, insisting him to take up the task of challenging the 
British. The tribes had assured him of the help of 400,000 
Free tribe fighters for the cause. They even suggested 
Gandhi to raise various issues in the forthcoming Round 
Table Conference. They had raised the issue of full 
independence to India, and the release of Sardar Bhagat 
66. The Times. Feb. 24, 1931 as its quoted in Ludwig, opcit. p. 299. 
The British Government had publicised the aid and that had caused 
enough embrassment to Afghan Government who was again trying to 
raise its national pride by denying any such receipient of aid. 
67. The origin of this party "Khudai Khidmatgaar" (or servants of God) 
or later known as Surkhposhan (Red Shirts) is very humble as it 
arose from a Utmanzai village in the Hashtangar area of the 
Peshawar district, led by Two brothers Dr. Khan Saheb & Abdul 
Gaffar Khan, belonging to Mohammadzai clans, see for more details. 
Caroe; Olaf; The Pathans (550 BC - A.D. 1957V Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd. London 1965, pp. 431-2. 
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Singh, Sukhdev, Rajguru, the Garhwalis and others, the 
compensation of 50 laks to the family of innocent Ghazi 
Habib Nur^* (who was hanged by British), the grant of 
reasonable pension to the widows and orphans of Indian 
uprising, the withdrawl of the British forces from the free 
tribal areas of Kajusi, alongwith the payment of an indemnity 
of 50 lakhs rupees to the Afridi's, and at last if the 
government makes delay in accepting above demands, they 
would rise against the government with all their might to free 
India.^^ 
While the British Government of India was not only 
concerned about the threat by the community of Free Tirah, 
it had sensed the danger that a coalition of Afghan tribes 
and the Indian Nationalists, with arms and ammunitions 
alongwith capable leadership, would pose a serious threat to 
the British rule in the Indian Sub-Continent. 
The British planes had bombarded and to some extent 
reduced the power of the tribes. The independent frontier 
tribes therefore, constituted a potential threat to both 
Afghanistan and the British India. Any triggering of revolts 
68. British officials in India, suspecting Soviet support for the Frontier 
Afghan, had initiated a campaign of anti-BoIshevick propaganda in 
the frontier areas. NAI, Foreign & Political Department 1932, 370-
F, Nos. 1-22. 
69. Ghazi Habib Nur was a transborder Afghan of Mohmand tribe, who 
had allegedly made an attempt on the life of the British Captain 
Barnes. NAI Foreign & Political Department, 1932 843-F, Part 4. 
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and uprisings in the region could have threatend the very 
stability of both the states.''•' 
The Viceroy called the conference of his Council on 
July 1933 to discuss the threat and how to destroy the 
tribal power? The solution agreed upon was to destroy the 
tribal power once and for all through "the gradual 
penetration of independent tribal territory and disarmament of 
the tribes." The Council was disturbed by the fact that 
possession of firearms by the tribes had risen from 80,000 
rifles in 1913 to 2,20,000 in 1933. In the mountain fastness 
of the North-West frontier, it seemed every house was a 
fortress and every man a soldier, and that no man ventured 
to go out without a gun. While the penetration to the 
frontier seemed feasible by constructing roads and extending 
rail-road terminals; but the question of the disarmament of 
the tribals would have clearly meant an undeclared war. The 
Viceroy's Council had deliberated upon the question as to 
"why should not the task of bringing the tribes in terms was 
to be achieved even at the risk of having to face war"?^' 
70. The intensification of the Indian Nationalist activities during 1930's, 
the frontier tribes had started allying themselves which the movement. 
Frontier Afghans with their leader Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and 
others associated with the Congress Party of India and the tribal 
congress of Free Tirah activated its coordination with them. Apart 
from that British officials in India suspecting Soviet support for the 
frontier Afghans initiated a campaign of anti-Bolshevick propaganda 
in the frontier area, NAI Forcing and Political Department, File No. 
370-71, 1932, Nos. 1-22. 
71. See for detailed discussion in the Viceroy's Council, Adamec 
Ludwig, Op.cit, pp.208-209. 
102 
However, there was opposition and a serious objection to 
the option of war as "the war had always been a costly 
affair in terms of men and material." But those in favour, 
therefore, forwarded the view" "that since the money could 
have been considred principally a capital expenditure for 
which there were budgetary provision, and that made the war 
economically feasible. They saw an advantage in winning so 
as to keep their hold on the territory across the Indus or 
otherwise the British would be forced back to the line of 
the Indus.^^ The Viceroy seemed reluctant, as he had 
foreseen "a no effect exercise if any undertaken." Whereas 
the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province was in 
favour of complete occupation of the whole region "for a 
permanent and lasting solution to the tribal problems." The 
Governor even went to suggest as how to control the 
Afridis''^ who had fallen to desperate plight since 
Afghanistan had stopped their subsidies. British India, by 
extending subsidies to them could have garnered favour for 
themselves. Whereas the Commander-in-Chief was in favour 
72. NAI, Foreign & Political Department File, 346-F, 1933 Nos. 126, 
Notes No.l. 
73. Among the famous North West Frontier Tribes the Afridis, Khattak, 
Orkzais, Bangash, Wazirs, Mahsud, and Tusi are few names. Afridis 
in particular are supposed to be not true Afghans but Karlanri (they 
are presented in geneological legend as descendent from a founding, 
ancester, named Karlanri). However they are eminently Pukhtuns or 
Pushtuns, the tribes who never fell under the effective sway of any 
recorded imperial authority and they formed the backbone of the so 
called tribal belt. See Olaf Caroe, opcit. Introduction XV. 
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of first "pursuation and then forcible compliance," his 
suggestion was that "we should have to say them that we 
want so many rifles and take the consequences" (that is to 
make war if they do not comply). He found slow process 
of penetration "as the best possible remedy." On the 
question of League of Nation's possible objection to the 
"peaceful penetration"; as the tribal land and the tribes were 
Indian citizens, no objection could be expected to any such 
policy.^ '* 
The other option to crush the tribes, was the blockade 
of the supply of strategic materials, prohibition of transport 
of raw materials to the frontiers, which could have been 
used in the tribal factories for the production of weapons. 
In fact the flexible policy of exporting arms to Afghanistan 
was one of the cause which led to the spread of arms-
culture among the tribes, as a number of previous internal 
disturbances the arms had fallen in their hands. There was 
an urgent need to confine the exports of arms to machine-
guns, aeroplanes and arms of a kind which the tribes could 
not use.^ ^ 
British tribal policy could explain in these words : 
"penetration, control and civilization" of the independent 
74. NAI Foreign & Political Department, F.No. 347-F, 1933, Nos. 1-6, 
Notes 1. 
75. NAI, Foreign & Political Department File, 346-F, 1933 Nos. 1-6, 
Notes No. 1. 
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tribal areas meaning by the taming of the tribes. The 
problem with the British Indian Policy in regard to these 
tribes, was that the Government had already concluded 
agreements with many of the tribes and as long as the tribes 
adhered to their part of the bargain as it was difficult for 
the government to change the status-quo.^^ 
A note drafted by an officer of the Political Department 
of Government of India in 1935 suggests a better planning 
to end the impasse when he says that "penetration should 
preferably take place, peacefully with the consent of the 
tribesmen, and that failing such consent it should be 
enforced by military action when tribal misbehaviour gives us 
a good case, sufficient to justify such a step in tribal eyes; 
otherwise we should count a degree of resistance and 
sympathetic rising which would hinder the application of our 
policy. "^ ^ 
76. By 1929 it was quite apparent that after 40 years of British 
administration of the frontier region, they had failed to stabilise the 
frontier areas. For that matter there was need to exercise control 
and influence beyond the border. Even by 1930 the British Indian 
authority had been paying 885,790 rupees annually in subsidies to 
these tribes, appart from using other means of use of force and air 
bombardments in taming them. See for more details S. Gopal : The 
Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin. Oxford, 1957. pp.73-74. Brock, H. Le 
M. "Air Operarions on the North-West Frontiers." J.R.C.A.S., 
January 1932. 
77. A memo by Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Bruce, "Policy In Waziristan" 
recommended a forward policy for control of Waziristan. India Office 
Library (lOL), Memo, A210, as quoted by Gregorian Vartan, opcit., 
p. 242. 
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In other words, Britain was to look for the plausible 
causes or grounds for declaring war, to further her objective 
of permanent conquest of the Afghan tribes. Building of 
roadways was one means of penetration. The roads were 
primarily of a strategic value and did not bring tangible 
economic benefit to the tribes through those areas they 
passed. A large number of tribes men were employed for 
the construction works of the roadways and later on for the 
maintenance of it. Though, in between, due to financial 
crunches, the Government of India often had to stop the 
construction of works and as a result the dismissal of the 
tribesmen, leading to acrimony between the two parties 
concerned. Besides the frontier Afghans had realised that the 
roads as the linkages, constituted a clear danger to their ever 
cherished independence.'* 
The mistrust had been seeping into the minds of the 
tribal chiefs of the frontier, as they had visualised the 
"process of penetration" working. But any resistance to the 
British plan would have provided the much sought after 
pretext for a war. The British had another ploy in buying the 
tribal favour as they had been paying subsidies to the tribes 
who had been finding difficulties in earning a livelihood in 
their mountain homelands. The British had then started to 
employ them as Khassadars,'^ tribal militia men and gave 
78. NAI, Files Foreign & Political Department, 162(2)-F, 1933, Nos. 1-
255, Notes, on 247. 
79. A soldier whose arms are furnished by their employer. These 
Khassadars were paid for their services rendered in petty issues 
such as road and camp protection. Hauner Milan Op.cit p. 82. 
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them a "vested interest in the maintenance of law and 
order," as understood by the British. The purpose was to 
make the tribals more and more economically dependent 
upon the Government of India and thus whenever they 
would resist the British move, was to get temporary 
suspension of subsidies or to pay heavy fines. In order to 
contain the tribals the British Government of India used to 
employ some of the aggressive tribals^° in order to counter 
the other tribes. The rugged, treacherous mountains and 
unknown passes had always made it difficult for the British 
to wage a war against the tribals in that kind of hostile 
region. The Afghan guerilla war tactice due to the tribal 
affinity, the British found it difficult to tackle them. 
Whenever the British were unable to quell their upsurge, 
they took the recourse of bombing the Afghan villages by 
planes or simply taking the hostages of the Afghan Sardars. 
But they were released soon as the younger member of the 
tribes could be stopped in joining the upsurge.^' 
To the British authorities in India it all appeared legal, 
when they had tried to enforce Barampta to arrest any 
offender particularly from the Sulaimankhel's. The regulation 
was equally justified under the Pathan custom of 'Tarbur par 
Tarbur Wahale Shi (A man is called to account for the 
offences of his cousin). 
80. Mandakhel tribe was one of the ferocious tribe which the British 
always dared not to disturb them. 
81. Maconachie, Opcit., pp. 229-231. 
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That case of enforcement was done with Sulaiman Khel 
when some members of that tribe ware arrested in Calcutta 
and in Dera Ismail Khan, where 13 had died while in prison. 
For justification to such cases British government had cited 
"Barampta. The sytstem of Brampta was so useful for 
controlling the unruly tribes that the British government had 
made it a kind it a kind of international method. The 
usefulness of that method in 1924 and for years after that 
even that official policy came to be known as "The 
Government of India" policy and the same do not admit 
that their liberty of action with regard to Brampta of Afghan 
subject in anyway circumscribed except by consideration of 
law.^ ^ 
Though, with the changing art of warfare and military 
technology, the losers were of course the tribal lashkar 
(conventional army) and they had no match for the aerial 
warfare, machine guns, powerful artillery, bombs and napalm. 
The fact is supported by the secret military document 
completed in 1948 by the Indian General Staff entitled "The 
Basic Handbook of Afghanistan"*^ When it says "the new 
82. The wholesale arrest of the person under section 21, Frontier Crimes 
Regulation. Brampta is word of central Asian Turkic origin, meaning 
by the seizure of person's animals or property belonging to a tribe 
or an individual at fauh, in order to bring pressure for restitution. 
Caroe. Olaf, Opcit. p. 3 50. See aslo Maconachie, Op.cit., pp. 
229-231. 
83. The Basic Handbook of Afghanistan. "Government of India Press, 
1948, Secret Document, p. 28. 
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frontier of Afghanistan offer little resistance to the invader 
from the North & West or East even desert of 
Afghanistan was difficult to cross but due to 
technological changes the case has become simpler.^ "^  
The tribes were not destroyed but due to the persistent 
policies of the British government - they were efficiently 
contained and much of the independent tribal areas had 
come under the influence of the govertunent of India. British 
tribal policy in independent tribal belt was viewed in Kabul 
with great alarm, on the contrary the Afghan ruler 
considered these tribals a buffer between British India and 
Afghanistan. If that buffer were gone, Afghan government 
felt that Afghanistan could not be able to maintain its 
independence as the frontier tribes considered Afghan King 
as their ruler in Islam. 
To avoid the brunt of hostile criticism and implications 
of selling out the Afghan tribes to the British, the Afghan 
ruler had to show his support in some way. 
Though with superficial cordiality, Anglo-Afghan relation 
were frequently under stress as fundamental contradiction 
could not be resolved. 
84. Islah Sep. 12, 1935, had vigorously protested British forward policy 
as a danger to Afghanistan. NAI, Foreign & Political Department, 
518-F, Nos. 1-40, Notes 7. The Anis Sept. 18, 1935 No. 25 
voiced similar protest about British moves in Mohmand area. Ibid. 
No. 32. 

CHAPTER-V 
KING ZAHIR SHAH'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING 
(1933-1947) : SEARCH OF A NEW IDENTITY 
King Zahir Shah ascended the throne at a very young, 
age of Ninteen.' He was educated at Habibia & Istiqlal 
Schools and was sent to France where he attended several 
Lycees' (French Schools). After his return to Afghanistan in 
1930, he underwent military training and graduated from the 
military school at Kabul. Though his selection to the throne 
ensured Musahiban legitimacy, yet the actual power rested in 
the hands of his three powerful patternal uncles.^ The 
occupied the highest posts and wielded total control over the 
internal and external affairs of Afghanistan. During Hashim 
Khan as the Premier of the country continued the process of 
strengthening, Afghan Nationalism and modernization. 
In the realm of foreign affairs all the policies were 
1. The New Monarch Mohamad Zahir Shah was bom in Kabul on Oct. 
15, 1914. See Fletcher, Arnold. Afghanistan : The Highway of 
Conquest. Cornell University Press, N.Y. 1966. p. After graduating 
from the Military School in Kabul he was appointed a Minister 
ofWar and Education at the precocious age of Eighteen. 
2. Sardar Hashim Khan was appointed as Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 
his two unclels Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali were elevated to high 
offices. See, Rahul Ram; Afghanistan. Mongolia & USSR. Vikas Pub. 
N.D. 1987, p. 24 and also for an account of Sardar Hashim Khan, 
See Fraser Tytler W.K.; Afghanistan. A Study of Political 
Development in Central Asia. GeoflFery Cumberledge, Oxford 1950, 
pp. 243-245. 
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formulated according to the wishes of King Zahir Shah. 
This was evident from his speech of 1934, in which he had 
explained his foreign policy, asserting that Afghanistan's 
foreign policy had to be shaped "according to the desire of 
the King and his government,for world peace; so that 
Afghanistan could continue to deal with its socio-economic 
backwardness and resume the path of progress."^ The three 
points of his programme were aimed at maintaining friendly 
relations and cooperation and understanding specially with 
the neighbouring countries. He was against raising any 
political issues lest it could jeopardise the chances for a 
better deal and development of the state. He expected a 
similar approach from any other governments towards 
Afghanistan too". In general he had adopted Nadir's policy 
of maintaining 'cordial relation' with the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain.'* Close friendly ties were to be maintained with 
3. See for details of his text of the Speech to the Afghan Parliament, 
"Kabul Alamanach 1934-35, p. 67, as quoted by Gregorian Vartan, 
Op.cit., p. 375. See also for other aspects and measures taken by 
the Zahir Shah government with regard to the formulation of new 
foreign policy of Afghanistan and its dealing with outside world. 
Castagne, Joseph; 'Soviet Imperialism in Afghanistan', Foreign Affairs, 
July 1935, p. 703. 
4. In 1936, to the great satisfaction of the Soviets, the Afghan 
Government had renewed the 1931 Soviet Afghan Mutual Pact, 
extended unrill March 29, 1946. See, Pravada. March 30, 1936; 
Izvestia. Sept. 6, 1936. For the text and the protocols of the treaty. 
See, Degras, Calender of Soviet Documents, p. 152. The pact was 
followed by Commercial Agreements (May 1936), providing transit 
right for Afghan and a financial arrangements between the Soviet 
Commissariat for external commerce and for the Bank-i-Milli for full 
text of the agreement see. Islah, May 23, 1936. 
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countries like Turkey, Persia and other Muslim countries. He 
was cautious in his approach towards the British India^ and 
the Soviet Union.^ Zahir Shah discouraged Anti-Soviet 
activities in Afghanistan and advised those leaders to 
emigrate to other countries. Similarly he discontinued to give 
support to the Indian rebels and the Afghan frontier was to 
be closed for any hostile activities against the British. At 
the same time took step discourage the NWF tribes against 
any hostility towards the British India. In the light of new 
development Afghanistan took no fresh initiative instead 
chose to follow the big powers. 
The British attitude towards Afghanistan was one of 
caution in the light of new developments and changed 
International scenario. They were aware that if they could 
not control "Afghanistan's foreign policy, they would not be 
able to guarantee her northern frontier, and in the event of 
any crisis. Therefore Russian was to adopt its policy 
keeping an eye on the British Interests".' In the changing 
5. In order to allay mutual fears of interference and particularly Afghan 
attempt to please the British, both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union 
had decided to close their respective Consulate in Tashkent and in 
Mazar-i-Sharif. See. Islah. April 25, 1938. 
6. Sensing the emergence of complex International relations on the eve 
of World War II, the policy of the then Afghan Government seemed 
to be activated by a sincere desire to maintain friendly relation with 
all the powers, particularly with great Britain and Russia, NAI-
Foreign & Political Files 38-F, Appendix to Soviet Treaty 540-F, 
1931, 137-F Nos. 1-51, No. 8. 
7. NAI, Foreign and Political Files, Appendix to Soviet Treaty 540-F, 
1931, 137-F nos. 151 (8). 
112 
International diplomatic prespective Afghanistan had desired 
to be a part of the international organisations as that would 
have provided her guarantee for its security, above all free 
from the bullying tactics of its two powerful neighbours. 
On the question of joining the League of Nations, 
Afghanistan did not join* till Soviet Union had done it.^ The 
British Government of India, as advised by the Military 
Branch, had been paying heeds to the problems in regard to 
relations with Afghanistan on a very strategic basis. They 
had sensed that India by herself could do nothing effective 
north of the Hindukush unless in cooperation with Afghan 
Government. They were also convinced that occupying the 
southern provinces of Afghanistan as a counter to the 
Russian invasion from the north, was fully justified even 
though such occupation would have brought no desired 
result.'" For maintaining better relations, the British 
Government had tried to convince the Afghan Government 
8. The Afghan move was purely diplomatic and quite disgusting to the 
British as that would have lessened their controlling Afghan affairs 
eflFectively. Memorandum of India Office Library, A-205, NAT Files 
15-F, 1931 Nos. 1-8 notes. No. 3, as quoted from Ludwig Adamec 
Op.cit., p. 216. For more details. See P. Sykes: "Afghanistan: The 
present position" JRCAS. April 1940, p. 161. 
9. See for details; NAI, Files Foreign PoHtical Deptt. 1931, Appendix 
to the Soviet Treaty, 540-F, 137-F, Nos. 1-51, No. 8. 
10. P&S, 12, 1722, 3/132, L/P and S/12, 1688 Coll 3/112, no.k 2904 
1936 India Office Records, quoted from Ludwig Op.cit., p. 217. Sir 
Robert Vanisttart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government, 
wrote in a paper, in Feb. 1936, that no Soviet danger existed. See 
for more details, Gregorian, Op.cit., p. 376. 
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that it was through the British interests that would guide 
their diplomatic relations, and a strong independent and 
friendly Afghanistan was best suited to them. Though, that 
had hardly assured Afghanistan of anything concrete. 
In their next attempt of reassuring, Kabul the British 
cabinet had instructed Sir R. Maconachie, the then British 
Minister to Kabul, to assure the Afghan Government that 
"there was no danger to Afghanistan from the Soviet 
attack". Further more, Afghanistan was advised to join the 
League of Nations in order to raise its status and emerge 
stronger. The attack on Afghanistan, they had assured, 
would be considered an attack on British and the Indian 
interests.'' 
Sensing the Japanese move on Manchuria, which had 
put the Soviet on the defensive, Afghanistan was hardly 
impressed by the British assurance, as there was no danger 
from the Soviet side. Very aptly and quickly realising the 
importance of alliance with Japan, Afghanistan had managed 
to undermine the Soviets. Just after that the Soviets had 
softened their hostile attitude towards Afghanistan and there 
11. In 1935 Afghan Prime Minster had confided to the German Minister 
saying it was due to the Japanese that the Soviets were not agresive 
towards Afghanistan. See, DAA, Innere Politik Beziehungen 
Afghanistan Und Deutschland. Vol. 4 No. 635, March 29, 1935). 
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were no border disputes.^^ Japanese aspiration towards 
Central Asia was evident from its coming closer to 
Afghanistan and it was quite startling. They reportedly had 
aspired to become Afghanistan's neighbour at Wakhan 
corridor.'^ The crisis of Italian planned agression to 
Abyssinia had also alerted Afghanistan, who had criticised 
the very existence of the League of Nations as it was giving 
in to the designs of Imperial power. That had led countries 
like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan to even think of joining 
with the Soviet Union, if ever threatened by the other 
Imperial powers. Afghanistan therefore, felt an urgent need 
for a stronger Afghanistan and the creation of a more 
powerful army.^ '* In the changing world scenario Afghanistan 
also needed the help of a western power to help her in its 
efforts of modernization and development. For a while. 
12. In a speech the Japanese trading representative had remarked so in 
Kabul, India Office Library, Annual Report, 1938 no. 97 p. 17, The 
Afghan Press also very euphoric and had reported the "Japanese 
inclination towards Afghanistan", L/P and S/12/688, Coll. 3/112, 
Kabul Report No. 30, March 7, 1936, India Office Records quoted 
in Adamec Op.cit. 
13. Reported by Dr. Georg Ripken, the new German Minister in 
Kabul, who succeeded Ziemke, DAA, Beziehungen Afghanistan 
Und Deutschland Personalien Staatsmanner, vol. 1, no. 1830, 
Sept. 24, 1935 as cited in Milan Hauner Op.cit . See also 
Adamec pp. 239, 250. 
14. DAA Beziehugen, Afghanistan Deustchland Innere Politik, Vol. 7, no. 
465, April 4, 1933. See also for details on German Economic and 
Political moves, Ludwig Adamec, Op.cit, pp.238 specially the 
chapters on World War II. 
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Germany was still the best option. It was believed that 
Germany would act as a balancing power between the Soviet 
Union and the Great Britain. Germany's distant location too 
was favourable for Afghanistan as it could hardly think of 
any territorial aspirations. 
The rise of Hitler in Germany was seen as a welcome 
move in the interest of Afghanistan as any existing possible 
secret link between Germany and the Soviet Union would 
come to end (Hitler was a thoroughly anti-Bolshevick). The 
fear in Kabul was that both Germany and the USSR might 
desire restoration of Ex-Amir Amanullah to the throne, or 
that an aggressive anti British policy might force Afghanistan 
into hostilities with India. With the formation of a Nazi Club 
in Kabul, Germany was to show their presence felt. In the 
words of Dr. Herbert Schworbel, the German Minister in 
Kabul, "Germany had replaced both the English and the 
Soviets in education and technical field and in Construction 
and Agriculture and had a plan to open a German Air Lines 
to Kabul."'' On July 10, and 29, 1935, Georg Ripken, the 
head of German Legation in Kabul, in a confidential report 
attributed to about the major shakeup in Afghanistan's 
domestic and foreign policy and felt comfortable with the 
15. See. Politische Bezichungen, Afghanistan Und Fremde Staaten. Vol. 2 
No. 1314, July 10, 1935; Ibid. No. 1465, July 29, 1935 as cited in 
Adamec p. 218, New approaches, p. 224, WK Fraser Tytler, 
Afghanistan. A Study of Political Development in Central and South 
Asia. Oxford, 1953 p. 252. 
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exclusion of both London and Moscow from any such 
participation. 1^  There was an intense competition among 
Afghan elite lobbies of different shades such as the Pro-
German, Pro-British, Pro-Soviet as well as the section of 
isolationalist party; had worked really hard to impress upon 
the Afghan Government and shape its policies. Nevertheless 
the majority of the Afghan intelligensia was in favour of an 
"independent national Afghan policy" which would give the 
country a maximum of protection from foreign agression. 
But the strongest group which the Afghan King Zahir Shah 
himself belonged to along with the Ministers of the Court; 
the King's cousins Muhammad Nasim Khan and Muhamad 
Daud Khan, the President of the Afghan National Bank, a 
number of younger secretaries and directors in various 
ministries) were strongly in favour of a "pro-independent 
national Afghan policy;" were in general wanted that 
Germany should to be given the sole responsibility of 
modernization and other such construction works in 
Afghanistan.'^ 
On Sep. 24, 1935, as reported by the German Minister 
Ripken, the Afghan Cabinet had agreed to work exclusively 
with Germany in all affairs at least in principle. Though there 
16. The "Independent Group" as the Ripken had called it, intended to set 
up a central planning agency to coordination and supervise all Afghan 
development projects, to balance the national economy in terms of 
trade and audit the expenditure and income. 
17. See notes in, NAI File, Foreign & Political Deptt. No. 242-F, 1937. 
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were attempts to get support from London & Moscow too, 
but contrary to that London was not in favour to extend 
any such support at that point of time.^^ 
As the International situation was becoming complex 
Afghanistan became more interested in military matters rather 
than economic issues. The Treaty of Versailles has put great 
restriction on Germany in dealing with arms, Germany was 
no longer abiding by that (as per Hitler's speech on May 
21, 1935) and was to provide Afghanistan a credit of 
around 18 million Marks for military equipments apart from 
the German Ministry Instructors though the so called Indian 
Circle, which was against the sole collaboration with 
Germany, had opposed such ties.^^ Inspite of that in 1936 
18. The socalled India Circle or Pro India Group included Allah Nawaz 
and his friends. Allah Nawaz was an Indian from Multan, educated 
at Lahore in 1920, had migrated to Afghanistan and became 
Assistant Editor of, Ittihad-i-Mashriqi of Jalalabad. Because of his 
Indian origin, he was suspected to be an Indian spy. See, Dundas, 
A.F. : Precis on Afghan Affairs (1927-1936). also See, NAI Files 
Foreign & Political No. 224-F 1931, Nos. 1:3 No. 1, 680-F, 1937. 
and for circumstances leading to Allah Nawaz's migration and story 
of famous Silk latters conspircy. See Trivedi, R.K. : The Criticial 
Triangle, India, Britain and Turkey. Jaipur, 1993, p. 177. For Hitler's 
speech and his bypassing the very terms of the treaty of Versailles 
see. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1922-1939, ed. by N. Baynes, 2 
vols. Oxford 1942. See for the prohibition for arms deal of 
Germany, Article 170, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
19. DAA Personalien Und Staatsmanner. Vol. 2. No. 21, March 14, 
1936. The Afghan had refused to conclude a commercial 
agreement with the Soviet Union. Ibid; Beziehungen. Zwischen 
Afghanistan Und der Soviet Union Vol. 2, No. A-1734, April 
6, 1936). See also Afghanistan Annual Report. 1938. para 81, 
Cf; also Adamec, p. 224. 
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Germany and Afghanistan was engaged in preparing the way 
for implementation of the German Afghan programme. The 
Afghan delegations were sent to Berlin and a number of 
agreements were reached in principle. At the same time 
Afghanistan had signed the protocol for a ten year extension 
of Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression.^^ 
The resulting agreements had brought various goods to 
Afghanistan. A fifteen million German Marks credit to 
Afghanistan in October 23, 1936 was agreed upon. 
Arrangement for sending 30 Nejat students to Germany for 
higher education January 1937 were made; similarly 
arrangement for flying instructor and planes, and 
considerable expansion of German-Afghan trade through 
Payment Agreement of August 1939 was also made.^' 
These diplomatic activities and the increasing size of the 
German colony in Afghanistan, was being watched closely 
by the Soviets and the British. Interestingly enough, until 
1938 Britain did not express any concern about increasing 
German influence as that was a deterrent for the Soviet 
influence too, or till it was confined to German need for 
raw materials and foreign exchange. The British, however. 
20. Ibid, Vertraege 1, Afghanistan Vol.1, Oct. 23, 1936, India Office 
Library Files, L/P and S/12 P2 375, 1937, See, also Kabul 
Minister Report No. 1689, No. 5216, 1938, Coll. 3/104. 
21. DDA, Personalien Staatesmanner Vertraege No.2, Afghanistan Nov. 
17, 1936 and Jan. 13, 1938. India Office Library Files, L/P and S/ 
12 Coll. 3/113 Pz 2175, 1936. As cited in Adamec, pp. 98-100. 
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had always feared German expansion in the Middle East, 
with its terminous in Afghanistan rather than in Persia, which 
they believed might lead to Soviet counter measures.^^ A 
situation that would place Britain in predicament. Since 
Afghanistan cooperated with the British and the Soviets they 
would not raise any finger against the German factor. But 
when in 1937 German Government had tried to extend 
German Airlines to Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and China 
the eyebrows were raised as both Britain and the Soviet 
Union had disliked the idea of German advances into that 
area. By June 1938, Eraser Tytler, the British Minister to 
Kabul, had warned the British Government of serious 
penetration of Afghanistan by the Germans involving both 
the economic and military aspects and that "involvement was 
acquiring a menancing proportion concerning British 
Empire."" Further commenting on the enlarged cooperation 
with the German, the British Minister had felt that" general 
prestige of the British had suffered and that there was 
urgent need to increase the cooperation with Afghanistan in 
every way possible in order to protect the interest of the 
22. NAI File Foreign and Political Files. No 410-F No. 68, 1936. 
23. Apart from German & the Soviet Union (with whom around $ 
1,05,000 worth of trade pact was on) Afghanistan wanted close 
relations with the Muslim countries in order to improve its image 
among them and to safeguard itself from the Northern neighbours. 
See Elizabeth Bacon & Alfred E. Hudson, "Afghanistan Waits". Asia 
Sec. 41, No. 51, p. 31, For details on Saadabad Pact, See. Sykes, 
P. : A History of Afghanistan. AMS Press, New York, 1975, Vol. 
II, p.333. 
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British India". 
A significant development was the conclusion of a pact 
among Muslim countries known as Saadabad Pact July 1937, 
an alliance which included Iran, Iraq, Turkey and 
Afghanistan. The objective of this pact was for "ensuring 
peace and security in the Near East, non-interference in the 
others internal affairs and always working as a group during 
any crisis whatsoever".^'* The move was welcomed by the 
British Government of India and the USSR. Though there 
was an air of apprehension, from the Soviet point of view 
the pact was an extension of Collective Security System of 
the League of Nation which could bring stablisation of peace 
in the region.^^ Saadabad Pact was concluded with the tacit 
approval and even active encouragement of both the Soviet 
Union and the Great Britain.^^ Germany's initial reaction to 
this pact was favourable, but Italians strongly objected to 
this, as they considered it to be an instrument of British 
24. For Soviet point on the development. See. Izvestia, July 10, 1937. 
For British Commentary, Sec. The Times. July 19, 1939. 
25. See on the Saadabad Pact and the reaction of the Imperial powers. 
See, Percy Sykes, Afghanistan, Vol.11, p. 334. 
26. Saadabad pact had aroused the Soviet fear as they sensed the 
increase Turkish influence in Afghanistan, as Turkey, though not 
hostile to the Soviet Union, was supporting the camp headed by 
Britain. See, Rahul, Ram; Afghanistan Mongolia & USSR. Vikas 
Publishing, N.D. 1587, p. 30 also, Fraser Tytler W.K., Afghanistan. 
A study of Political Development in Central Asia. Geoffery 
Cumberledge Oxford, 1950, p. 251. 
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Imperialism in the Middle East.^'' 
The Saadabad Pact was the first regional security and 
friendship pact entered by Afghanistan, which was to ensure 
greater solidarity among the signatories in meeting aggression 
from European power and in forestalling the possibility of an 
attack against another Middle-Eastern states.^^ 
Moreover, Afghanistan's increasing dependence on the 
financial and technical assistance of the Axis Powers in their 
economic development programme had placed them in a 
precarious position on the eve of the World War II. The 
Allies would never like that to happen to Afghanistan but 
neither "American chose to do anything nor the British". The 
alternative left to Afghanistan was to go to the Russian side, 
which again would be a point of discomfiture for the 
British.On the other hand, even the British presence was not 
welcomed by the Afghan's. The development had come to 
27. According to George Kirk the Saadabad Pact Nations represented 
"A regional block strong enough to withstand Great Powers 
interference whether from the growing Mediterrnean ambitions of 
Fascist Italy are from the traditional Middle Eastern rivalry of Britain 
and Russia." See, Kirk, George (Ed), Survey of International Affairs: 
The Middle East In The War 1939-1946. Oxford, 1952, pp.489-90. 
Also Lewis, Bernard : Turkey Today. London, 1940. pp.77-78. For 
an Irarian Commentry See, Abbas Khalatbary : L' Iran et. La Pacte 
Qrientale. Paris, 1938, Part III. 
28. Afghanistan was heavily dependent upon Germany, Italy and others 
for various kind of cooperation. The dilemma of the powers like the 
Great Britain and Russia was as to how cope with the situation, 
Ludwing Adamec, op.cit., p. 238. 
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create problem on both the fronts of the Axis vs. Allies, as 
well as head long collision between the British and the 
Soviet Union in Afghan matters. William Barton had proposed 
a different course for the British to follow in that kind of 
situation. Accordingly, the British had aimed at three points 
formulae which would eliminate the Amir Amanullah's 
influence in Afghanistan, contribute to the defence of British 
India, and gain the gratitude of the Afghans.^^ He argued 
that "a strong and friendly Afghanistan" was essential in the 
pacification of India's turbulent border area, and economic 
development was "of the prime impotance." Further 
ellaborating, he maintained that "Afghanistan's foreign trade 
and economic development heavily depended upon the 
cooperation of its neighbour who would provide her the 
outlet to the sea, and in return Afghanistan would not 
hesitate to grant special trade facilities to the British India.^ '^  
But Barton's idea had hardly found any takers among the 
British policy makers. In case, such a concession would 
have been conditional on the most favoured nation clause 
and capitulatory treaties for the Great Britain. At the very 
last the Soviet response would have been for reciprocity. 
Both consequences were unacceptable to the Afghan ruling 
elite. Under the circumstances, then, the Afghan government 
29. See for more details on the issue, William Barton; "North West 
Frontier And The War." United Empire. London, Nov. 1939, p. 
1103. 
30. Barton, William, op.cit., p. 1103. 
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could only continued to walk on a tight rope during 1938. 
Eventually the most fundamental principles of Afghan 
foreign and economic policy thus far pursued received a jolt 
after the outbreak of World War II. More so after the 
conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non Agression Pact in 1939.^' 
The dilemma of the Afghan government was apprent and the 
possibility of Afghanistan's independance might be 
jeopardised and that the country might become a 
battleground for European diplomacy; may even be a theatre 
of war, seemed very real.^^ The Hashim Government sought 
to salvage its modernization programme and to safeguard the 
country's independance followed the traditional Afghan foreign 
policy by proclaiming Afghanistan's neutrality. Zahir Shah 
declared Afghanistan a neutral country "who wanted to have 
close economic and political ties" and was in favour of 
31. Bacon, Elizabeth & Alfred E. Hudson; "Afghanistan Waits" Asia Part 
41, No. 51, p. 31. The Nazi Soviet Pact shocked the Afghan 
government. As long as the European war did not breakout, the 
Afghans believed to be in an unenviable position to play off Russia 
and Britain against one another. See also, "Documents on German 
Foreign Policy/D/VII, Nos. 228, 229, as cited by Milan Hauner : 
India in Axis Strategy. Klett Cotta, Stutagart, 1981. pp.90-92, 132-
133 also 183-186. 
32. The rumour was making round that Germany through the Soviet 
Afghan Treaty had infact authorised Soviet Union to attack 
Afghanistan. Elizabeth Bacon & Afterd & Hindson p. 31. Op.cit. 
also, VedicVed, Pratap; Russio-American Rivalry in Afghanistan. 
National Publishing House, Delhi, 1973, p. 29. 
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peace in the World in September 1939." Serious internal 
and external pressures were brought to bear upon that 
neutrality, however. There were Afghan Nationalists and 
modernists who could not see how Afghanistan could stop in 
defence efforts, interrupt its modernization programmes, and 
severe its diplomatic and commercial ties with the Axis's 
powers without actually jeopardising its independance and 
sovereignty. There was frustration in Afghan ruling circle 
because the proposed plan of industrial development and 
military re-equipment had begun to arise and was in coming 
into full operation. Much material ordered from Czecho-
slovakia and Germany had been delivered, but there was 
much still to come. Textile Mills were half finished, 
hydroelectric installation lacked essential parts, there were 
guns without ammunition and ammunition without guns. 
Nothing could have been more unfortunate than a severage 
of relation with Germany, at least untill the delivery of all 
recent purchases had been completed. "^ '^  Afghans were able 
to complete some of their programmes during 1939-41, 
period since the Soviets did not pressurize them to severe 
33. In order to keep intact the German favoured emotion intact 
Afghanistan was pushing up very cautiously. Since Afghanistan was 
never sure of the outcome of the war it was very difficuh to decide 
which side to favour for. Thus keeping intact good old tradition of 
neutrality See, Kissing's contemporary. Archives, 1940-43 (Bristol) 
Part 4, p. 427-1. also. Vedic Ved Pratap, Op.cit. p. 
34. See Kirk, George E. (Ed) Survery of International Affairs: Middle 
East In The War. 1939-1946. Oxford, 1952, p. 192. 
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their connection with the Axis, while the Nazi-Soviet pact 
was in effect.^ ^ The British for their part, were in a poor 
position to make such a demand. A confrontation with 
Afghanistan would have played into the hands of Nazi-
Germany and seriously threatened the British defences in 
India. Since 1938 the Great Britain had been trying to 
prevent an erruption in the NWFP, where the Pathan 
tribesmen did not need much prompting to assert their 
autonomy, a fact that had always created difficulties in 
Anglo-Afghan relations and had continued to do so even 
during this period.^^ An explosive situation developed in 
Waziristan in the spring of 1939. Tribals at Waziristan, were 
fighting against the British intrusion in their area and were 
more angry with the Afghan Government's attitude towards. 
Because Government of Afghanistan had not supported them 
in any way. The tribals of Sulaiman Khel resented to the 
collection of taxes from the nomads who had hither to 
freely conducted their trade without any hindrance." 
35. With the trade pact between the Soviets and Afghanistan just prior 
to the declaration of the neutrality by the King Zahir Shah, the 
various development programme could be continued. Daniel J. Dalin, 
Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy (1930-42^ New Haven, 1942, p. 421. 
36. The outbreak allegedly organised by the Italians and the Faqir of 
Ipi, who had attempted for the attention of both the Indian and the 
Afghan Government . See. Eraser, Tytler; W.K.; Afghanistan. A 
Political Development In Central Asia. GeofFery Cumberledge Oxford, 
1950, p. 253. 
37. Ludwig Adamec, op.cit., p. 228, also NAI Foreign and Political 
Deptt., F-558, 1937. 
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About the same time a Syrian Adventure Saadi-al 
Geilani, known as the Shami Pir, had denounced King Zahir 
Shah as an ususper.^^ On June 13, 1938 al Geilani had 
convened a Loe-jirgarh which was attended by some 3,000 
tribals, and in that tribal meeting he had denounced King 
Zahir Shah as an ususper and supported Ex-Amir Amanullah 
as a lawful King. Geilani had raised a tribal force had 
attacked Afghan frontier fortifications. Though the attempt 
proved futile when and he failed to capture the fortification 
but that led the Afghan Government to lodge strong protest 
- with the British Government over the incident.^' As some 
Afghan circles had seen in the incident - a British hand 
38. Saadi-al Geilani, popularly known as Shami Pir from Syria, was 
distantly connected to with Queen Soraya Tarzi, the wife of Ex-Amir 
Amanullah, was a Pir of Qadiriya Silsila, had managed to gather a 
large number of followers in the frontier. He was known to have 
German connection too. For detailed information regarding All Geilani 
the reference is obtained from British Counsel in Damascus, who 
provided a personal file of the Shami Pir. The report was based on 
his personal acquaintance with the religions leader as well on 
information from other sources. L/P&S/12/1665, Coll. 3/96, No. 73, 
July 15, 1938, India Office Record. As quoted from Frase Tytler's 
Afghanistan - Annual Report. 1938. para 1 and further paras, 51-88, 
128-129, 142-153, 303-310. Also Caroe, The Pathans. 550BC-AD. 
1947. London, 1958, pp. 408-409. 
39. On the question of why that had happened, Al-Geilani had 
represented the entire affair as a "matter of chance" when sought 
after by the members of the Qadiria sect for overthrowing the 
oppressive regime of Afghanistan, he had gone to Waziristan with the 
help of Faqir of Ipi and some leading Qadiriya Shaikhs, a force of 
5000 men were raised and had attacked Afghan frontier post. See, 
L/Pes/12/1665, Coll. 3/96, No. 73 July 15, 1938, India Office 
Record. Cited in Fraser Tytler, pp. 266-267. 
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applying pressure against the Afghan Government for its 
extensive ties with the Germans. The Indian political 
Department, had then managed to defuse the situation 
reportedly by persuading the "holy man of Damascus" to 
accept $ 20,000 and go home/" 
The Shami Pir incident was a serious indication of how 
the NWF had become a volatile region. From 1937 onwards, 
the periodic anti British uprising in Waziristan led by Haji 
Mirza Ali Khan, the famed Faquir of Ipi, drained both 
British wealth and manpower, and "acted as a magnate to 
draw adventurous German and Italians".'*' Aftermath of the 
World War II, at the Nuremburg Trial it was revealed that, 
the Italians had tried to induce the Faquir of Ipi (with large 
sum of money) to carry on Pro-Axis activities in the 
Frontier Areas and to creat difficulties for Britain.'^ ^ 
40. For that matter Govt, of India was heavily criticised by the 
Government of Afghanistan, as the anger shown in a latter by the 
Afghan Foreign Minister to the British Minister in Kabul on the 
incident that government of India not only had spared man's life but 
had accorded him the honour of flying from Wana to Delhi and 
from there via Karachi to Basra. See, Spain, James; The Pathan 
Borderland. The Hague, 1963, p. 235 and The People of the 
Khvber: The Pathan's of Pakistan. New York, 1963, pp. 134-35. 
Also L/P&S/12,1665, Coll. 3/96, no. 84 enclosure 1, July 20, 1938, 
India Office Records. In an article in Islah. Faiz Muhammad Called 
Geilani "one of several Lawrences", Islah. No. 282, July 11, 1938. 
41. See, Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan, op.cit., pp. 253 and People of the 
Khvber. pp. 134-35. Also Fletcher Arnold, Afghanistan, op.cit., p. 
239. 
42. Among the most notorious of the self styled tribal leader in 
Wazirstan from 1936 was Mirza Ali Khan, better known as the 
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The Italian negotiation with the Faqir of Ipi were carried 
on by Anzillotti, the counseller of the Italian Legation in 
Kabul. In Feb. 1941, the Italians and the Germans gave the 
Faqir Rs.160,000. In February 1941 after a visit to the 
Faqir's camp Anzillotti had reported that Faqir was willing to 
intensify the border fightings and to accept Axis nationals as 
Radio technicians. In order to intensify hostility, however he 
would need a large amount of money. The Italians were not 
able to provide the necessary amounts promptly. The 
German Legation in Kabul made a new proposal, instead of 
£ 25,000 every two months, the Faqir was to be paid Rs. 
309000 (Indian) a month to keep up his "petty hostilities" 
(Contd. from previous page) Faquir of Ipi. He had gradually 
acquired a reputation of saintliness untill he had emerged as a 
powerful religious leader and champion of Islam to whom miraclous 
powers were commonly attributed by his followers. Even Indian 
intelligence repotrt had to admit, not withstanding that a large number 
of those who flocked to his banner did so out of genuine belief in 
his claim to divine support. In 1937 nearly 40,000 British and Indian 
troops were reported in the field to trying to curb the Faquir's 
activities but with little success. Note on Faquir of Ipi, War Office 
London, 24/11/1937, 208/773, L/P and S/12/32-36-7, 3249, 3217-9, 
3192-3; Waziristan, India Office Records. Activities of Fqir of Ipi; 
question of cooperation by Afghan Government in Operation against; 
1937-1941; Italian and German interests in Affairs in Tribal Territory, 
1935-1944; Disturbances, 1937/38, Peshawar Weeklv Summarv from 
Deputy Director of Intelligence, 1936-39. Baluchistan Weeklv 
Intelligence Bureau Summarv. 1937-39. War Office 106/5446; 
Waziristan 1933-38; Foreign Office 371/24766. See also Swinson, 
North West Frontier. People And Events. 1839-1947. London, 1967. 
pp.327-332. C.E. Bruce: Waziristan. 1936-37. The Problem of 
North West Frontier of India And Their Solution: Aldershot 1938; 
J.G. Elliot; The Frontier 1839-1947. London 1968, pp.266-289, as 
cited by Hauner Milan; India In Axis Strategy. Ernest Klett, Stuttgart 
1981, pp.83-84. 
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double that amounts if he extended the hostilities to other 
areas, and triple the amount if he could stirrup a general 
uprising in the North-West Frontier Province."^^ 
It was also revealed that after the War, Peitro Quaroni 
the Italian Minister to Kabul, had prepared a major plan for 
the insurrection of the North West Frontier tribes, which the 
Italian Govt, had communicated to the German High 
Command.'^'' In the belief that Britain was about to 
succumub any way, the Germans shelved the project, 
explaining that "they did not want to diminish further the 
prestige of the Whites in the Middle East or in India."*^  
There were German plans in 1939-40 to divert the 
British attention in India by encouraging the Soviet Union to 
43. See U.S. Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Ministry, 
July 14, 1941. For Italian activities in Afghanistan and border areas. 
See also Quaroni, Pietro; II Mondo Pi Un Ambasciatore. and Vaigia 
Diplomatica Milano, 1956, and 1965, pp. 120-128, as cited in Milan 
Hauner op.cit. p.228. 
44. Ripken the German Minister during his negotiation in Kabul had met 
the Italian Minister Quoroni, and there was proposal for close 
German-Italian cooperation in economic and political matters apart 
from Quaroni's emphasis on the strengthening of their position in 
Kabul so that in the event of war, they could promote unrest on the 
North West Frontier and compel Britain to keep strong force in 
India. Adamec-Ludwig-Op.cit. p. 239. 
45. MussoUni's conversation with Ribbentrop, May 13, 1941, as quoted 
in Kirk, Survey, p. 143. Seel also. W.B. Smith; Trois Annees A 
Moscou (Paris, 1951), p. 100. 
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move into Afghanistan/^ Brauchitsh, the Commander-in-Chief 
of Germany's land forces, recalled in January 1940 that, the 
Reich was intent on channeling Soviet expansion into 
Afghanistan and India. But even as the Nazis were thinking 
in there terms, the German envoy in Kabul was making 
further overtures to win the Afghan to the Axis cause. In 
1940 he confidently announced to them that Hitler would be 
in London by August. He reportedly offered Afghanistan a 
restoration of the Durrani Empire, proposing that she be 
given Baluchistan, Sindh, Kashmir and the Western Punjab 
including the port of Karachi.''^ 
In 1941 the Germans had renewed their efforts in 
attempting to enlist the Afghan government to the cause of 
the Rashid Ali al -Ghilani Government in Iraq, which was 
carrying on a nationalist, anti-British campaign in which 
Afghan Government would also be involved.'*^ The idea of 
46. Ribbentrop had suggested that "the focal point in the territorial 
aspiration of the Soviet Union would pesumably be centred South of 
the territory of Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean. 
See R.J. Sontag and J.S. Beddie eds. Nazi-Soviets Relations, 1939-
1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. 
U.S. Deptt. of State Washington, D.C. 1948 as cited by Gregorian 
op.cit., p. 368. 
47. Kirk, Survey, p. 143. 
48. Though with some close cooperations in economic field Germany had 
already penetrated into the Afghan rank and files but the Germans 
had desired to further their political objective on the eve of the 
World War II. The Abwehr, the German Armed Forces Intelligence 
Department in Cooperation with the Foreign Office wanted to resume 
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sending Germans to Afghanistan through Iraq, though was 
disliked by the Afghan government at Kabul. The Afghan 
Government was not in favour of such adventurism and thus 
decided to maintain its neutrality like that of Amir HabibuUah 
during the 1st World War/^ The Government adopted a 
better attitude towards British India and the Soviet Union, 
reiterating often and loudly its devotion to peace and 
neutrality, and the Neutrality Act promulgated by Zahir Shah 
was approved by both the Houses of the Afghan 
Parliament.^° The Afghan's rejected the suggestion of the 
(Continued from previous page) arms deliveries to Arab countries, 
especially to Iraq, where anti-British elements under Rashid al Geilani had 
assumed power. See Woermann's memoranda of 4/2 and 26/2/1941 
(Under Secretary of State, Germany) (Document of German Foreign 
Policy/D/XII, Nos. 12 and 92 Grobba-Canaris, Wilhelm, German 
Admiral's Conversation on 6/2/1941 (German Foreign Office) and 
Woermann's notes of 19/3/1941 as examined by Hauner op.cit., p. 197. 
49. In August 1939, Abdul Majid had told Ripken that Afghanistan had 
intended to remain neutral, as Afghanistan faced dangers for two 
neighbours. Although Ripken had linted that Afghanistan's neutrality 
"might become benevolent if Germany would help in regaining the 
territories, Afghanistan had lost to Indian annexation. Sec. DAA, 
Bureau des Staatssek retaer, Afghanistan, Vol. I. Report by Ripken, 
Nov. 7, 1939, no. 479899-910. The Abwehr German Armed Forces 
Intelligence Department in Cooperation with the foreign office wanted 
to resume arms deliveries to Arab countries especially to Iraq, where 
anti-British elements under Rashid Al Geilani had assumed power. 
See Woermann's memoranda of 4/2 and 26/2/1941 (Under Secretary 
of State, Germany) (Document on Foreign Policy/D/XII, Nos. 12 and 
92 Grobba Canaris, Wilhelm, German Admiral's Conversation on 6/2/ 
1941 (German Foreign Office) and Woermann's notes of 19/3/1941, 
As examined by Hauner. Op.cit., p. 197. 
50. For the text of Afghan neutrality act. See Kabul Alamanch: 1939-40, 
pp. 432-33; its approval by the Afghan Parliament, was reported in 
that and its reaffirmation was carried in The Times. July 3, 1942. 
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Iraqi government that they take up its cause under the terms 
of the Sadabad Pact, such move, they replied should have 
come before not after, the hostilities. Another Iraqi 
suggestion, that Afghanistan take the initiative and call for a 
jihad against Britain, was also rejected.^^ Fraser Tytler then 
the British Envoy to Kabul, described the situation as one in 
which "The Afghan figuratively buttoned their coats and 
turned their backs to the blast, crouching behind the frail 
shelter of their international frontiers, and their proclaimed 
neutrality hoping that the whirlwind would pass by 
them"." 
Though such was not the case, however after the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union, it became evident that 
neither Great Britain nor the Soviet Union, now allies, would 
tolerate the presence and activities of hundreds of the 
Germans and Italians (as well as Japanese) nationals in 
Afghanistan." Moreover, the Allies fears of Axis activities 
were not unfounded. In 1941, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, the 
51. US Deptt. of State, Foreign Relation p. 508; Mac Murray (U.S. 
Ambassador to Turkey to Secretary of State, May 13, 1941). 
52. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan p. 253. 
53. British Officials were worried of the appointment of Von Renting, 
who was of Wassmuss's calibre (German agent in Persia who during 
World War I had given Britain considerable trouble in Southern Iran) 
and had visited areas in Middle East, had greater risk of fomenting 
trouble in Central Asia. See Ludwig Adamec, Op.cit. p. cited from 
IOL/P&S/12/1689, no. 3 file 113, P.Z. 7641/38 & L/P&S/12/256, 
August 5, 1938. 
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German Foreign Minister had instructed Dr. Von Hentig,^ '* the 
newly appointed German minister to Afghanistan, to 
coordinate the activities of German teachers, officers 
engineers and doctors, to establish contacts with Afghan 
nationalist circles in order to use then (if necessary against 
the Govt.) to coordinate the German intelligence servicces, 
and to contact the frontier tribes and their nationalist leaders. 
He was also instructed to speed up German propaganda in 
India, to note British military measures in Baluchistan and 
along the Iranian frontier, and to support the national 
independence movement in Iran and Afghanistan, "particularly 
in so far as these were connected and cooperate with one 
another.^^ More correctly, the Nazir hoped for permission 
from the Afghan Government to establish a short wave radio 
transmitter in the Afghan Indian border to allow" 
inconspicuous German participation" in using the transmitter 
of Kabul Radio and to tolerate "certaint amount of smuggling 
of arms."^^ As for the Italian as noted, their negotiation with 
54. From the day Germany had attacked the Soviet Union wild rumour 
prevailed in Kabul that Allies would force the Afghan Government 
to dismiss all Germans and Italians from Afghanistan. Ludwig. 
Op.cit., p. 253. 
55. See, U.S. Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
XIII 51, June 29, 1941, Instruction of Ribbentrop as cited by 
Gregorian. Op.cit., p. 341. 
56. See U.S. Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, XIII 
51 June 29, 1941, Instructor to Ribbentrop, XII 971. As part to 
the Axis propaganda both German and the Italians were quick to 
understand the importance of propaganda through radio transmission. 
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the Faqir of Ipi were carried on through their legations in 
Kabul. 
Both Britain and Soviet Union had seperately expressed 
concern over the presence of Axis subjects in the Afghan 
Kingdom earlier, now they were in a position to take 
concerted action. In October 1941 they had sent similar 
notes to the Afghan Government, demanding the ouster of 
German and Italian citizens." 
The Afghan reaction to this ultimatum were 
apprehension, bitterness and public outcry as the same was 
done to Iran before invasion.^* The Afghan government 
summoned Loya jirgah for consultation. It had agreed to 
comply with the demands but it also expressed Afghanistan's 
will and determination to preserve its strict neutrality. 
(Continued from previous page) Radio Himalay, an Italian Station had 
already been in operation and were broadcasting to Afghanistan and 
India.Now the German's were seriously looking a chance to use the 
Radio Kabul for such propaganda. TOR L/P & S/12/3249: GOT to 
Kabul, No. 2340, 21/5/1941 (as cited by Hauner op.cit., p. 235). 
57. See The Times. October 21, 1941. Kirk, Survey pp. 145-46. Also 
Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan, pp. 254-55. 
58. The Anglo Soviet attack and invasion of Iran had thoroughly alarmed 
the Afghans. The German envoy had reported in Sep. 1941 that "the 
hostile feeling against England and Russia on the part of the govt, 
and people, produced by the Iranian events, still persists. Although 
the govt, had taken amounts of this feeling sharply criticising what 
had happened public statements in the newspaper events could be 
repeated here" Sec. US Deptt. of State, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, XIII 463-64; Pilger to Foreign Ministry as examined 
by Gregorian Vartan. op.cit., p. 388. 
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independence and territorial integrity. ^ ^ In order to curtail the 
range of Axis activities in the country, the Afghan authorities 
not only placed the Kabul area under stirct surveillance but 
in July 1941 began restricting travel by imposing gasoline 
rationing (three gallons a day per car). In the same month 
Afghan border guards shot two German agents on their way 
to the camp of Faqir of Ipi, killing one and wounding the 
other, Hashim Khan conveyed his regrets to the Germans. 
The Afghans guards, he said had mistataken the two agents 
for Amanullah's son and the nephew of Ghulam Siddiq 
Khan.^° He also told that the German, in strict confidence 
that the British who had previously protested the 
appointment of the "agitator," Dr. Von Hentig, now had filed 
a protest "almost in the form of an ultimatum" demanding 
not only on behalf of the British Government but on behalf 
of the Soviet's as well that the German colony's activities be 
restricted. Hashim Khan assured the German that he had 
rejected these protests; nevertheless, he demanded that 
Afghanistan's neutrality be observed, and that such incidents 
not be repeated, for they could be used by agents who 
59. For the proceeding of Loya Jirgah of 1941 Sec. Kabul Amanach 
1941-42 pp. 280-85. For details about the exodus of Axis nationals 
Sec. US Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy 
XIII. 640-41. 
60. Ghulam Siddique Khan, the former Afghan Foreign Minister and 
Amanullah's brother- in- law had been living in Berlin since 1930 
and was engaged in Pro AmanuUah activities (Foreign Office German 
402/20: Record of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan, p. 25) as 
examined by Hauner op.cit., p. 161. 
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wanted to provoke. 
The convening of Loya Jirgah was an astute move on 
the part of Hashim Khan. It gave a national mandate to his 
foreign policy, eliminating the possibility of the charge of 
appeasement of the Allies and contributing to a greater sense 
of national unity and purpose.^* An aroused Afghan 
nationalism allowed Hashim Khan to push forward measures 
that at any other time would have been highly unpopular. 
Among them a new national conscription law making military 
service obligatory for all male Afghan citizens over the age 
of seventeen and a special tax to help the government 
increase the size of the army, purchase arms, and improve 
the country's communication. 
The only resolution that was passed by the Great 
Assembly boldly stated that Afghanistan would not tolerate 
occupation of any part of her territory by another power. 
61. The Loya Jirga summoned for the first-time in Nov. 1941 after a 
gap of almost a decade (Last summoned in 1931) was hailed as 
brilliantly stage managed by the Afghan Premier Hashim Khan who 
not only saved his face and buttressed the position of Yahya Khel 
dynasty in the aftermath of the expulsion of the Axis colonies, but 
succeeded in gaining approval for his policy through this unusual 
demonstration of national solidarity, equavalent to a selective 
plebescite. Instead of weakening his semi-dictatorial position, Hashim 
Khan strengthened it. About 1150 delegaes met on 8/11/1941 and 
was entertained in Kabul at Government expense. Compiled by 
Hauner, Op.cit. from Katodon 410 & 421 of 10 and 8/11/1941: 
Kabul Weekly Intelligence Sumary, no. 46 of 15/11/1941; General 
HQ Wkly. Intell. Summary of NWF and Afghanistan Nos. 43, 44, 45 
of 1,7 and 14/11/19541 in Foreign OflBce 371/31322, WO 208/773. 
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would under no circumstances allow other states to use her 
land and air routes, would not enter into any treaty which 
might prejudice her neutrality and would preserve her right 
to maintain and establish diplomatic relation with any country 
she chose.^^ It was obvious that these provisions were 
intended to forestall the possibility of further Anglo-Soviet 
demands, and to make it clear to the Allies that any further 
move on their part which could compromise Afghan 
independence or neutrality, would mean war. They also 
served the premier to allay tribal fears that the Yahya Khel 
Government were sacrificing country's right to manage her 
own foreign relations and thus returning the country to the 
position of dependence it had occupied before the Third 
Anglo Afghan War. 
Thus it was an evident neutrality that Afghanistan had 
pursued vigorously during the world war of 1939-1945. 
Though in the best interest of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah had 
given in the issue of Axis national, but that was purely 
diplomatic move as that had saved Afghanistan becoming the 
theatre of war between Allies and Axis powers. 
The conclusion of the second world war in 1945 had 
changed the international political scenario with certain marks 
on Afghanistan as well. The war time allies - United State 
62. British Cabinet Paper 68/8 ; W.P. (R) (41) 75, as cited in Hauner, 
op.cit. p. 326. 
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and Soviet Union as the main rivals for dominating the world 
scenes. The conference of the Three Great Power, at Yalta 
(USSR) on 10 Feb. 1945, assigned Afghanistan to the Soviet 
Sphere of influenced. Apart from that Afghanistan became 
the signatory of the UN charter and joined the UN on 19 
Nov. 1946. 
When the British Withdrew from India in the summer of 
1947, the raison 'detre for Afghanistan as a buffer between 
between the Soviet Union and the British India had 
disappeared. In that place the war time allies - United States 
and the Soviet Union had emerged as the main rivals for 
dominating the world scenes. The traditional great power 
United Kingdom had lost its "Sun never sets in the British 
Empire" status its withdrawal had changed the geopolitical 
power configuration. The Soviet now rivals on the block the 
Soviets Vs. US had yet to unleash an era of cold war and 
yet another "Power Game". 

CHAPTER-VI 
PART-I 
INITIAL RESPONSE TO GERMAN INTEREST IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
In between the two world wars there appeared on the 
Afghan scene, Germany, about which neither the British nor 
the Russian at first took any serious note of. German 
interests in Afghanistan right from the beginning was 
motivated by the "wishful strategic consideration" ^  The 1915 
adventurous expendition led by Warren Otto, Von Hentig and 
Oskar Von Nidermayer, reached Kabul with the intention of 
using Afghanistan for subversive activities against the British 
India^. Warner Otto Von Hentig had led in 1915-16 with the 
purpose wining over Amir HabibuUah towards the Central 
powers. The ultimate aim of Hentig/Neidermayer Mission was 
to direct from Afghanistan an anti-British as well as Pan-
Islamic propaganda into India to help foment disorder and 
1. Cited from L.W. Adamec et.al, Afghanistan - Some New 
Approaches, Ann Abor 1969, pp. 204-259. 
2. There is a recent study on the Turco-German Intrigue and pan-
Islamic interest in Afghanistan, see R.K. Trivedi, The Critical 
Triangle - India, Britain and Turkey. Infact German's were so much 
interested in Afghan affairs that they had offered Amir HabibuUah a 
treaty without precedent, besides the assurance of Afghanistan's 
co,mplete independence the treaty provided for military assistance in 
personnel and equipment on a fantastic scale, quoting 10,000 modern 
rifles, 300 Aftillery pieces a free gift of $ 10 million. See Text of 
draft treaty between the German Empire and Afghanistan, dated 
24.1.1916 and signed by Hentig and Neidermayer (Cf Vogel R., 
die Persien. pp. 292-294) as quoted from India in Axis Strategy. 
Milan Hauner, p. 70, 1980. 
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became not only the most important promoter of 
industrialisation in Afghanistan but also chief supplier of 
arms to her armed forces. German experts and advisers 
came in large numbers and outnumbered the other 
Europeans, working for similar ends in Afghanistan. Germans 
for example were about ten times more in numbers than the 
British^. The German had nearly acquired monopoly and 
willingly setout to build the Afghan communication network, 
the roads" bridges, civil aviation and telecommunication 
works. The German pattern of penetration during the 1920's 
and 30's indeed offers the most striking parallel with the 
systematic soviet infiltration of Afghanistan later on since the 
1950's, which culminated in the complete military take over 
of that country^. 
Amir Amanullah's project of reforms and his political 
manoeuvring between Britain and Soviet Union resulted in 
establishing Germany as the most important third power in 
Afghanistan. It was in December of 1923, that Fritz Grobba*, 
the German, charge d'Affaris arrived in Kabul and the 
German colony rapidly increased in numbers. By August 
6. Ibid., p.290. 
7. Ibid., p.291. 
8. Dr. Fritz Grobba was very manipulating diplomat who got the 
German interests established in the very beginning of his arrival. See 
f. Grobba, Manner and Machte in Orient. 25 Jahre diplomatischer 
Tatigkeit in orient Gottingen, 1967, pp. 14-59; lOR L/P & S/12 
1878; German Minister at Kabul 1922-1947 as cited by Milan 
Hauner; India in Axis Strategy. London 1980, p.73. 
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1924, seventy two German experts not counting their 
families resided in Afghanistan, constituting the largest 
European colony in the country. It is notable that on the 
occasion of Grohha's first audience with Amir Amanullah, 
the Afghan ruler had expressed his appreciation for all that 
Germany had accomplished in Afghanistan. Amanullah had 
indicated that he would rely largely on German skill and 
expertise in his efforts to modernize Afghanistan.^ He wanted 
that the Afghan graduate studying in German schools in 
Kabul should be admitted in the German universities which 
he thought was the best in the world. Infact the Afghan sent 
to Germany had made quick progress than students studying 
in other countries. Amanullah had seen that the stature of 
Germany had not declined inspite of her defeat in the war. 
He attributed this to be internal strength of Germany. 
Grobba cautiously dealt with the other European 
diplomats in the Afghan capital and made friendly were 
indeed motivated by economic rather that political 
9. A special Afghan diplomatic mission reached Berlin with a long list 
of wishes, amongst which predominated the desire to establish 
diplomatic relation between the two countries to pruchase machinery, 
to sent Afghan student for training to Germany and to acquire 
German experts. Cf H. Glaesner, Das Dritte Reich under Mittlere 
Osten. Politische and Westschaftliche Bezichungen Deutschlands Zur 
Turkei 1933-1939, Zu Iran 1933-1941 and Zu Afghanistan 1933-
1941 Diss. Weirzburg 1976 pp. 421-424 as cited by Milan Hauner, 
op.cit. p. 73. 
10. See for detail, Adamec, Ludwig, op.cit. p. 218, id. New 
Approaches, p. 224. 
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Germany's economic well being depended on the success of 
her foreign trade and even in areas as remote as 
Afghanistan.'' In 1923 German trading interests in Bremen 
founded an export-import company for the purpose of 
developing trade with Afghanistan. The company was at first 
called Deustch Orientalische Handelsgese Uschaft, A.G. but a 
year later the name was changed to Deustch Afghanische 
Company (DACOM). 
In the summer of 1923, DACOM opened a branch 
office in Kabul which was staffed by three Germans, Kurt 
Wanger (a member of the Hestig-Neidermayer expeditaion) 
Emil Trunkker, a geologist, explorer and author and Gottiff 
Blaich, a technical consultant. Thereafter two German 
directions of the firms namely Fritzebner and S. Silbermann, 
arrived in Kabul. A year later DACOM imported to 
AFghanistan such items as cast itions. Pipes telegraph poles. 
Cement, and various types of machinery. Until July 1925 
DACOM was exclusively engaged in importing the products 
and equipments needed by the Afghan government for its 
various development projects.'^ 
The fortunes of the German company took a turn for 
the worse, fearing an unfavourable trade balance, began to 
11. See. W.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan : A Study of Political 
Developments in Central and Southern Asia. Oxford 1953, p. 252. 
12. See details onthe affairs of the Company. Milan Hauner, op.cit. 
p. 74 
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the worse, fearing an unfavourable trade balance, began to 
restrain its activities and imposed certain limitations. DACOM 
was prohibited from dealing with merchants other than those 
designated by the Afghan laws. The measure was not 
appreciated by the company and their profit went down. 
Grobba observed that the company, always lived from 
hand to mouth. ^ ^ 
Considering Amir Amanullah's respect for German 
experties in military science and weapon's technology it was 
natural that he hoped to obtain German military supplies and 
instruction from Afghanistan's military academy.^'* But 
Germany was prohibited by Article 176 of the treaty of 
Versailles from giving military aid to any country. 
Consequently the Germans were replaced by Russians for 
military supplies and the British had heaved a sigh of relief. 
Still in April 1924 a group of 41 Germans had arrived in 
Kabul (some former military officers') who were to be 
employed as teachers and military advisers.'^ 
The most important among the officers were Major A. 
Christian, Freiherr Roland, Von Kalternborn Stachau and 
Karul G. Von Plater. Inspite of a lot of objections Germna 
entered into Afghan government services. Germans were 
13. Ibid., p. 133. 
14. Milan Hauner, op.cit., p. 134. 
15. See Adamec, op.cit., p. 214. 
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mechanics. They had contributed greatly in the success of 
the Afghan government against the tribal forces during the 
Khost uprising of 1924-25.'^ British had visualised the 
cementing of Russian interest in Afghanistan as a 
counterpoise to the German threats.'^ 
Amanullah had tried to invite people from different 
nationalities so that no particular country could monopolise 
or dominate in Afghanistan. Nevertheless by 1924 German 
had gained a predominant position projects. They got more 
chances after the famous piper no incident (in which an 
Italian engineer Afghan national) in July 1924 in which most 
of the Italian engineers had left Afghanistan.'^ The incident 
greatly affected the prospects of Italians in Afghanistan as 
well as their diplomatic ties with them. More significantly it 
affects German relations as it served as a precedent to a 
similar case involving a German Stratil Sauer and a Afghan 
citizen. Though sauer was pardoned but that made Grobba 
to leave Afghanistan. August Feizel came to Kabul on June 
18, 1926 after his departure. German interest did not decline 
but there was no advance in their bilateral relation hereafter 
till the commencement of World War-II. 
16. Ibid., p. 215, 
17. See W.A.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan of Political Development in 
Central and Southern Asia. Oxford, 1953, p. 253. 
18. See Adamec, op.cit. p.218. 
CHAPTER-VI 
PART II 
ANGLO-AFGHAN DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS 
GERMAN FACTOR DURING WORLD WAR II 
Afghanistan's role as a buffer state underwent a critical 
change due to the emergence of Anglo-Soviet Partnership. 
During the Second World War another German invasion of 
Soviet Union made it more apprent. Afghan policy makers 
therefore, realised that it would be difficult to resist the 
combined British-Soviet pressure to open and provide for a 
free passage of supplies to the Soviet-Union. Realising this 
predicament and the adverse situation King Zahir Shah in his 
speech of 6* July, 1941 before the National Council of 
Parliament clearly expressed the desire to remain neutral, and 
preserve their cordial political and economic relations the 
with two powers; at the same time, safeguarding the 
country's rights and interests. Allies therefore, wanted to take 
the advantge of the situation and get all Axis powers 
nationals expelled from Afghanistan at the earliest. 
Afghanistan wanted to maintain trading relations with the 
outside world in order to keep their the stock of essential 
goods intact during the war. For this reason Afghanistan 
maintained good relations with Great Britain, because the 
only outlet to sea routes was through India. The British, 
therefore, secured effective economic stranglehold over 
Afghanistan and they did not hesitate to apply again and 
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again, to see that the Axis colonies were removed from 
Afghanistan. • 
However, the first reaction in Afghanistan against the 
German invasion of Soviet-Union was, of great relief that 
their hated neighbour had been attacked by the Germans. 
The British Government of India was apprehensive that this 
news might well influence muslim opinion throughout India 
too. Although they had realised that Indian opinion was 
mostly sympathetic to Soviet Union. Such was not the 
response in Iran and Afghanistan. "Moslem hatred of 
Russia's godlessness" was regarded as being a genuine 
sentiment among the Afghans and on the North West-Frontier 
inhabitants.2 Anticipating a possible intensification of German 
propaganda, in the Muslim world the Government of India 
therefore adopted certain measures to counter their intrigues. 
German promise to Saadabad countries, would be a prelude 
to the Axis attack, and if Russia was defeated in the war, 
then these countries would also be destroyed. German policy 
was one of "Drang nach osten" (the drive towards the East), 
India Office L/P & S/12/1778. General situation from June 1941; 
The situationin Iran and Afghanistan created by Germans attack on 
Russia; note by India Office, London, 23/6/1941). Cited in Milan 
Hauner; India in Axis Strategy. Klett Cotta, Germany, 1981.p 306. 
The file concerning correspondence between the Government of 
India and the India Office, No. 3190 27/6/1941; repeated to Kabul 
and Tehran, Main Office London 106/3765 has been cited in 
Hauner. op.cit 307. 
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included Turkey and Iraq in the Lebensraum (under German 
rule or sphere of influence) and the German domination of 
Iran and Afghanistan. This was their dream since 1890s. 
German Imperialism was more intense and seemed more 
unprincipled than the Russian threat. After the Russian 
Revolution Russia was considered a Godless country by 
Orthodox Muslims, yet Germany then posing a greater threat 
to Islamic ideas.' The news from the Soviet front was 
reaching Kabul with the report of the advance of German 
troops, in Russia. Afghans naively began to speculate that 
the defeat of the hated Russia was only a matter of time, 
and the Soviets state would disintegrate and thereby the 
perpetual northern menance to Afghanistan would be 
removed, for generations to come. On the second day of 
the Nazi-Soviet clash the Afghan premier had made several 
enquiries as to whether Russia would be able to hold off 
the German advance? The British Minister in Kabul had 
reported regarding Hashem Khan harboured ideas in "the 
hope that the two powers would weaken each other" and 
spread the war to the Middle East.'"' Presumably he was 
right. The German Minister was assured of Afghanistan's 
sympathies with Germany. That was owing to the new 
Govt, of India to India Office London, No. 3190. 27/6/1941. as 
cited in Hauner, op.cit p. 307. 
British Minister in Kabul to Foreign Office London, 210 of 26/6/ 
1941, cite in Milan Hauner op.cit p.307. 
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Anglo-Soviet partnership in the war. Afghanistan was not in 
any position to help Germany as it was militarily powerless.^ 
Pilger had reported that the AfghanWar Minister had held a 
conference with senior officers who were asked "whether the 
moment was opportune to open hostilities against British 
India?" Only the Air Force commander and Prince Daud 
were said to be in favour of attacking, the rest suggested 
waiting.^ The German Military Adviser, Major Walter Schenk 
had confirmed that the country was not engaged in any 
military preparations whatsoever, the stocks of petrol was 
critically low and the military spare parts including munitions 
had not been improved since 19 Sep. 1939.^ 
Nevertheless, Berlin assured Afghanistan about the arms 
delivery to them, in order to strengthen and modernize their 
somewhat weak army based upon traditional mode of 
warfares.^ 
5. Correspondence of Dr. Hans Pilger, Minister at Kabul, No. 
197 of 24/6/1941 to German Foreign Office 617/249945. 
Cited in Hauner op.cit.,p. 08. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Carl Rudolph Rasmuss (a German Trade Commisisoner in Calcutta) 
was attached to German legation in Kabul in Feb. 1944 nominal as 
Commercial Attache; and there he was also involved in espionage 
for Abwehr and provides infomation (See pilger/Rasmuss, 
Correspondance to German Foreign Office 391/ 19 5566-7 No. 
233 of 17/7/1941, cited in Hauner op.cit. p.308. 
8. German Documents (photocopied) from German Forcing Office. 
(Deposited at) Cornwall House, London 344/2000 61-2, 24/6/1941. 
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Equally there was a great expectation, among German 
ranks that Afghanistan would join the Axis Powers after the 
fall of Moscow and replacement of Churchill as the British 
Prime Minister.' On July 11, 1941, Joachim Von Ribbentrop 
the German Foreign Minister gave instruction to his Minister 
in Kabul to impress upon during his interviews with the 
Afghan Government, and or whenever such opportunities 
occur to inflict a fact that the Red Army had win 
practically destroyed by Germans and that Afghanistan's 
future hope laid on the side of a victorious Germany. ^ ° 
German optimism was reflected merely in words and her 
interest in Afghanistan's affairs. When the Operation 
BARBAROSSA, was launched that activities started in 
Afghanistan to put up a front against the British and the 
Soviets.^' 
Barely one week after on 29 June, the beginning of 
BARBAROSSA, Werner Otto Von Hentig, a German expert 
on Oriental affairs had received instruction from, Ribbentrop, 
9. See Haider, R, Kriegstagbuch Taghiche Aufzichnungen des Chefs des 
Generals stabes des Heeres 1939-1942. 3 vols (War Diarv lITt p. 
29 (ed & tra) by HA. Jacobsen, Stuttgart 1962-64. 
10. See, Ribbentrop, J. Von. Zwishen London and Moskau Erinerungen 
and Letzte Aufzeichnugen. ed. by Annelies Von Ribbentrop, Leonian 
Starnberger See, 1953, Engl. (Ed). The Ribbentrop Memoris. 
London 1954. p. 65. also German Foreign Office files 24 9973. 
11. For the details of operation Barbarossa, See Hitler's War Directive 
or Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhrung 1939-1945. Dokumente 
des OKW. ed. by W. Hubatsch, Frankfurt 1962, Engl. (Ed) by 
Trevor Roper, London 1964. p.96. 
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(despite the fact that he had been on the retired lists since 
Oct. 1939) to go to Kabul. Hentig had led a mission during 
the First World War, now leading a retired life since 
October, 1939. Suddenly his services were required and was 
order to replace Hans Pilger the German Minister to Kabul, 
who was regarded too passive.^^ This was the second 
mission of Hentig. He was instructed to ascertain the British 
strength and position both in India and in Afghanistan, to 
co-ordinate all Abwehr agents on the spot, doctors and 
teachers in German schools, engineers of the Organisation 
Todt (A huge road construction firm and a vast Nazi 
institution) alike in order to use them, if necessary against 
the Government in power. Hentig's task on his second 
mission was not only to observe and report on but actively 
to support "the national independance movements in Iran and 
Afghanistan, particularly in so far as these were connected 
issues and needed co-operation. The other objective of 
Hentig was to establish contact with the frontier tribes on 
Indo-Afghan border and their leaders to open communication 
with India, and to exert political influence by means of 
12. See Hentig, WO; Aufeichnungen. 1957, Vol. 2 pp.41-42 also 
Hentig's biography published in 1963 (Hentig,W.O., Mein Leben Eine 
Denstreise, Gottingen 1963). Hentig has since claimed that his 
acceptance of the post in Kabul was subject to Ribbentrop fulfilling 
his conditions first, that he (Hentig) decided about the timing of the 
mission, and tht all Germans nationals, in Afghanistan, members of 
the Nazi Party, Abweher (the German espionage) agents alike, would 
be "wholly and unconditionally" subjected to his command. For 
details of Hentig's activities during World War I. See, Trivedi, R.K; 
The Critical Triangle : India Britain And Turkey (1908-19241 
Publication Scheme, Jaipur, 1993. 
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propaganda. He was also to observe military measures taken 
by the British in Baluchistan and along the Iranian border. ^ ^ 
Significantly Hentig's proposed assignment was thoroughly 
questioned and challanged by Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi 
leader and the Head of AuBen Politishe Amt. or NSDAP 
German Foreign Policy Office on the ground that he was 
considered to be an "enemy of the oriental people.'"'* 
The British had strongly reacted to the news of Hentig's 
nomination at Kabul in the strongest possible way. The 
British got alarmed over the increasing German intrigues and 
activities in Afghanistan. Therefore, they demand for the 
explusion of the German nationals from Iran and 
Afghanistan. This became a major policy item on British 
agenda immediately after Hitter's attack on Soviet Union. 
London rightly assumed, that with the cessation of trade 
between Afghanistan and Germany through Russia the reason 
for the stay of many German nationals in Afghanistan had 
no base whatsoever. However, the British was not yet keen 
to call upon Soviet co-operation in the matter of bringing 
political pressure upon the Kabul Government. That was 
considered dangerous. Instead the idea of using the Soviet 
13. German foreign Office files, 329/195546-8 as examined by Hauner 
op.cit p.308. 
14. See for the views of Rosenberg about Hentig, Rosenberg, A; Per 
Zukunftsweg einer deutschen An Benpolitkk. Munchen, 1927. Also 
Rosenberg A; Aktennotiz ciber die Tatigkeit des Gersandten V. Hentig in 
AA; Doc. PS-231, 8/7/1941 forwarded to Hitter through the Chief of 
the Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammes on 12/7/1941 also Seraphim, H.G.; 
Die Deutsch-Russischen Beziechungen 1939-1941. Hamburg 1949, pp. 
231-238 for Criticism sec; Hentig, O.V., Aufzeichnungen, vol. 2, pp. 
36-42. As cited in Hauner op.cit, p. 309. 
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economic blockade on Afganistan along with the British 
measures was an acceptable alternative.^^ The British Minister 
in Kabul was told that he would raise the subject of 
repatriation of Germans with the Afghan government at the 
earliest opportunity. ^ ^ The Government of India in agreement 
with the military advisers stressed over and over again the 
point of strategic unity of the entire region. The possible 
penetration of either Iran or Afghanistan, or both, by the 
German forces, was seen by them as one problem. They had 
regarded Iran a key point in that front, and emphasised 
that from military point of view, Iran is the responbility of 
Indian and therefore their views must be taken into 
account. ^ ^ But before the British Minister in Kabul could 
raise the subject of German nationals and request their 
expulsion, the Hentig affair had flared up. As soon as 
Fraser-Tytler the British Munister in Kabul had learnt that 
present German Minister in Kabul was about to be replaced 
by Hentig, he had protested at once on July 10, 1941, only 
to be told that the Afghan Government after careful 
15. India office. Note of 23/6/1941, "The situation in Iran and 
Afghanistan created by Germany's attack on Russia" lOR L/P & 5/ 
12/1778, cited by Hauner op.cit. p. 310. 
16. India Office to Government of India, No. 7305 of 25/6/1941, cited 
in Prasad B. (Ed.); Defence of India: Policy and Plans: Official 
History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 
New Delhi, 1963, p. 86. 
17. Correspondence between the Government of India and the India 
Office, No. 3389 of 6/7/1941 quoted in Hauner op.cit. p. 310. 
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consideration, had already given their consent to the 
appointment of the new German Minister. Fraser-Tytler 
therefore, replied that he was surprised to hear this act of 
folly as the Afghan government must have been aware of 
Hentig's contact with the Shami Pir. Knowing that Afghan 
Government had refused Hentig's appointment.'* He could 
not have imagined "short of flying the German flag on the 
palace of Kabul" anything more calculated to disturb the 
Anglo-Afghan relation. The Afghan Foreign Minister Ali 
Mohammad Khan endeavoured hard to assuage British 
resentment with dignity. As long as the British trusted the 
Afghan Government, no individual German would make any 
difference to their policy at the same time they could accept 
no pressure from outside. Had they refused the agreement 
for Hentig, they would have been accused of succumbing to 
British pressure, which they could not face. 
The British closely watched and kept their surveillance 
on Hentig's movements. The British Counsel in Damascus had 
reported in February 1941 that he had heard how Hentig 
was putting great pressures on Shami Pir to return to 
18. In "strict confidence" from the Japanese Charge 'd' Affaires, 
Kabul to London 224 of 9/7/1941 and also Kabul to London 
227 of 11/7/1941, War Office London 106/3765. Cited in 
Hauner, op.cit, p.3 10. 
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Afghanistan, but so far the latter had not agreed.'^ Under 
these circumstances Fraser-Tytler had suggested two 
alternative course of action first was to watch the present 
situation and hope for the better; as their were no immediate 
signs of internal disruption in Afghanistan. The number of 
Germans in the country was relatively small, and he had 
warned that if the Germans had managed to reach the 
Caucasus, the situation would adversely change with the 
Axis propaganda and plans. Thereon subversion would be 
speedily set in motion.^" Therefore, the alternative was 
immediate pressure on the Afghan Government to eliminate 
the German influence. But for the second course Fraser 
Tytler had suggested some concession (financial & military) 
to the Afghan Government for the purpose of replacing the 
German technician by the British. The activities of road 
building on the Kandhar to Herat route by the Germans was 
19. Shami Pir was undesirable man in the NWF province both from 
Govt, of Afghanistan's point of view (due to his family connection 
with ex-Amir AmanuUah) and for the British (as he had German 
connection) and had links with Islamic fraternities. See for details 
Fraser-Tytler's; Afghanistan. Annual Report. 1938 para 8 and further 
paras 51-58, 128-9, 142-53, 303-10. 
20. Correspondence of Gardner, (the British Counsul in Damascus) to 
Foreign Office, London, No. 13, 14/2/1941, Pz 981/41. Fraser-
Tytler in Kabul was duly informed about this meeting. Correspdence 
to Foreign Minister to Kabul; 36 of 12/2/1941 and warned the 
Prime Minister Hashem Khan. Correspondence from Kabul to 
London 55 of 12/2/1941, all in India Office Records, L/P&S/3258 
and Forcing Office London 371/45216. When Sardar Ahmad Khan, 
the Afghan Minister in London, called on the Foreign Office to 
complain about an unfriendly article in British press he was told 
immediately the fact that Hentig had contacted the Shami Pir earlier 
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also a cause of concern for the British.^^ The reaction of 
London to these activities had disquiten the policy makers. Now 
the policy makers were concerned that the Germans were 
planning to start more active measures" to stirrup trouble for the 
British in Afghanistan, Iraq and no doubt in India too.^ ^ 
(continued from previous page) that year in Syria, and the Afghans 
should have ruled him out as Minister at Kabul. See Foreign Office 
Spokesman Sir Horace Seymour, Note dated 18/7/1941, E. 3960/ 
144/97; Foreign Office London, 371/27033. Hentig also mentions 
his visit to the Shami Pir in his private papers but not in his 
published memoirs. (Hentig, Aufgzeichungen, Bd. 2, pp. 83-143. 
Reise durch Syrein Januar 1941/1942). Also cited in Hauner op.cit, 
p. 311. 
21. Kabul to London (Correspondence regarding situation in Afghanistan) 
file No. 230 of 11/7/1941 also Fraser-Tytler, W.K, Afghanistan. A 
Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia, London 
1967. Fraser-Tytler had calculated that there were about 120 
Germans employed in Afdghanistan. The Afghan Government 
employed 23 as teachers, 10 as doctors, 41 as architects and 
technicians, 19 on miscellaneous tasks, 27 were employed by 
private firms. 
22. Cf; Dr. Trott, Berlin to Pilger, the German Minister to Kabul, 6/6/ 
1941, German Foreign Office Record 195/139/66 as cited by 
Hauner, op.cit p. 312, 329 & 333. (A detailed quetionnaire on the 
possibilities of setting up an intelligence network operating from 
Kabul which would provide information on and co-ordinate 
subversive activities against India.) Ausl. Abw, Nr. 02667/41 geh III 
E, Britische Ma Bnahman on Der indiisch - Iranischen Grez. Bericht 
eines Zuverlassigen V-Mannes; 14/6/1941 in: BA-MA/Wi/II 2.2 
Report on road condition in Afghanistan, on troop movements and 
fortification works along the Indo-Afghan border, by Maj. Schenk, 
the Military Adviser to the Afghan Government, dated 25/7/1941; in 
Ibid; Ausl./abw, Nr. 7329/41 geh. Ila. Cf 9N. above and part-II-6, 
80 N. See also various reports on the Afghan economy, road 
network etc. prepared by the OKW (Ober-Kommando de 
Wehrmacht / Armed Forces High Command) Wistschafts-und 
Rustungsant in BA/MA/Wi/II B 2.1, R88/506-7, 843 : EAP 66-c-g-
12/2-5. Cited in Hauner, op.cit, p.311. 
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There was some justification in Axis claim as the Iraqi 
Charge d'Affairs in Kabul, Yamulki, was reported as having 
been in touch with the German Minister in Tehran on his 
way through and asked to help in fomenting an uprising in 
Afghanistan against the present Government." 
The British Department of Military Intelligence was 
greatly alarmed to know the designs of Baron Von Hentig, 
who alongwith Oskar Von Neidermeyer attempted to 
established a close co-ordinated link between Turkey, Iran 
and Afghanistan in order to create a "Germanophile Islamic 
federation."^'* Hentig however, failed to pursuade Amir 
Habibullah to remain neutral during the WWI. Yet succeeded 
in laying the seeds of trouble, in the North-West Frontier in 
India between 1916 and 1920. On the Hentig issue measures 
suggested by against his appointment by Fraser-Tytler (The 
British Minister in Kabul) to the Government of India, was 
read with caution and apprehension, still the Government of 
Afghanistan was approached not to accept Hentig. The 
British Government also had approached the Soviet 
Government in an attempt to bring continued pressure to 
23. India Office Minute by R.T. Peel, Head of the Political Department 
(External) in India Office 11/7/1941, India Office Record L/P & S/ 
12/1778/ as cited in Hauner op.cit. p. 312. 
24. Yamulki who was meanwhile supplying information to the British 
legation in Kabul, which the Govt, of India enthusiastically granted in 
order to pick up Pro-German agents who was supposed to meet 
him in Lahore. See the Correspondence between the Govt, of India, 
and the to India Office London F.No. 3547/1941, also War Office 
London, F. No. 106/3765, Ibid. 
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bear on Kabul not to accept Hentig.^^ 
Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told Stafford 
Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, on August 1st, 
1941, that the Soviet Government would support the British 
protest concerning Hentig's appointment at Kabul. Although 
the Soviet policy towards Afghanistan was still under 
consideration. In another meeting with Afghan Prime Minister, 
Fraser-Tytler on 27* July 1941 again discussed the matter of 
Hentig's nomination and had refused to alter his decision 
while making it clear that Afghanistan would not accept 
dictation in its internal policies.^^ In retaliation the 
Government of India promptly imposed a "mild economic 
sanction" on Afghanistan from 1st August 1941. The oil 
supplies from India were reduced to 25 percent; they 
delayed the arrival of new lorries and imposed delays on the 
issue of export licenses from Afghanistan.^^ Though oil 
25. For a more detailed account of the Turco-German intrigues during the 
World War I and the activities of Hentig-Neidenneiyer See, Trivedi, R.K; 
The Critical Triangle. India Britain and Turkey. (1908-1924). Publication 
Schemes, Jaipur, India, 1993. Whole chapter on Turico-German Intrigues in 
India during the Worid War I. 
26. See, Files regarding the Hentig issue, in Government of India to Kabul 
repeated to India Office, No. 16/8-S, 13/7/1941; Govt, of India to India 
Office, No. 3583 of 16/7/1941, India Office Record, L/P & S/12/1778, 
See Linlithgow Pap&s, Corre^ondence with Ameiy (the Secretary of State 
for India, Vol VI (1941), 26/4, 7/5, 16/5, 15/7/1941, Correspondence from 
Kabul to London 126 of 23/4/1941, Government of India to India Office 
No.2765 of 28/4/1941, also Correspondence of Sir Anthony Eden, British 
Foreign Secretary to Cripps, No. 826, of 18/7/1941, repeated to Kabul 
and Delhi, Cripps to Eden, No.828, 20/7/194; Foreign Office 371/2704) 
cited in Hauner, op.cit. p. 314. 
27. Ibid.Correspondence regarding that, Kabul to London, file No. 247 of 27/ 
7/1941, War Office London, 106/3767. 
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sanction had seemed reasonable during war period, the 
seized lorries (supplied by General Motors U.S meant for 
Afghanistan numbering 670), "very strategic act to stop these 
lorries "in the words of Indian General Staff.^ * 
In order to see the case of explosion from Afghanistan 
a reality the British Governemtn of India imposed stringent 
measures against Afghanistan to see that the Axis Nationals 
were expelled from its territories. An unfriendly act, which 
was to undermine the influence of the Pro-British faction in 
Afghan politics.^^ Much to the relief of the Allies,before any 
further step in that direction of increasing economic 
sanctions against Afghanistan could be taken, the Afghan 
Foreign Minister informed Fraser-Tytler that Hentig was not, 
coming to Kabul.^° Meanwhile on July 19, 1941 while the 
Hentig affair was on a serious incident of subotage, was 
reported from the Logar valley, where two German agents 
28. Ibid. Kabul to London, file No. 247 of 29/7/1941, War Office 
106/3767 Govt, of India to India Office, No. 3913 of 31/7/1941. 
Also cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 312. 
29. Ibid. Government of India's Correspondence to India office. No. 
3432 of 14/7/1941, War Office 208/4 : 1941 heading "Lorries for 
Afghanistan." Also see in Hauner, op.cit., p. 315. 
30. Ibid. Kabul to London, file No. 252 of 1/8/1941, On 23"* July 
1941, the Indian General Staff had sent to the War Office the text 
of two telegrams, intercepted a week earlier" from our usual 
source," one was from the Afghan Minister in Berlin urging Kabul 
to agree to Hentig's appointment. The other came from the Afghan 
Embassy in Moscow and had warned that the British and the 
Soviets might demand the expulsion of German subjects from Iran 
and Afghanistan. 
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Professor Oberdorffer, Leprosy Expert and Dr. Brandt, an 
entomologist, accompained by twelve tribesmen were moving 
at night with arms and amunitions, meant for Faqir of Ipi. 
The group was intercepted by the Afghan patrol party and 
their interrogation was startling because they were conspiring 
to foment troble under the codename of FEUERFRESSER 
(fire eater") which was infact part of a bigger operations, a 
full scale uprising codenamed TIGER. The incident were 
quite revealing to the Afghan Government on the German 
activiteis. Allah Nawaz was reported to have remarked to 
Hentig that the German activities were only tolerable in 
Afghanistan till those were in consent with the Afghan 
Government and that Faqir of Ipi had the support of 
Afghan Government against the British.^^ 
Hashem Khan, the Afghan Premier had informed Pilger, 
(the German Minister to Kabul) that Afghan Government was 
ready to assist the approaching German troops, "with 
500,000 mobilized men including tribes," but Logar valley 
type of incident would hardly do any good to the Germans 
against the vast British spy network. He had also disclosed 
that the British and the Soviets had again lodged a sharp 
protest against Hentig's appointment and demanded drastic 
31. Memorandum by Hentig, 23/7/1941, German Foreign Office file, 
Photocopied document deposited at Cornwall House, London. Cited 
in Hauner, op.cit., p. 317. 
161 
reduction of the German colony in Afghanistan.^^ When 
Hentig did not come to Kabul the Government of India 
therefore, decided to relax economic sanctions, except on 
the patrol rationining measures. The British even then tried to 
persuade the Afghan Government to accept their objections 
against the presence of Germans in their country was "a 
breach of neutrality". The similar move of the British and 
the Soviets in Iran was aimed at to see the ouster of the 
Germans by combining economic and political pressure to 
bear on them to expel the Germans." In no way the axis 
power national's presence in Afghanistan was to be tolerated 
by the Allies, particularly Britain. The British occupation of 
Iran was justified by London telling the Kabul Government 
that this was necessary in order to "prevent Germany from 
establishing herself in Persia, thus menancing the security of 
Central Asia as a whole."^^ After occupation of Iran the 
British were more keen to see the expulsion of the Axis 
nationals particularly Germans and the Italians from 
32. Ibid., correspondence by Pilger, No. 259 of 30/7/1941 German 
Foreign Office, 617/249988-94 and Document on German Foreign 
Policy /D/XIII, No. 169, Compiled also from earlier Kabul 
despatches of 22, 23, 24 and 28/7/1941 German Foreign Office file 
No. 617/249984-8, 329/195, 554-63). 
33. Ibid , correspondence between Commander-in-Chief to War Office 
London, No. 9429/G, 18/7/1941, also file No. 106/3795 and 193/ 
644. 
34. Ibid. Foreign to Minister Kabul file No. 265 of 22/8/1941, India 
Office Records L/PS/12/1778. 
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Afghanistan. As the secret report suggests the British were in 
commanding position and that "Afghan would give in to any 
such demand which they would ask for."^ ^ 
Meanwhile, the newly appointed British Minister to Kabul, 
Sir Francis Wylie, too favoured the policy of evicting the 
German colonies from Afghanistan. The German constituted 
around 2,000 in number. The British nevertheless continued 
to put pressure on Afghanistan, by all means possible 
including the toughest option of economic stranglehold 
through the economic blockade. 
Infact, the British diplomatic circle had even contem-
plated the annexation of Afghanistan on the similar pattern 
adopted in the case of Iran. But Sir Francis Wylie the 
British Minister to Kabul foresaw the repurcussions, so 
Afghanistan was not to be attacked. The Government of 
India was therefore, advised to modify their aggressive 
posture. Wylie had seen twofold disasters of such a course 
firstly there would be a Soviet annexation of Northern 
Afghanistan and secondly her end as a buffer state against 
Russia from the British point of view.^ ^ 
35. Foreign to Minister Kabul file No. 272 of 27/8/1941, Kabul to 
London, 282 of 28/8/1941. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 317. 
36. See, Anis (Kabul) of 30/8/1941, Anis the Kabul paper had 
appeared with leader entitled "The deplorable incident in Iran, "which 
drew a protest from the SovietAmbassador who insisted that the 
Afghan Government publish the statement he had offered them at 
the time of the invasion of Iran. The Soviet version was then duly 
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Compared to Iran British had no stakes in Afghanistan; 
there were no oilfiedls, or the transterritorial railways nor 
was there any need to secure cover for their flank. On the 
other hand, India could not afford to tie up her forces on 
and beyond the NWF and to the maze of tribal resistance in 
a difficult topography. The British were also apprehensive of 
the repurcussions such a policy would have on India's Sunni 
Muslim if they chose to attack Afghanistan. Finally, there 
was perennial fear of tribal risings in reaction to the threat 
of blockade and even more in case of invasion. The British 
Government accepted the views and worked on the 
alternative policy of showdown in case of Axis nationals. 
They demanded from the Kabul Government guarantee of 
strict surveillance of Axis legation and to expel non-offical 
Axis nationals, within a month under guarantee of safe-
conduct to Axis controlled territory." But at that stage the 
Afghan Government was still refusing to give in. But as the 
pressure was mounting, the Afghan Premier Hashem Khan 
had to accede to their demands while having reservations. 
The time bound repatriation of the Axis nationals was not 
acceptable and before that whole issue was to be put up 
(continued from previous page) published in the Anis on 6/9/1941, 
also correspondence from Kabul to London file No. 300, 301, 313 
& 328 of 5,7, 14 and 27 of Sep 1941, for the German reaction, 
see Pilger No. 328 of 8/9/942 in Document on German Foreign 
Policy /D/XIII No. 289. Also cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 319. 
37. Ibid. Files on Army & Air Headquarter Intelligence Weekly 
Summary of NWF & Afghanistan, No. 26, 12/9/1941, War Office 
London, 208/773. 
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before to the Afghan Cabinet and to the National Council 
(Parliament) and afterwards even to the Loe-jirga (the Grand 
Assembly of Mullahs, notables and tribal chieftains). He 
further asked for a written guarantee from the British 
Government that they were not seeking to substitute supply 
routes for Russia via Afghanistan, and that they would bear 
the full cost of repatriation provided that the Axis nationals 
were expelled within a month.^ ^ 
But with the threat of a possible expulsion of Axis 
nationals becoming apparent there took place numerous 
deliberations regarding the issue. The German Minister in 
Kabul was informed about the content of the joint Anglo-
Soviet deliberation (demarche) and quickly summoned the 
entire German colony on 13* October, 1941. They were told 
that Berlin had agreed that they would be handed over to 
the British under the guarantee of safe passage and that 
they should pack with all speed lest the British should 
change their minds.^^ 
Acting very fast, the authorities had arranged the whole 
thing in a very short time. In less than a fortnight altogether 
204 German and Italian nationals had left for Peshawar in 
two batches, the first on 29* October and the second on 
38. India Office Records L/P & S/12/1778, Cf Kabul to London, 328 
of 27/9/1941. As examined by Hauner, op.cit., p. 319. 
39. Ibid , correspondence between India Office to Govt, of India file 
No. 10880 of 6/9/1941, repeated to Moscow & Kabul. 
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following day, to proceed from there to Karachi and further 
via Iraq and Turkey to an Axis controlled territory/^ 
Unexpectedly the whole matter of their expulsion was 
given wide publicity by the Afghan Government through 
broadcast on Kabul Radio and a print in daily Islah.^ ^ 
The Government of India were then convinced that the 
removal of Axis legation from Kabul was desirable.'*^ But the 
Government of India's utter cautiousness in the matter of 
getting rid of Axis legations and the advantages accrued 
from it, they insisted that India's war effort must not to be 
divested to a new Afghan War. 
40. See for details, correspondence from India Office to Government of 
India, Nos. 11231 & 21231 & 11263 of 13/9; also 
correspondence from Govt, of India to India Office, file No. 5023 
of 16/9, also to Foreign Minister to Kabul 299 of 19/9; Govt, of 
India to India Office, file No. 51545 of 21/99, Govt, of India to 
India Office file No. 11835 of 24/9; Kabul to London 318 of 19/ 
9; Kabul to London 337 of 3/10; Foreign Minister to Kabul 336 of 
4/10/1941. As cited in Woodward, L.E.; British Foreign Policy in 
the Second World War. 4 Vols. London, HMSO, 1970-5 Vol. II 
pp. 57-58. 
41. The British Cabinet papers, 68 files No. 68/8 W.P. (R) 41, 69. As 
examined & cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 324. 
42. See War Office London files No. 106/3767 Correspondence from 
Kabul to London No. 361 of 14/10/1941, No. 42 of 18/10/1941, 
Foreign Office, 371/31322, for the German reaction see, Pilger's 
despatches of 8/9 and 22/10/1941 in DGEP/0/XIII, Nos. 289 & 
398; Conversation between Hashem Khan and Pilger on 18/10/1941 
in German Foreign Office, 329/195510; Weizsacker (German 
Secretary of State to Pilger, file No.366 of 25/10/1941, and 
195505-06, See also The Times (London) of 21/16/1941. As 
cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 325. 
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Meanwhile, just concluded Loejirgah (Great Assembly) 
attended by 1150 delegates on 6th November 1941, had 
come with the resolution that "Afghanistan would not tolerate 
occupation of any part of her territory by another power, 
would under no circumstances allow other state to use her 
land and air routes, would not enter into any treaty which 
might prejudice her neutrality, and would preserve her right 
to maintain and establish diplomatic relations with any 
country she chose."^ ^ 
It was obvious that these provisions were intended to 
forestall the possibility of further Anglo-Soviet demands, and 
to make it clear to the Allies that any further more on their 
part which could have compromised Afghan Independence 
on neutrality, would meant war. 
But Wylie the British Minister at Kabul^^ though 
admitting the success of Loejirgah resolution, had continued 
to work for his objective of seeing the German and Italian 
legation closd. For that matter he had suggested a Tripartite 
43. Ibid., correspondence from Kabul to London, 371 of 18 Oct. 
1941, Govt, of India to India Office, No. 5861, See also The 
Times of 7 Nov. 1941, Out of 204 Anis nationals expelled 176 
were Germans, including 57 women and 12 children, the rest were 
Italians as compiled from Pilger correspondence file No. 337 in 
German Foreign Office 617/250053, General H.Q. Weekly 
Intelligence Summary of the North West Frontier and Afghanistan, 
file No. 46 ofl5 Nov. 1941, British Cabinet Papers file No. 68/8; 
w.P. (R) (41), No. 69, also Pilger, file No. 444 of 30/10 and No. 
462 of 8 Nov. 1941, German Foreign Office 329/195562 and 
250100). 
44. See, Islah 19 Oct., 1941, also Correspondence from Kabul to 
London, file No. 370, 374 & 375 of 17 and 19 Oct. 1941. 
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Alliance among Afghanistan, Britain and Soviet Union. 
The Wylie proposal had fallen flat as that was almost 
impractical due to Afghan dislike of "Godless Russia" and 
the Government of India was convinced that the Afghans 
would resist strongly any alliance with Soviet-Union. Though 
Wylie had contined to work over the Winter month of 1941/ 
42 on the future posibility of an Anglo-Soviet Afghan 
Alliance, which could work as a bulwark against the Axis 
designs, but without any success. Wylie's plan though not 
very acceptable. Government of India just wanted to give 
some technical help to Afghanistan (not the economic 
assistance which was needed most) for keeping some contact 
or in order to replace the contingent of Axis technical 
personnel.''^ 
Again it was the 'buffer state' diplomacy which the 
Government of India, thought better to continue. The only 
effective assistance they thought for Aghanistan was a gift 
of money (50,000 Pound, in instalments spread over two 
years) in order to help the royalty against any possible tribal 
uprising, or as a means to bribe the mullahs and tibal 
leaders in order to check the Axis activities and pro-
Amanullah elements. But as Afghan Premier Hashim Khan 
had replied" Afghanistan needed help in kind especially in 
forms of armaments.""^ 
Despite serious setbacks received by the Axis 
45. Correspondence from Govt, of India to India Office, No. 6338 of 
12 Nov. 1941. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 325. 
46. Ibid., Files regarding Military Intelligence, War Office London, 
Department responsible to India, 15 Nov. 1941. 
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conspirators in Logar valley incident, Hentig Affair and at on 
the issue of the expulsion of German nationals, their 
intrigues had continued. During the evacuation of the 
German nationals, the German legation had seriously 
considered leaving its abwehr (German Spy) agents behind. 
They were to have wireless contact with Germany and 
penetrate into the Afghan Army.'*^ The retention of Abwehr 
agents by the German legation in Kabul testified to the 
continuining interests of German War planners in India. 
The intelligence reports suggest that the British 
Intelligence tried hard to track down the leader of the 
remmaining contingent but none of the left German nationals 
deserved attention. In this regard Soviets also supplied 
information to the British which suggests of a possible link 
between the Soviets and the British Intelligence. 
Regardless of the strict control imposed by the Afghan 
authorities on the movements of foreigners outside Kabul. 
Indian intellingence believed that the Axis legations were still 
in communication with the Faqir of Ipi, and even with 
47. Loye Jirgah wa an medieval institution which may have comprised 
upto two thousand representativesof the various Afghan tribes. It 
met only three times between the two World Wars, the last time in 
1930, when Nadir Shah had summoned it to acclaim his right to 
throne. About 1150 delegates had met on 6th Nov. 1941 and had 
to be entertained in Kabul at Government expenses. See for more 
details, correspondence from Kabul to London., file No. 410 & 421 
of 10 and 18 Nov. 1941; Kabul Weekly Inteligence Summary, No. 
46 of 15 Nov. 1941 in Foreign Office (London) 371/37322, War 
Office 208/773. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 326. 
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certain Afridi tribesmen. The Italians and the Germans were 
reported to have supplied money (Rs. 300,000 by Italians) 
arms and wireless sets/* 
By 1943 Indian intelligence had estimated that the Faqir 
must have accrued about a half million Afghanis paid to him 
through the Axis legation.''^ But a more fair picture of 
Faquir's fortune emerges through British intelligence sources, 
which indicated that Faquir's fortune was not that high as it 
was made out to be.^° 
In December 1941 some agents gave to the British with 
doubtful information about "two Germans mechanics with the 
Faquir of Ipi who had escaped from Iran.^' Despite the 
setbacks and rapidly deteriorating Axis position in 
Afghanistan, preparation for a"bigger action" condenamed 
48. Correspondence from Kabul to London, file No. 315 of 14 Sept., 1941, 
Cf also Foreign Minister to Kabul file No. 299 of 19 Sep. 1941. As died 
in Hauner, op.cit., p. 327. 
49. Ibid., General Headquarter Weekly. Intelligence Summary of NWF and 
Afghanistan No. 43 of 11 Nov. 1941, para, 6 & 7 also, India Office 
to Govt, oflndia. No. 12109 of 30 Sep 1941, Foreign Minister to 
Kabul 331 of 30 Sep 1941; Govt, of India to India Office No. 25 
Oct. 1941, Foreign Minister Kabul to 3759 of 26 Oct., 1941. 
50. Correspondence by Pilger file No. 347 of 17 Sep. 1941, German 
Forcing Office 329/195518. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 329. 
51. See Army & Air Headquarter Intelligence Weekly Summary of NWF & 
Afghanisatn file No. 37, 19 Sept 1941, also Communication between 
Directory of Information Bureau, Delhi and I.P.L. 9-10, /10/1941 P(s) 
2293/1941, in lOR L/P & S/12. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 331. 
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"Tiger" were speeded up meant for wider sabotage action." 
The operation remained in force even after the expulsion 
of the Axis nationals from Afghanistan, and was still on the 
agenda during the following year, when it must have been 
obvious that the chances of its success were becoming more 
and more remote." 
After another failure the Abwehr decided in Oct 1941 
to switch the destination of the planned operation from the 
NWF to Soviet Turkistan. The TIGER Unit under captain 
Walter Harbich being at the time about 70 men strong, was 
to be complimented by Turkomen prisoners of war.*'* 
In between emerged the Turanian question for liberation, 
a situation of discomfiture for the Soviet's. It was a linked 
issue with Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism. Around 80,000 
52. See Files for Foreign Office London, 371/34928; Activities of the Faquir 
of Ipi, Gen. HQ. Weekly Intell. Summary of NWF & Afghanistan, No. 
45 of 14 Nov. 1941. No. 2 of 15 No. 1942, No. II of 20th March 
1942, No. 13 of 4th AprU 1942, Kabul Weekly Intell. Summary No. 
2 of 16/3, 1943 No. 5 of 5 Feb. 1943, No. 7 of 19 Dec. 1943. As 
cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 332. 
53. Ibid., India Office Records, R/12/1/22, Statement of Ghulam Qadir, 
Nizam Bazar, Bannu, dt. 6/5/1943; Statement of Ghulam Qadir 
resident of Karachi, aeroplane mechanic dated 22 July 1944, Sir 
Francis Whylie expressed his emphatic disbeUef in the existence of 
"two Germans at Katawaz, as alleged by the Peshawar Intelligence 
Summaries to D. Pilditch DIB, Delhi, dated 11 Oct. 1942, 10/2 
and 10th March 1943, in Foreign Office 371/34920, E 2649/86/97, 
I0RL/P&S/12 1928. 
54. See Minutes of meeting held on 11/8/1941 between the Foreign 
Office and the Abwehr agents. German Foreign Office 4748 H/ 
233480. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 332. 
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Turkick refugees lived in Afghanistan and there were various 
elements supporting their cause alongside of the Axis 
elements. One Syed Mubashir Tirazi (an official in Royal 
Secretariat in Kabul) in 1942 had risen to champion the 
cause of Pan-Turanism. Continuing his plan he had written 
to several supporters of the Bukhara-Mohajir Association' in 
Delhi apparently asking them for assistance in liberating 
Russian-Turkistan from the Soviet rule. In Nov. 1942 he had 
instructed the Association to develop branches in various 
Indian cities, and contacted the President and the Secretary 
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulmai-e-Hind, the Muslim Section which at 
the time still co-operated with the Indian National Congress 
Party. The Government of India had immediately sensed 
subversion when they had intercepted Tirazi's corresondence 
and claimed confirmation of German backing of the whole 
scheme.^^ 
The Tirazi affair whose importance was certainly inflated 
by India's domestic insecurity, offered a pretext for second 
Anglo-Soviet intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. That 
had resulted in Tirazi's arrest in April 1943 and further allied 
pressure, particularly by the Soviet Ambessador who had 
presented a list of 51 suspects.^^ Thus it was also partly 
55. See Auslandsorganisation (Foreign Organisation)/Abwehr II/SOS 
2396/41 g of 4 Nov. 1941; Instruction to send Abwehr agents -
Dohl. and Witzel from Kabul to the NWF. As cited in Hauner, 
op.cit., p. 333. 
56. Lahousen Erwin, Colonel, Head of Abwehr II, Entry, 23 Oct. 
1941, p. 176. 
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thanks to the Anglo Soviet co-operation in intelligence 
matters, however paradoxical it might sound in a different 
context that the British Raj had been fortified and 
approaches to the Sub-Continent safeguarded againts the 
intrigues of a hostile power. 
The chief contact between the Axis legation and India 
had remained, however, Bhagat Ram alias Rahmat Khan, a 
young communist sympathieser from the NWF Province, 
escorted Subhash Chandra Bose (the Indian revolutionary 
leader) from Peshawar to Kabul. He was a trusted name 
among the conspirators and particulatly the Italians and the 
German legations reposed a lot of faith in him. With Uttam 
Chand, Harvinder Singh Sondhi (a Punjabi Communist, who 
was trained in Moscow), Santimoy Ganguli (a Bengali 
terrorist) he was to co-ordinate all such activities. Uttam 
Chand was an Indian Political refugee in Kabul, who had 
been expelled in May 1942 by the Afghan authorities acting 
under British pressure. He was then duly arrested and 
interrogated by the Peshawar Police and remained 
imprisioned, for the rest of the War period.^^ Rahmat Khan 
continued to be the source of information used for 
subversive activities. He had supplied the Axis legation with 
57. See, Note by Wilhelm Keppler, Sec. of State "for special duties" in 
German Foreign Office of 15th Oct. 1942, on the possibility of 
regular contacts between Tirazi (codenamed Hansa') and the Grand 
Mufti of India.' Also collated files an "Axis Intrigues" in Afghanistan 
in I0R:L/P&S/12 1778, 1799 & 1933, MI.l file "Axis conspiracy 
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the information of military importance concerning 
recruitments, troops movement and fortification being built in 
the passes which guarded the approaches to India from 
Afghanistan.^* 
With the Russian winter approaching which had halted 
the German advances before Moscow and the new and 
more imminent threat coming from the East where the 
Japanese finally had decided to launch their own concerted 
attack against the Allies, the attention of the major powers 
had turned away from Afghanistan. While still fearing the 
Soviets as their main enemy, the Afghans had showed no 
particular admiration for the Japanes. The criticism of the 
British for their lack of farsight in sufficiently protecting 
their Far-Eastern possession, was mingled with a strong 
sense of relief that the chances of a British invasion of 
Afghanistan, so much alive in the Autumn had now become 
more remote. For the internal situation, even on the NWF as 
the active zone prone to happenings had remained 
surprisingly quite. If there were any warnings about Axis 
intrigues and agents ready to start trouble on the frontier 
(continued from previous page) in Afghanistan' lOR is L & S/12/ 
1798, 1799 & 1933, MI 2, File "Axis Conspiracies in Afghanistan 
(in War Office in 208/30) especially Govt, of India No. 3682 to 
India Office, 10th May 1943, Wylie to Caroe, No. 42 of 29 May 
1943 (lOR L/P/S/12/1789). As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 334. 
58. See files containing Interview between the Soviet Ambassador and 
the Prime Minister Hashim 8 June 1943, War Office 208/30. As 
cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 335. 
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and in India itself, nothing had stopped so far. 
For the notorious Faquir of Ipi, he remained (during 
those dramatic months) in seclusion on the British side of 
the Durand Line at Gorwekht, despite alleged German 
intention to induce him into action. In one of his letters to 
mullahs in Southern Waziristan which came to the knowledge 
of Indian intelligence he stated while continuing to vilify the 
British, that no help should begiven to the Germans they 
were apposed to Islam.^ ^ Thus by close of 1941 the Afghan 
saw the future of their neutrality in somewhat brighter colour. 
They hoped that with the skillful diplomacy they might 
endure the war with their neutrality unscathed. 60 
59. See Headquarter India Weekly Intell. Summary of NWF and 
Afghanistan, No. 24 of 19/6/1942, Pilger No. 369 and 884 of 26/ 
5 and 3/6/1942, German Foreign Office, 6/7/250/82, 250192, See 
also Uttam Chand's Testimony to the Indian Police in War Office 
208/733) also, German Foreign Office 617/250006; Talwar P. 129, 
Uttam Chand's Testimony, Sondhi, was reportedly arrested in March 
1942, Pilger No. 579 of 23/8/1942, German Foreign Office 195/ 
139865, Talwar. p. 131, See also S. Ganguli's Statement in S.C. 
Bose, (Ed.) Netaji and India's Freedom. Proceeding of the 
International Netaji Seminar 1973, Cal. 1975, pp. 243-248, Ganguli 
was arrested in Nov. 1942. 
60. See Pilger the Grman Minister to Kabul, No. 352, 372, & 375 of 
20/9 and 1/10/1941, GFO 617/250035-6, 250039-42, As cited in 
Hauner, op.cit., p. 335. 

CHPATER-VII 
CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan emerged successful, in warding off the 
threats of European Imperialism during the 19* Century and 
the first quarter of the 20**' century. Its unique tribal 
apparatus of fighting its location and topography along with 
the love for freedom enabled it to save itself. During the 
first half of the 20* century through diplomacy and policy 
of "neutrality" in between the competing great powers, 
Afghanistan managed to keep them at bay. 
Unlike the numerous Afro-Asian countries, who could 
not withstand the colonial advances; Afghanistan managed to 
survive the severest of the onslaught from the two great 
powers Great Britain and Russia during the 19* century; 
their rivalry had seen the drama on the Central Asian stage 
the so called Great Game. The Russian desired to get 
access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the 
British for safeguarding their prized colonial possession the 
British India, impelled them to have control over Afghanistan. 
No denying the fact that other important reason for her 
success in staving off the foreign domintion were the 
strategic location, the difficult terrain skillful tribal militia and 
the fighting spirit of the major tribes (Pushtuns, Uzbecks) of 
Afghanistan. The British could not get foothold on Afghan 
terrritory through two full scale Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1842 
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and 1888. The skillful diplomacy of the Afghan Amirs during 
the 19* century, also helped them to not to fall prey to 
one of the two fighting powers. Though the British had 
managed to have some say in the Afghan foreign affairs 
during the closing quarters of the 19* century. 
Afghanistan had managed to reduce their infleunce 
through the "Policy of isolationism" and by taking ful control 
of the Afghan forcing policy during the period roughly from 
1880-1919. The Afghan Amirs had managed to have full 
control over their affairs, away from outside interference. For 
the above odd forty years Afghanistan had resisted British 
advances in the country which was not only in terms of 
military but also through economic concession, (subsidies 
etc.) extension of rail-raods and telegraph lines deep upto 
the Afgahn territories and through the bribing of the tribal 
chiefs. The subsidy factor was one of the most important 
ploy for the British as the cash starved Afghan royalty was 
always in need of the hard currency. The British had used 
cash in buying off certain tribal chiefs and proteges in order 
to penetrate into the ranks and files of the Afghan elite. 
In maintining Afghan political independence Afghanistan 
had to pay dearly as the country had to make a number of 
compromises in regard to its foreign relations with the 
British and later on through the acceptance of much hated 
Durand line as the boundary between Afghanistan and the 
British India during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. 
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Beyond that through isolationalism (a policy which 
Afghanistan often pursued) was a successful weapon in 
warding off any outside vested interests, the same was very 
i.e. detrminetal to the socio-economic developement of the 
country (of which the economy was never looking up). 
The Afghan state found herself culturally politically as 
well as economically isolated. Her isolation was also due to 
Afghanistan being the landlocked country. 
Not only the external aggression but also internal forces 
of dissension and disturbances due to its regressive tribal 
social set-up, Afghans rarely saw peace. The Afghan rulers 
found it equally tough to rule the country which was a 
hetrogenous ethnic tribal state, where a majority of the 
populace show loyalty to their chiefs (Sirdars) and where 
religious bigotry not rationalism played important role in 
shaping the destiny of the nation. 
Whenever, any modern and forward progressive looking 
rulers tried to work for developments. He had to face stiff 
resistance and severe opposition. In glaring case of Amir 
AmanuUah the same forces had tried to block all his 
modernisation plan and ultimately that cost his throne. 
Though his continued modernisation programme is rightly 
termed as "defensive modernisation" by Cyril Black in his 
work. "Dynamics of Modernization" (pp 121 ff). On the 
other hand it is true that the same modernization was a 
necessity for political unification of the country and for 
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consolidation of power at the centre apart from a degree of 
military and economic self sufficiency. With the emergence of 
various new elements, developments taking place after the 
World War I the Anglo Afghan relations passed on from 
conventional pro-British Afghan policy to the aggressive anti-
imperialism and particularly anti-British. Amir Amanullah for 
the first time championed the cause of Afghanistan's total 
independence both internally as well as externally and called 
for removing any sign of British domination. The resultant 
acrimony between the two neighbours i.e Afghanistan and the 
British India, led to the outbreak of so called War of 
Independence in 1919. Though the war a military stalemate, 
the Afghan diplomatic circle claimed that to be a big 
diplomatic win. That was humiliation for the mighty British 
empire and thus a turning point in the Anglo-Afghan 
diplomatic relations. Though that was hardly beneficial for 
the poor nation of Afghans to continue without the help and 
the assistance of the old neighbour. As the relation with the 
British empire strained the problems for Amir Amanullah had 
compounded. Then he had to fight with the external as well 
as internal forces of dissension which were obviously 
fomented through outside suppport as various documents 
suggest. The turmoil and regression continued throughout his 
short nine years reign and ultimately with the outside help 
and support the regressive forces prevailed over the 
reforming zeal and thus his final ouster. 
Bacchae-Saqqao's take over symbolises the very nature 
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of disintegrative state where the kind of tribal pattern is the 
natural breeding ground for such dissension. Though against 
majority Pushtun domination no leadership from other tribes 
could have prevailed but the attempt to modernise the 
medieval oriented state had received severe jolt and the 
whole edifice established by Amir AmanuUah had fallen flat 
due to the tribal onslaught and other orthodox elements 
oppose to his radical views. Though Baccha's reign was of 
around six months but he had rolled back Afghanistan to 
about a century. 
Afghanistan after Amanullah was in grip of anarchy due 
to Bachha's not being a Pushtun and his unpopularity. In 
the ensuing civil war he miserably failed and the mantle 
passed on to the powerful Musahiban faimly which was laid 
by Nadir Shah. The British were also looking for a suitable 
leadership in Afghanistan and more a pro-British one. Since 
Nadir Shah feared a return of Ex-Amir Amanullah and more 
uprising, he found more reason in thinking a pro-British 
policy for Afghanistan. That was the need of the hour too, 
as Afghanistan was severly facing financial crunches and 
arms and amunition were urgently needed. Unfortunately he 
had also fallen to the designs of recalcitrant elements. 
The period of Zahir Shah's reign had heralded a period 
of lasting internal peace in Afghanistan and a more 
pronounced foreign policy towards the British, based upon 
mutual trust and goodwill. Though Afghanistan declared its 
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total neutrality in that regard. Due to the complex 
international scenario as the Nazi Germany had a showdown 
with the Allies, Afghanistan was found in the web of 
international conspiracies and intrigues. All these powers 
involved in the World War II had desired to launch their 
propaganda and war efforts from Afghanistan. The design 
was due to the strategic location of Afghanistan and its 
suitablity for any of the warring party to launch military 
onslaught or war propaganda. Zahir Shah was under 
tremendous pressure as all the powers involved had started 
inducement process. But for his astute diplomatic move he 
saw the better of Afghanistan in the neutrality stand. By this 
way Afghanistan was saved from turning into the battle-
ground of Central Asia and thus it emerged unscathed from 
the destructive World War II under the able leadership of 
King Zahir Shah. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX -1 
AFGHAN RULERS (1919-1947) 
AmirAmanullah (1919-1929) 
AmirHabibullah(Baccha-e-Saqqao) (Jan. 17, 1929-Oct. 13, 1929) 
King Nadir Shah 1929-1933 
King Zahir Shah 1933-1947 onwards 
*** Sardar Nasrullah Khan was king for about five days in Feb. 
1919 and Sardar Inayatullah Khan was king for three days in 
Jan 1929. 
VICEROYS (BRITISH INDIA 1916-1947) 
Lord Chelmsford 1916-1921 
Lord Reading 1921-1926 
Lord Irwin 1926-1931 
Lord Wellingdon 1931-1936 
Lord Linlithgow 1936-1943 
LordWavell 1943-1947 
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APPENDIX - II 
NADIR SHAH CABINET 
(Islah No. 6 as on Nov. 14,1929) 
Sardard Mohd. Hashim Khan 
Sardar Shah Mohamud Khan 
Faiz Muhamad Khan 
Hazrat Sher Agha 
Muhamad Ayyub Khan 
Ali Muhammad Khan 
Haji Muhammad Akbar Khan 
Ahmad Shah Khan 
Muhammad Akbar Khan 
Muhammad Yaqub Khan 
Undersecretaries : 
General Muhammad Gul Khan 
General Muhammad Hashim 
Mirza Muhammad Khan 
Adam Khan 
Mir Ata Muhammad Khan 
Mirza Muhammad Hussain Khan 
Muhammad Husain Khan 
Ghulam Muhayyuddin Khan 
Premier & Minister of Interior 
War Minister 
Foreign Minister 
Minister of Justice 
Minister of Finance 
Minister of Education 
Minister of Commerce 
Minister of Court 
Independent Mudir Director 
of Medical Department 
Wali (Governor of Kabul). 
To the Premier 
To the War Minister 
To the Foreign office 
To the Minister of Interior 
To the Minister of Justice 
To the Minister of Finance 
To the Minister of Commerce 
To the Minister of Court 
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APPENDIX - III 
Heads of the N.W. Frontier Province (1901-1947) 
Chief Commissioners : 
Sir Harold Deane 1901-1908 
Sir George Roos-Keppel 1908-1919 
Sir Namllor Grant 19199-1921 
Sir Lord Maffey (Lord Rughby) 1921-1923 
Sir Norman Bolton 1923-1930 
Sir Stuart Pears 1930-1931 
Sir Ralph Griffith 1931-1932 
Governors: 
Sir Ralph Griffith 1932-1937 
Sir George Cunningham 1937-1946 
SirOlafCaroe 1946-1947 
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APPENDIX - IV (A) 
Foreign Legations and Embassies in Afghanistan (1919-1947) 
British: 
Sir Fransis Humphsrys Jan 27, 1922- Feb., 1929 
Sir Richard Maconachie March 2, 1930 
Lt.Col. W.K. Fraser-Tytler 1935 
Sir Francis Wylie 1941 
Sir Giles Fredrick Squire 1943 
Soviet Union : 
K.Bravin Sep., 1919 
Z. Suritz 1919 
F. Raskolinkov 1921 
Leonide Stark 1924 
Boris E.M.Skvisky 1936 
Constantine Mikhailov Alexandrovich 1938 
IvanBakulin 1944 
Sinlovski Ivan Vasilovich 1947 
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German : 
Fritz Grobba 
August Fogel 
Baron Von Plessen 
Herbert Schworbei 
Kurte Ziemke 
Hans Pilger 
Turkey : 
Abdur Rahman Beg Peshawari 
Fakhir Pasha 
Nabil Bey 
Yusuf Hikmet Bey 
Mamduh Shevket 
Kemal Ko Pruln 
Ahmad Cevad Ustun 
U.S. : 
Charles W. Thayer 
Cornelius Van Engert 
Ely E. Patmer 
Dec ,1923 
1926 
Feb. 27-Aug 4, 1929 
May 2, 1931 
1933 
1936-1945 
1921 
1922 
1926 
1928,1930 
1933 
1942 
1945 
1942 
1942 
1945-1948 
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APPENDIX - IV (B) 
AFGHANISTAN LEGATIONS AND EMBASSIES ABROAD 
LONDON : 
Marshal Shah Wali Khan Ghazi 
Ahmad Ali Sulaiman 
Ali Muhammad Khan 
Ahmad Ali Sulaiman 
Sardar Mohd. Naim Khan 
PARIS : 
Ahmad Ali Khan Sulaiman 
Marshall Shah Wali Khan Ghazi 
Sardar Moh. Daud Khan 
BERLIN : 
Abdul Haq Dawi 
Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi 
Sardar Muhamd Aziz Khan 
ROME : 
Abdul Husain Aziz 
Muhammad NaimKhan 
Muhammad Akbar Khan 
Abdul Samad Khan 
Muhammad Akram Nur 
MOSCOW : 
Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan 
Abdul Husain Aziz 
Sultan Ahmad Sherzoy 
Mohd. Nauroz Khan 
ANKARA: 
Ghulam Nabi Charkhi 
Sultan Ahmad Sherzoy 
Paiz Muhammad Zakaria 
Muhammad Akbar Nur 
1930 
1931 
1933 
1938 
1945-1948 
1929 
1931 
1948-1949 
1929 
1931 
1933-1945 
1930 
1932 
1935 
1936 
1946-47 
1929 
1933 
1937 
1946 
1929 
1930 
1938 
1948 
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APPENDIX - V 
THE DURRANI RULERS OF AFGHANISTAN 
SADDOZAIS 
Ahmad Shah 
(1747-1773) 
TimurShah 
(1773-1793) 
26 sons 
1st wife 
Shah Zaman * Shah Shuia + 
1793-1800 1803-1809 
1839-1842 
2nd wife 
Shah Mahmud 
1800-1803 
1809-1818 
MUHAMMAD ZAIS 
Sultan Muhammad Khan 
50 sons 
Dost Muhammad Khan 
Afzal Azim Sher Ali 
1863-65 
1869-78 
Yaqub Khan 
1878-1879 
Ayub Khan 
Abdur Rahman 
1881-1901 
Habibullah 
1901-1919 
Amanullah 
1919-1929 
Nadir Shah + 
1929-1933 
Zahir Shah o 
1933-1973 
Mohd. Aziz 
Daud Khan 
1973-1978 
+ Assassinated 
* Blinded 
o Exiled 
~ Abdicated 
O Those who ruled are under lined; only the principle characters are identified. 
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APPENDIX - VI 
AFGHANISTAN 
Rivers and Mountains 
Mountains : 
Hindkush, Kohewakhan, Kohe-Safed, Kohe-Siah, Kohe-
Baba, Kohe-Firoz, Kohe-Safi, Kujad, Buland Takhti-Millak, 
Baghlan, Qara Batur, Chunghar, Markhana, Almortak, Abarz, 
Khwaja Ghar, Koh-e-Malmand, Regarawan Ghar, Kohe-Tirban, 
Kohe-Malik Dokan, Paghman, Sher Darwaza, Maqsud Ghar, 
Ziarat Ghar, Hada Ghar, Iwarghar, Shamshad. 
Rivers : 
Landay Seen, Kunar River, River Fogar, Panjshir, Tagab, 
Nejrab, Hari Rud, Farahrud, Helmand, Murghab. Kokcha, 
Panj-Murghab, Pule-Khumri, Andrab. Balkh, Oxus, (which 
form the Afghan-Soviet Border) Band-i-Amir (Lakes), Kalu 
Shabar, Bamyan, Kashrud, Rod Fars, Rod Shin, Daud, 
Mahmud Rod, Rod Yazd, Dagh Namd (lake). Maymana, 
Qaiser, Shirin Tagab, Ghani, Rod Shakar, Rod Sarpank, Rod 
Khamshor, Rud Musa Qala, Rod-Bani, Rod Shorab, Gazrod, 
Saropul, Dori Rod, Salsoon, Maroof Nawa.Kunar, Alishang, 
Logar. 
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APPENDIX - VII 
SPOKEN LANGUAGES OF AFGHANISTAN 
1. Iranian Languages : 
(i) Persian (ii) Pushtu (iii) Baluchi 
2. Pamir Languages : 
(i) Shughri Roshni (ii) Wakhi (iii) Murzi-Yidgha 
(iv) Ishkashmi 
3. Other : 
(i) Ormuri (ii) Parachi 
4. Dadric - Kafir Languages : 
(i) Kati (ii) Waigeh 
(iii) Ashkun (iv) Prasun (v) Gwar-Bati (vi) Tirahi 
5. Turkic Languge : 
(i) Uzbeck (ii) Turkomen (iii) Kirghiz 
6. Others : 
(i) Mangolian (ii) Kurdish (iii) Arabic (iv) Lahnda 
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APPENDIX - VIII 
SHORT SKETCHES OF PERSONALITIES INVOLVED 
INANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS (1919-1947) 
Caroe. Olaf, KCIE (1892-1981) Governor of North West 
Frontier Province, 1946-1947. THE PATHANS 
(London, 1958). 
CunnJgham. Sir George. FCIE, CSI, QBE (1888-1964) 
Governor of North-West Frontier Province (1937-
1946), DIARIES. 
Gurzon of Kedleston. Lord George. KG, GCSI, GCIE 
(1859-1925) Undersecretary of India (1891-92), 
Viceroy of India (1898-1905). 
Dundas. Sir Ambrose: KCIE, CSI, (1899-1973), Residents in 
Waziristan (1941-1943) Governor of North West 
Frontier Province (1948-1949). 
Durand. Sir Mortimer. GCMG, KCSI, KCIE (1850-1924). 
Actively involved in British Diplomacy. The famous 
Durand Line is associated with him. 
Fraser-Tvtler. W.K. KBE, CMG, CB, British Minister at 
Kabul. AFGHANISTAN Oxford, 1956. 
Hamilton. Lord G.F. (1845-1927) Secretary of State for India 
(1895-1903). 
Emerson. Herbert. QBE (b. 1907) joinded ICS 1930; IPS 
1935. in NWFP Assistant Commissioner Nowshera, 
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1937; Assistant Political Agent at Southern 
Wazirstanl937, Assistant Commissioner Manshera 
1940, Secretary to the Governor of North West 
Frontier Province 1941. 
McMahan. Col. Sir Arthur Henry. GCVO, KCIE, CSI, 
(1862-1944) in North West Frontier Province. 
Political Agents, Gilgit (1897-1898); Political Agent 
Dir, Swat and Chitral (1899-1901). 
Roos Keppel. Sir George. GCIE, KCSI, (1866-1921) In 
North West Frontier Province; Indian Army, Kurram 
Militia (1893-1897); Political Agent Khyber 1899, 
Comandant Khyber Rifles 1903; Chief Commissioner 
North West Frontier Province (1908-1919). 
Barkatullah (d. 1928) Indian Revolutionary. Founding member 
of Pan-Aryan Society, Prof, of Urdu in Tokyo 
edited Islamic Fraternity, formed Provisional 
Government of India at Kabul. 
Pratap. Raia Mahendra (1886-1982). Indina Revolutionary and 
an active member of Provisional Government of 
India formed at Kabul. 
Zahir Shah. King of Afghanistan (1933-1973) succeeded to 
the throne after Nadir Shah's death, at an early 
age of 13 years. Brought peace and stability in 
Afghanistan. 
Wvlie. Sir Francis - British Minister in Kabul, active during 
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World War II, acted for Anglo-Soviet patch up and 
was instrumental in causing explusion of Axis 
nationals from Afghanistan. 
Uttam Chand - Indian Revolutionary active in North West 
Frontier Province acted as spy. 
Shami Pir Al Geilani - Syrian adventurer in Afghanistan, had 
acquired immense popularity due to his saintliness 
and was instrumental in uprisings in North West 
Frontier Province. Anti imperial and anti British later 
turned against Germans too. 
Ribbentrop. Von Dr. - German Foreign Minister during World 
War II. 
Rahmat Khan, (real name Bhagat Ram) - Instrumental in 
subversive activities in North West Frontier Province 
and used to provide shelter to other revolutionary, 
had escorted Subhash Chandra Bose to Afghanistan. 
Quoarani. Pietro: Italian Minister in Kabul, had proposed 
close German Italian cooperation as War effort, 
wanted to pursue the reinstatement of Ex-Amir 
Amanullah. 
Pi 1 gen Dr. Hans - German Minister in Kabul. 
NiederMaver. Dr. Oskar Von. (A Bavarian German Officer), 
A prominent member to the Turko - German 
Mission to Kabul during World War I in 1915 for 
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inducing Afghanistan to side with the Central 
Powers in the War. Attempted to mobilize the 
Afghan tribesmen, in order to tie up British and 
Russian forces in that area. 
Nadir Shah (1929-1933) King of Afghanistan, had taken over 
after a Civil War in Afghanistan which had ousted 
Amir Amanullah and had provided chance to a 
bandit named Bacche Saqqao to occupy Kabul. 
After the Civil War Nadir had replaced Bacche 
Saqqao. Ruled for a short period of 4 years. 
Lawrance T.E. of Arabia (the famous British Agent and 
spy) Instrumental in causing immense damages to 
the Central Powers in Middle East and the allegedly 
brought the fall of King Amanullah. 
IPI. Faquir of (Mirza Ali) - Self Styled tribal leader from 
Waziristan acquired reputation of saintiliness, 
emerged powerful religious leader and Chanmipn of 
Islam against the British Imperialism. Operated 
actively against the British interest in the North 
West Frontier Province from 1936. 
Hashim Khan, Mohammad - Afghan Prime Minister (1929-1946) 
brother of King Nadir Shah from Yahya Khel tribe. 
Habibullah. Amir of Afghanistan (1901-1919). Succeeded 
father Amir Abdur Rahman, assasinated while on 
hunting trip, with Pro-British leanings. 
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Grobba. Dr. Fritz. German Charge d' Affair in Kabul from 
Dec. 1923, instrumental in increasing German 
pressure in Afghanistan and setting up large number 
of German Colonies. 
Ghulam. Siddiq Khan, Afghan Diplomat and Foreign Minister 
in Berlin under Amir Amanullah Khan, executed on 
the charge of murdering King Nadir Shah's eldest 
brother. 
Anzillotti. Enrico, the Italian spy who had been busy in 
subversive activities in Afghanistan against the 
British interests and had contact with Faquir of Ipi 
in the North West Frontier. 
Amanullah. Amir of Afghanistan (1919-1929), succeeded his 
father Amir Habibullah, Anti-Imperial and Anti-British 
leanings. Pro Pan-Islamic, champion of moderni-
zation in Afghanistan, succumbed to the tribal revolt 
and fled the country in 1929. 
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